Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2000

The Overproduction of Death
James S. Liebman
Columbia Law School, jliebman@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV 2030 (2000).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/118

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

THE OVERPRODUCTION OF DEATH
James S. Liebman*
In this Article, Professor Liebman concludes that trial actors have
strong incentives to-and do-overproduce death sentences, condemning to
death men and women who, understate substantive law, do not deserve that
penalty. Because trial-levelprocedural rights do not weaken these incentives
or constrain the overproduction that results, it falls to post-trial procedural
review-which is ill-suited to the task and fails to feed back needed information to the trial level-to identify the many substantive mistakes made at
capital trials. This system is difficult to reform because it benefits both prodeath penalty trial actors (who generate more death sentences than otherwise)
and anti-deathpenalty lawyers (who concentrate their resources on post-trial
review proceedings where, given high rates of trial error, they prevail abnormally often). Reforms that focus only on trials or appeals cannot solve the
problem. Professor Liebman offers a comprehensive 10-part plan to adjust
the skewed incentives and curb the overproduction of death.
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[W]e have constructed a [capital punishment] machine that is
extremely expensive, chokes our legal institutions, visits repeated trauma on victims' families and ultimately produces
nothing like the benefits we would expect from an effective system of capital punishment. This is surely the worst of all worlds.
-

Hon. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher1

[W]ho chose this system?
-

Jordan Steiker2

INTRODUCTION

This Article considers the relationship between substance and procedure in death penalty and habeas corpus law. 3 Since the 1960s, a crucial
1. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, For an Honest Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1995, at A21 [hereinafter Kozinski & Gallagher, Honest Death Penalty].
2. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism,
1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 315, 318 [hereinafter Steiker, Excessive Proceduralism].
3. Also exploring this relationship are, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence
Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with Federal
Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 Ind. L.J. 817, 822, 831-34 (1993) (decrying the
Supreme Court's "overconfidence in the value of procedures," including both death
sentencing and habeas corpus procedures, to cure substantive defects in undeserved
convictions and death sentences, and calling for a "frontal assault on the process
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assumption has driven all efforts, however motivated, to reform capital
punishment and habeas corpus law. According to that assumption, criminal procedural rights and substantive capital punishment have a zero-sum
relationship: Expanding procedural rights-particularly the right to a
post-conviction or habeas corpus procedure for enforcing other rightsfrustrates the death penalty. Contracting criminal procedural rightsparticularly habeas review-permits capital punishment to flourish.
This assumption appears to have considerable basis in fact. The abolition and procedural rights campaigns launched by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund (the "Fund") in the mid-1960s initially
succeeded in securing enhanced procedural protections for capital and
other criminal defendants. These protections indeed led, first, to a moratorium, and then, in 1972, to a ban on executions under pre-existing
death penalty statutes. Even after many states began adopting new statutes in 1973, the Fund's continuing procedural successes coincided with
the limitation of executions to none or only a few a year for a decade.
But when the Supreme Court began scaling back the procedures for enforcing criminal procedural rights in the mid-1980s, the number of executions rose.
This Article, however, presents evidence revealing how thoroughly
our actual system of capital punishment belies the traditional zero-sum assumption. In the guise of enforcing criminal procedural rights, our posttrial review processes in fact have come to play an essential role in the
substantive determination of who lives and who dies. Trial-level actors
drastically overproduce death sentences (two to six or more for every one
the system means to carry out), foisting on post-trial courts the
prodigiously expensive task, for which they are unsuited, of winnowing
out the excess sentences. With little resistance from defense lawyers at
trial, and with the unwitting connivance of the anti-death penalty bar
thereafter, 4 police, prosecutors, judges, and juries operate with strong incentives to generate as many death sentences as they can-reaping robust
psychic, political, and professional rewards-while displacing the costs of
their many consequent mistakes onto capital prisoners, post-trial review
courts, victims, and the public.
In the wake of public outcry over both the length of the capital appeals process and the number of high-profile reversals of death sentences
based on actual innocence and other serious trial errors, legislatures have
begun contemplating reforms designed to correct this overproduction.
orientation of modern Eighth Amendment law");Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz,
Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 65, 113-14 (urging the Court to expand
habeas review of criminal cases in which there is a showing of actual innocence and to
contract review in cases in which there is no issue of actual innocence); Steiker, Excessive
Proceduralism, supra note 2, at 320 (proposing the elimination of "many of the purely
procedural questions in federal habeas law"); infra note 261 (citing other sources).
4. I have been a member of that bar since 1979, when I began a six-year stint with the
Fund.
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But these reforms rarely attack the skewed incentive system that permits,
and even encourages, the overproduction of death sentences. What is
needed to curb this overproduction is a comprehensive and integrated
set of reforms designed to realign the incentives and rationalize the
system.
Part I of this Article reprises the evidence understood to establish a
relationship between enhanced procedural rights and a less robust system
of capital punishment. Part II looks beyond this superficial evidence and
discovers a system in which an elaborate but overtaxed post-trial review
process is substantively crucial because participants on both sides have
conspired to reward trial-level actors for every death sentence they secure,
including substantively erroneous ones, while failing to provide any
meaningful constraints to counter the pull of those rewards. Part III examines existing reform efforts, contending that, alone, they cannot accomplish the much needed task of forcing trial-level actors to bear the
costs of their mistakes. Part III concludes with a proposal to do just that,
in the process requiring states to stand and answer the question "Who
chose this system, and who will take responsibility for fixing it?"
I.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND THE DIFFERENCE DEATH MAKES

A. More Procedures, Less CapitalPunishment (1965-1983)
In the mid-1960s, Fund lawyers devised a two-pronged litigation campaign to convince the Supreme Court to abolish the death penalty. 5 The
Fund modeled the first prong of its campaign, which directly pursued the
judicial abolition of the death penalty, on the line of cases culminating in
Brown v. Board of Education,6 in which the Fund convinced the Supreme
Court to abolish state-mandated school segregation. 7 Aware that the abolition campaign might fail in the short run, the Fund supplemented it
with a second strategy that is less well-documented and is the focus of this
section. This second part of the Fund's plan was aimed at expanding
criminal procedural protections and liberalizing the habeas corpus process for enforcing those protections." The Fund modeled this part of its
campaign on three separate lines of cases in which the Court had expanded criminal procedural rights in capital cases, leading immediately,
or at least eventually, to their expansion in noncapital cases as well. As is
described below, the second prong of the Fund's campaign was only
partly designed to achieve some residual procedural benefit, in the event
that the Fund's primary, substantively focused strategy failed. In addition, the second prong was designed to contribute to the penalty's medium-term demise if the primary strategy failed to succeed on its own in
5. See Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual:
Punishment 60-72 (1973).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See Meltsner, supra note 5, at 7.
8. See id. at 15.

The Supreme Court and Capital
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short order. Crucial to this approach was the assumption that additional
procedures would eventuate in less capital punishment.
The first line of cases upon which the Fund built the procedural part
of its strategy began with one of the earliest civil rights landmarks, the
Scottsboro Boys case, in which the Court for the first time applied the
Sixth through the Fourteenth Amendments to require states to afford
indigent state criminal defendants a right to the adequate assistance of
counsel, if "they stood in deadly peril of their lives." 9 Once that capitalspecific procedural reform was decreed, it was only a matter of time
before the Court extended it (in two habeas cases) to some,10 then, in
Gideon v. Wainwright, to all state felony defendants.'I Motivating the initial step in this reform process was the Court's view that "death is different"-that "[t]he taking of life is irrevocable," so that "[i]t is in capital
cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must be weighed
2
most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights."'
This "solicitude for life" also had previously led the Court to adopt more
exacting appellate review procedures in capital cases than in other criminal cases.

13

A second line of precedent suggested that capital cases provided an
attractive setting for the adoption of new procedural rights that would
9. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
676 (1948) ("[T]his Court repeatedly has held that failure to appoint counsel to assist a
defendant or to give a fair opportunity to the defendant's counsel to assist him in his
defense where charged with a capital crime is a violation of due process.").
10. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that the right to counsel in
noncapital cases turns on case-by-case analysis of fundamental fairness).
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see Meltsner, supra note 5, at 26.
12. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1957) (Frankfurter and Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948) ("In death cases
doubts ... should be resolved in favor of the accused."). In Andres, the Court extended the
Sixth Amendment requirement of unanimous jury verdicts to the capital sentencing phase
of federal capital trials. In Reid, the Court held that civilian dependents whom the military
tried for capital crimes overseas deserved the protections of Article III and the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. Anticipating the Powell-Gideon progression, the Court three years later
extended the same protections to noncapital defendants. See Kinsella v. United States ex
rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
13. Griffin v. United States, 336 U.S. 704, 708 (1949) (holding that because the case
was capital, the lower court was obliged to explain its reasons for affirming the denial of a
motion to reopen a judgment of conviction based on newly discovered evidence). In
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955), the Court found inadequate a state procedural
bar to Supreme Court review of a capital conviction imposed by ajury selected in a racially
discriminatory manner. The same decision might not have been reached in a noncapital
case:
The difference between capital and noncapital offenses is the basis of
differentiation in law in diverse ways ....
Fair regard . . . for the constitutional
commands binding on all courts compels us to reject the assumption that the
courts of Georgia would allow this man to go to his death as the result of a
conviction secured from a jury which the State admits was unconstitutionally
impaneled.
Id. at 391.
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apply from the outset to all state defendants. It thus was in two capital
cases in 1936 that the Court for the first time invalidated state "convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by
officers of the State by brutality and violence." 14 Until relieved of the
duty by lower federal courts on habeas, and then by the prophylaxis of
Miranda v. Arizona15 (itself a collection of cases including one that was
capital 16 ), the Supreme Court applied its coerced confession rule in
twenty-eight cases (by the Court's last count in 195917), among which,
twenty-one were capital.1 8 The reform 'impulse Fund lawyers hoped to
harness in this regard was frankly described by Justice Jackson in one of
the capital confession cases: "When the penalty is death, we . .. are
tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order
to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance."1 9
A third set of cases showed that the fear of unreliable executions
made especially salient to the Court the need not only for expanded procedural rights at state criminal trials but also to deputize the entire federal judiciary, on habeas, to assist the Court in enforcing those rights.
Thus, the classic story of the writ's twentieth-century expansion 20 is in
14. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936).

15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. See People v. Stewart, 400 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965), affd sub nom. Miranda,384 U.S. at
436.
17. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2 (1959).
18. The 21 capital confession cases as of 1959 are: Spano, 360 U.S. at 315; Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Thomas v.
Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 881
(1950); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941);
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty v.
Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown, 297 U.S.
at 278. Three of the eight latest of these confession cases (Brown, Leyra, and Thomas) are
habeas cases.
19. Stein, 346 U.S. at 196. For other innovations adopted in capital cases, see United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (limiting state's capacity to induce waivers of the
right to trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (requiring hearing to determine
whether possibly incompetent defendant validly waived his right to a competency hearing);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (adopting procedural protections to keep pretrial
publicity from biasing juries).
20. The classic discussion of the writ's expansion is Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963), followed
in, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). As I have
shown elsewhere, what in fact expanded was not (as Bator thought) the range of claims
cognizable on habeas. Rather, what expanded was the frequency with which habeas was
needed and used as a mechanism for federal review as of right once writ of error review as
of right in the Supreme Court was replaced by discretionary certiorari review. See James S.
Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct
Review Parity, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1997, 2091-94 (1992).
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essence a story of five cases "rais [ing] serious federal constitutional questions upon which the carrying out of death sentences depended"2 1-Frank
v. Mangum, 22 Moore v. Dempsey, 23 Brown v. Allen, 24 and the 1963 duo of Fay
26
v. Noia25 and Townsend v. Sain.
The Fund's short-term procedural reform program was notjust a fortuitous byproduct of its long-term abolition campaign. Rather, the former was designed as a key mechanism for eventually achieving the success
of the latter. Central to the Fund's abolition strategy was an assumption
that enhanced procedures-including ones for enforcing other procedural rights-were the enemy of substantive capital punishment: As reliable
procedures flourished, the death penalty would vanish. The idea was
only partly to impel the Court to insist on a specialized set of reliable
capital sentencing procedures that it then would discover (as the Fund argued in Gregg v. Georgia,27 and as the Court itself had said in McGautha v.
California2s ) were "beyond present human ability." 2 9 Also at work was the
belief that cheap and unreliable criminal procedures, at both the guilt
and sentencing phases, were crucial to the ability of capital sentencing
jurisdictions-for the most part, counties with a limited ability to pay
30
their way in criminal cases-to make economical use of that penalty.
21. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (emphasis added).
22. 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (reviewing capital conviction and death sentence of Leo
Frank).
23. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (reviewing death sentences of five African American men
charged with killing a member of a white mob that had attacked a church the condemned
men were defending).
24. 344 U.S. at 443 (reviewing, inter alia, the validity of confessions that formed the
basis for three capital convictions).
25. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that the failure of a prisoner serving a life sentence
to appeal his conviction to the state's high court-although otherwise preclusive of federal
habeas review of his meritorious coerced confession claim-was excused because
appealing would have made him eligible for a death sentence on retrial).
26. 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (reviewing capitally sentenced inmate's coerced confession
claim). Capital punishment and expanded federal habeas also played a role in broadening
rights to state procedures for reviewing criminal procedures. See Case v. Nebraska, 381
U.S. 336, 337-38 (1965) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring) (tracing to Court's habeas/
exhaustion decision in Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949), an incipient right to
adequate state post-conviction procedures). Compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13, 20
(1956) (ordering Illinois, which previously had afforded indigent criminal appellants a
right to transcripts at state expense only in capital cases, to provide such transcripts in all
criminal cases) with id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Since capital offenses are sui
geneis, a State may take account of the irrevocability of death by allowing appeals in capital
cases and not in others.").
27. 428 U.S. 153, 198-202 (1976).
28. 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
29. Id. The McGautha Court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not
regulate capital sentencing procedures, id., a view the Court has now spent nearly 30 years
disavowing.
30. See Meltsner, supra note 5, at 66 (explaining that "[1]itigation over procedural
rights would force the states [in]to extended judicial proceedings in order to make a death
sentence stick").
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Boykin v. Alabama,3 1 the case in which the Fund ,lawyers unveiled
their abolition campaign, dramatically confirmed the campaign's procedurally reformative potential. Boykin is, of course, a central document of
the Criminal Procedure Revolution. But few will recall that it began as
primarily a capital case. The questions presented were (1) whether the
death penalty, at least for the nonhomicidal offense of robbery, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) whether a guilty plea in a
capital case was an intelligent and voluntary confession of guilt and
waiver of the right to trial absent notice that, among other things, the
plea could result in a death sentence.3 2 Without mentioning a Fund amicus curiae brief arguing, for the first time, that death was a cruel and
unusual penalty per se, 33 the Court focused on the guilty plea. In so doing, however, it not only adopted an important new constitutional right
(to explicit warnings about, and to waivers of, a variety of trial rights
before pleading guilty), but it also extended that right to noncapital, as
well as capital, cases.
Due to the initial success of the Fund's abolition strategy in the runup to and in Furman v. Georgia,34 there were few capital direct appeals
and no capital habeas cases in the Court in the 1970s in which to pursue a
strategy of capital-case incubation of procedural rights. 3 5 In the early
1980s, however, the Court (mimicking its involuntary confession jurisprudence) did use a few capital (usually habeas) cases to recognize new generally applicable rights, 3 6 and (on the model of the right-to-counsel
31. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
32. See id. at 241-42.
33. See Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the
National Office for the Rights of the Indigent, as Amici Curiae at 24-61, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (No. 642).
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating all extant capital sentences and
statutes); see Meltsner, supra note 5, at 106-07 (discussing the "logjam" of cases resulting
from the Fund's successful moratorium strategy).
35. The first post-Furman capital habeas case to reach the Court on (unsuccessful)
petition for review was Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied sub nom. Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), stay denied, 442 U.S. 901
(1979). The first such case that the Court reviewed was Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981) (discussed infra note 37).
36. In three post-1972 capital cases (two of them on habeas), the Court recognized
important new procedural rights applicable across the board: Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 307-08 (1985) (barring use of mandatory rebuttable presumption instructions on
elements of the crime; habeas case); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985)
(expanding modestly the "nonindependent state ground" exception to the procedural
default bar to federal review of state criminal judgments and recognizing fight of all
indigent criminal defendants to assistance of state-funded psychiatric experts as long as
mental disorder arguably figured in the criminal conduct); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 669-70 (1984) (holding that (1) the exhaustion bar to habeas review is not
jurisdictional and can be waived or defaulted by the state; (2) the right to counsel includes
the right to a competent lawyer; and (3) the standard for assessing competence is stricter
than the "farce and mockery" and other similarly forgiving standards in use in some lower
courts). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 510-11 (1968) (rejecting invitations
to abolish capital punishment and to forbid "death qualification" ofjurors, but forbidding
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cases) did insist on several procedures in capital cases that it did not initially demand across the board. 7 To justify these actions, the Court reiterated that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long,"38 so "[it] is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion." 39 And, indeed, expanded procedural rights coincided with reduced capital punishment: Between 1966 and 1978, no involuntary executions occurred; between 1978 and 1983, only seven did.
B. Fewer Procedures, More Capital Punishment (1984-2000)
Since approximately 1983 or 1984, however, the Court has (1)
stopped using capital direct appeal cases as a forum for considering the
existence of newly proffered procedural rights-except in rare instances
states to use scruples against the death penalty as a sufficient reason to excuse jurors for
cause). For later cases in this same vein, see infra note 40.
37. Guilt-phase and guilt-focused cases include: Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993) (rejecting newly discovered evidence as grounds for habeas relief from convictions,
but implying right not to be executed when demonstrably innocent); Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28 (1986) (giving capital habeas petitioners a right to question prospective jurors
about racial biases, though noncapital defendants have no such right); Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625 (1980) (giving only capital defendants a right to an instruction on viable
lesser included offenses). Sentence-phase cases include: Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988) (recognizing right to benefit of nonunanimous jury decision on mitigating
circumstances); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (barring execution of death
sentence when prisoner is insane); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (applying
stricter standard for assessing validity of prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases
under Due Process Clause than applies in noncapital cases); Estelle, 451 U.S. at 454 (ruling
in habeas case that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Miranda rule
apply to capital sentencing proceedings); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)
(extending double jeopardy protection to capital sentencing decision); Green v. Georgia,
442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam) (enforcing right to present defensive evidence at
sentencing phase); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (per curiam) (enforcing due
process protection against affirmance of sentence on basis different from one on which
jury relied in imposing it); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (establishing right,
previously denied in noncapital cases, to present mitigating evidence); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (establishing right, previously denied in noncapital cases, to disclosure
of presentence report); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (implicitly recognizing right
to bifurcation of guilt and capital sentencing phases); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1 (1989) (majority of Justices in separate opinions implying a limited due process
right to effective counsel in capital, though not in noncapital, state post-conviction
proceedings).
38. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
39. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 (plurality opinion). See, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 411
(plurality opinion) ("In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that
factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability."); Ake, 470 U.S. at 87
(Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment) ("In capital cases the finality of the sentence
imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other cases."); California
v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 & n.9 (1983) ("The Court . . .has recognized that the
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.").
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when it uses them to deny such rights; 40 (2) adopted a "nonretroactivity"
doctrine forbidding federal courts (itself included) to declare new "procedural" rights in habeas cases; 41 (3) repeatedly declined to adopt new
due process or habeas rights in capital cases that do not already apply in
noncapital cases; 42 and (4) frequently refused to extend to noncapital
cases the due process rights it had applied to capital cases in the late
1970s and early 1980s. 43 Worse, the Court has used the grisly facts and
40. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (holding that due process
is not offended if less than all jurors agree on whether murder was premeditated or
committed in course of a specified felony, as long as all agree that one or the other version
of first-degree murder was committed); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991)
(ruling that criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to explore the content
of information about the case that prospective jurors acknowledge having learned from
the press). The Court has modestly expanded procedural rights in several recent capital
cases, most of which have been habeas cases. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134
(1999) (plurality opinion) (holding in capital case that nontestifying "accomplices'
[against-penal-interest] confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence," hence cannot be admitted against the defendant;
direct review case); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-10 (1997) (expanding modestly
habeas petitioners' right to discovery); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422, 441-54 (1995)
(granting certiorari explicitly because habeas petitioner was under sentence of death and
expanding right to prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence to include evidence
revealing the foibles of the state's investigation); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 298 (1995)
(expanding slightly the still very narrow "innocence" exception to rules barring successive
habeas review); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1988) (holding that prosecutor's
failure to make public his instructions to the jury commissioner to underrepresent African
Americans on the jury venire provided "cause" for the habeas petitioner's failure to make a
jury challenge in a timely manner).
41. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-316 (1989). Cf. Bousely v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (noting that Teague doctrine is limited to declaration of
procedural, as opposed to substantive, rights).
42. See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1998)
(concluding that no more process is due in capital clemency proceedings than the
minimal amount that suffices in noncapital cases); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405 ("[W]e have
'refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed requires a different
standard of review on federal habeas corpus.'" (quoting Murray, 492 U.S. at 9)); 1 James S.
Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 2.6, at 102
n.15, 105 n.16 (3d ed. 1998) (citing other decisions).
43. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 722 (1998) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which the Court has found applicable in the capital sentencing context,
see Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), does not extend to noncapital sentencing
proceedings); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) (holding that the standard for
reviewing claim that ambiguous jury instructions impermissibly restricted the jury's
consideration of "constitutionally relevant evidence," which the Court developed in a
capital case, Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), and in which context the Court has
"held that the Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding
than would be true in a noncapital case," does not apply "[o]utside of the capital
context"); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (ruling that Eighth
Amendment rights to proportionality between crime and sentence and to individualized
sentencing, which were extended to capital defendants in, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at
289-90, do not apply to noncapital sentencing); MuMin, 500 U.S. at 423 (reaffirming rule
of Ristiano v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), that capital defendant's right recognized in
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convoluted procedural histories of single or sets of capital cases as a reason to interpret nearly out of existence a number of rights that it previously had extended to criminal cases generally-gutting the right to the
effective assistance of counsel; 4 4 for the first time imposing a harmless
error defense to the use of involuntary confessions; 45 making procedural
defaults in prior state and federal proceedings a nearly impenetrable barrier to habeas review of noncapital as well as capital judgments, in the
process, overruling a Warren Court mainstay, Fay v. Noia;4 6 and broadly
defining the new rules that cannot be applied on habeas to include any
rule requiring even a minuscule accretion to previously recognized precedents. 47 Since the 1980s, that is, capital cases have been in the vanguard
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), "to question prospective jurors as to racial prejudice
in every case where the races of the defendant and the victim differ" does not apply to
noncapital cases). But see Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (extending
to noncapital sentencing proceedings the rule of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981),
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to capital sentencing
proceedings).
44. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 364 (1993) (holding that counsel's failure
to raise then meritorious objection in capital case did not meet standard of prejudice
established in Strickland); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 776 (1987) (ruling that defendant
in capital case whose attorney assisted in the defense of a co-indictee is not entitled to
habeas on conflict-of-interest grounds or based on incomplete pretrial investigation);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-700 (1984) (concluding that counsel's failure
to investigate character witnesses and secure psychiatric testimony is not sufficiently
prejudicial to merit reversal); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-96 (1999)
(narrowly construing the prejudice and materiality concepts that are prerequisites for
findings of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial suppression of evidence);
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378-80 (adopting a rule making it more difficult to demonstrate that the
jury understood ambiguous instructions to have an unconstitutional meaning than the rule
the Court previously had adopted in the noncapital case of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 517-19 (1979)).
45. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991).
46. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1992) (holding
that failure to raise claims in earlier federal habeas petition bars defendant who does not
meet "actual innocence exception" from raising claims in later habeas proceeding);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 722 (1991) (overruling Fay in part and barring
federal habeas review of claims that prisoner did not raise at trial or on direct appeal and
presented for first time in state habeas petition); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 467
(1991) (treating prisoner's failure to raise claim during initial habeas proceeding as
barring relief based on the claim in subsequent habeas proceeding); Dugger v. Adams, 489
U.S. 401, 402 (1989) (holding that failure to object at state trial or to appeal based on
incorrect jury instruction bars prisoner from raising issue in later federal habeas
proceeding); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 527 (1986) (holding that defendant's failure
to appeal unconstitutional admission of psychiatrist's testimony to Virginia Supreme Court
bars federal habeas relief from that violation); see also Stephen B. Bright, Death by
Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate
Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 679, 690-95 (1990) (describing
the deleterious consequences of Supreme Court's highly preclusive procedural default
rules denying habeas relief to capital petitioners whose inadequate trial and appellate
counsel were responsible for the procedural default).
47. See Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (per curiam) (barring habeas
relief based on state's violation of Vienna Convention in part because enforcing that treaty
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of the destruction of procedural protections and procedural review, for
capital as well as noncapital defendants.
In taking these steps, the Court has frequently "mix[ed] discussions
of the substance of condemned inmates' federal constitutional claims
with recitations of the numbers of courts to which the claims have previously been presented without success, or of the length of time during
which post-conviction proceedings have been pending," 48 suggesting, as
Justice Blackmun lamented, that the Court's "impatience with" capital
proceedings supplies an independent basis for denying claims raised in
50
that setting. 49 And in a cruel twist of the "death is different" logic, the
right might require adoption of a "new rule"); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-68
(1997) (denying prisoner habeas relief under recent Supreme Court decision, which
allowed capital defendants to respond to state's claim of future dangerousness by showing
that they would be parole-ineligible if not sentenced to die, because Court's decision
qualified as a new rule); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-39 (1997) (barring
habeas relief based on improper instruction because legal principles relied on to invalidate
instruction were not "dictated by precedent" within meaning of Teague); Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-70 (1996) (barring relief on claim that would require
announcement of a new rule); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 466-78 (1993) (holding
that claim is not a valid basis for habeas relief because it would require announcement of a
"new rule" not "dictated" by existing precedent within the meaning of Teague); Sawyer v.
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 227 (1990) (denying relief under decision barring particular
prosecutorial argument in favor of death penalty because decision announced a new rule);
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 491 (1990) (forbidding habeas relief based on claim that antisympathy instruction given in Oklahoma capital case "unconstitutionally limited the
manner in which . . . mitigating evidence may be considered" because relief was not
dictated by prior decisions invalidating instructions that "altogether prevented" jury from
considering evidence); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 407 (1990) (withholding relief
under a recent decision, notwithstanding that it was directly controlling, because decision
qualified as a new rule); cf. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 368-73 (holding that Teague rule does not
bar state from taking advantage of new rule of law that deprives prisoner of relief to which
he would have been entitled at time of trial and direct appeal, and on that basis rejecting
ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised on lawyer's failure to make objection
under preexisting rule of law, even though there was a reasonable probability that such an
objection would have avoided a death sentence at the time). But cf. Stringer v. Black, 503
U.S. 222, 227-37 (1992) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314-15 (1989) (capital cases
in which Court held that very modest accretions to rule in question were not "new"). Twothirds of the Court's Teague cases have been capital. As these cases and those cited in supra
notes 40 and 44-46 suggest, capital cases have frequently supplied the Court with the
occasion for cutting back on procedures used to enforce other procedural rights. Cf.
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2470 (1996) (noting that Rehnquist Court
has narrowed criminal procedural rights, not by limiting the rights themselves but by
limiting the procedures for enforcing those rights).
48. Anthony G. Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, Hum. Rts., Winter 1987, at 14, 56; see, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
398 (1993) (stating that capital habeas petitioner's claim of constitutional right not to be
convicted and condemned when innocent "must be evaluated in the light of the previous
proceedings in this case, which have stretched over a span of 10 years"); Amsterdam, supra,
at 60 & n.90 (collecting other examples).
49. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
also Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1238 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
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Court has validated especially truncated procedures in capital cases (and,
most especially, capital habeas corpus cases), designed pursuant to a policy, in Professor Amsterdam's phrase, "infavorem m0rtis." 5 1 As a result of
these capital-specific procedures, condemned prisoners are denied rights
that could not constitutionally be withheld from "any other federal appellant-say, for example, a civil appellant claiming that he was overcharged
by five dollars in federal income taxes, or underpaid by two dollars in
52
social security benefits."
denial of stay of execution) (attributing denial of stay of execution, which would have
permitted possibly innocent defendant to litigate witness-perjury claim, to courts'
"impatience" with the fact, noted by lower court judge in opinion denying stay, that
"'[t] his case has been pending for a longer period of time than this nation was involved in
World War II and the Korean War combined'") (citation omitted).
50. See supra notes 12-13, 19, 26 and accompanying text.
51. Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 14. See, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 341 & n.7
(interpreting exception to bar to successive petitions especially narrowly because of the
susceptibility of such petitions to "last minute" filings designed to delay executions);
Gomez v. United States Dist. Ct., 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (inviting federal
courts to resolve doubts and uncertainties as to the merits of habeas petitions against
capital petitioners when their filings come at the last minute in the face of an impending
execution); In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236, 240 (1992) (per curiam) ("The delay in this case
demonstrates the necessity for the rule that we now make explicit [which gives federal
courts granting stays of execution] the concomitant duty to take all steps necessary to
ensure a prompt resolution of the matter . . . ."); Penry, 492 U.S. at 313-14 (deciding to
forgo notice to parties and briefing before extending rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), to capital cases, because adherence to the Court's standard procedures might
"delay the enforcement of the judgment"); see also Schiro v. Indiana, 493 U.S. 910, 914
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (suggesting that Court may have
denied certiorari in capital case raising substantial constitutional claims due to concerns
about delay: "The long delay. .. in this case is a matter of public concern and.. .is relevant
to any consideration of the efficacy of capital punishment. . . . [but] is manifestly not
relevant to, and should have no impact on, petitioner's entitlement to consideration of his
substantial federal claims by the federal courts."). Compare Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S.
949, 958, 963 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (encouraging
Court, in order to take "some responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice system"
caused by "endlessly drawn out legal proceedings" in capital cases, to adopt a policy of
granting certiorari to review all capital direct appeal and state post-conviction petitions in
order to "deny" relief, thereby expediting executions by precluding (on res judicata
grounds, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c)(1994)) all subsequent federal habeas review) with
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (l1th Cir. 1985) (granting habeas relief based on
egregious juror bias to same petitioner to whom, and in later stage of same case in which,
then-Justice Rehnquist had sought peremptorily to deny relief and subsequent habeas
review in order to expedite the proceedings).
52. Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 53-54 (discussing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983)). For further discussion of the detrimental effect on capital habeas review of a
regime of expedited and truncated review like that imposed by Barefoot, see James E.
Coleman, Jr., Litigating at the Speed of Light: Postconviction Proceedings Under a Death
Warrant, 16 Litig. 14, 52-53 (1990); William S. Geimer, Death at any Cost: A Critique of
the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 737, 760-66 (1985); Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the
Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1187, 1205-08 (1984); Robert
Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 305, 343-45; Julia E. Boaz, Note,
Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the Federal
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The best evidence that capital cases have been the death knell of
procedural rights is the aptly named Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).53 That act has little to do with terrorism
and nothing to do with the substantive standards for imposing the death
penalty, but everything to do with dismantling criminal procedural protections by attacking the main forum for enforcing them-habeas
corpus-especially in capital cases. A centerpiece of AEDPA is a set of
"Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases" 54 that make a death
sentence a prerequisite for diminished procedural review, 55 including a
maximum of 180 days to file a certiorari, state post-conviction, and a federal habeas petition.5 6 To see how death now is "Special," compare the
roughly sixty days AEDPA gives newly assigned lawyers 5 7 to file each of
these three actions-the first requiring a fine-tooth combing of the record for "new law" claims that cannot thereafter be raised; 58 the others
requiring a detailed factual as well as legal investigation and fact, not notice, pleading 59-to the ninety-day limit 6° on noncapital certiorari petitions, the one-year or longer limit on most noncapital state post-conviction
petitions, 6 1 and the 365 days AEDPA gives noncapital petitioners to prepare just the latter two proceedings. 62 A death sentence also sometimes
triggers a ban on post-answer amendment of petitions, an expanded default rule, and strict time limits on district court and court of appeals
63
deliberations.
Despite its crude linkage of terrorism and capital prisoners' pursuit
of habeas relief, and the use of death sentences to trigger diminished
review, AEDPA does its worst damage to procedural rights in the 99%64
plus of habeas cases that do not qualify for "special" capital procedures.
Courts, 95 Yale L.J. 349, 349-55 (1985).
53. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (Supp. IV 1998).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 2263. The time limit is tolled while the certiorari and state postconviction petitions are resolved.
57. Id. § 2261 (d) (requiring appointment of new counsel after direct appeal).
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
59. See 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, §§ 7.1(a), 11.2, 11.3, 11.7.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1994); Sup. Ct. R 13.
61. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202 (1997).
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
63. See id.§§ 2264(a), 2266(b) (1) (A), 2266(b) (3) (B), 2266(c) (1) (A).
64. Approximately 10,000 petitions are filed each year. See Roger A. Hanson &
Henry W.K. Daley, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Federal Habeas Corpus Review: Challenging State
Court Criminal Convictions 2 (1995) ("For the past several years, the number of habeas
corpus petitions filed in the Nation's Federal district courts has equaled or slightly
exceeded 10,000 cases."). Of these, fewer than 200 are capital. In fact, most capital cases
are reviewed under AEDPA's general provisions, which are so draconian that states have
not thought it worth the extra resources to qualify for the "special" capital provisions. See
1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 3.3b; Henry Weinstein, Faster Death Penalty Appeals
Rejected, L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 2000, at A3 [hereinafter Weinstein, Faster Appeals] ("So far,
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Consider that by all- objective accounts-e.g., that of ChiefJudge Richard
Posner-noncapital habeas and section 2255 procedures were working
well by the early 1990s, with per capita filings down by two-thirds since
1970.65 Despite this salutary situation, Congress used the occasion of
making the "Death Penalty" more "Effective" to revamp habeas and section 2255 generally-imposing a statute of limitations, 66 barring hearings
on facts not presented in state court absent a convincing showing of innocence, 6 7 abandoning de novo review of legal and mixed legal-factual issues, 68 banning successive litigation of any claim previously included in,
and nearly all claims omitted from, a prior habeas or section 2255 action,69 and forbidding federal prisoner appeals except upon certification
that they raise substantial constitutional issues notwithstanding that many
such appeals feature federal statutory claims. 70 AEDPA in fact has provided a mini-boon to capital prisoners, who are represented by counsel
and thus are better able to exploit the Act's "pig's ear" quality of drafting. 71 Of the Court's nine initial forays into the Act, 72 six occurred in
capital cases, and most accepted the prisoner's view of the Act. 73 Where
no state has been deemed qualified by a court for [AEDPA's capital] fast-track program.").
65. See Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts (Richard A.
Posner, Chair), I Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee
Reports (July 1, 1990), at 470-72 (reporting that steady drop in filings of habeas petitions
per 100 state prisoners from a peak of 5.05 in 1970 to 1.85 in 1988-about the same level
as in 1964-"refutes the claim that reform is necessary to stem the flood of petitions
created by Supreme Court doctrinal innovation" beginning in 1963); see also U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1997, at 442 tbl.5.80, 444-45 tbl.5.82, 490
tbl.6.35 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds.) [hereinafter 1997 Sourcebook of
CriminalJustice Statistics] (indicating that habeas petitions per 100 prisoners dropped still
further after 1988 and through 1995, on the eve of the enactment of AEDPA).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
67. See id. § 2254(e).
68. See id. § 2254(d)(1).
69. See id. §§ 2244(a), 2244(b).
70. See id. § 2253(c) (2).
71. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("All we can say is that in a world
of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEPDA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.");
Linda Greenhouse, Death Penalty Gets Attention of High Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1999,
at Al (attributing Supreme Court's recent spate of certiorari grants in capital cases in part
to AEDPA's poor drafting, which has left "the lower Federal courts.., in disarray over how
to interpret central provisions of the law").
72. Nine forays in three years itself suggests the Act's abstruseness.
73. See Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000); Terry Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.
1495 (2000); Michael Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000); Hohn v. United States, 524
U.S. 236 (1998); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637 (1998); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Lindh, 521 U.S. at 320;
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996). Michael Williams, Terry Williams, Martinez-Villareal,
Ashmus, Thompson, and Felker are all capital cases. The prisoner's interpretation of AEDPA
prevailed in Slack (on two separate questions), Michael Williams, Martinez-Villareal, Hohn,
Thompson, Lindh, and Felker, and the split decision in Terry Williams favored the capital
prisoner (who won habeas relief) more than the state. See also I Liebman & Hertz, supra
note 42, § 3.2 (Main Text & 2000 Supp.) (reviewing these decisions); Judith Resnik, The
Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered
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AEDPA truly bites is in pro se cases (i.e., in nearly all noncapital habeas
and many section 2255 actions), in which the Act's complexity is a
74
minefield for the unwary.
Confounding Fund lawyers' predictions, therefore, the death-driven
"reform" of the last fifteen years has been that procedural rights-habeas
corpus included-"wither" first in capital cases, with the blight spreading
to, and the devastation being greatest in, noncapital cases. 75 Replacing
the sentiment that the state's irrevocable decision to take a capital defendant's life requires the epitome of procedural rights is revulsion against
76
capital criminals and the realization that procedural rights take time.
Aspirations, 86 Geo. L.J. 2589, 2623-27 (1998) (noting habeas petitioners' success in
litigating AEDPA issues before the Supreme Court).
74. See, e.g., Henderson-El v. Maschner, 180 F.3d 984, 985-86 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that district court did not err in dismissing habeas petition filed a few days
after AEDPA's statute of limitations expired and in failing to apply rule treating date of
filing as date prisoner deposited his habeas petition in the prison mailbox because the
prisoner could not produce evidence proving he placed his petition in the mail before the
limitations period had expired); Rodriquez v. Klinger, 1999 WL 394562, at *1 (10th Cir.
June 16, 1999) (ruling that warden's failure to provide pro se prisoner with copy of AEDPA
statute of limitations provision did not constitute adequate basis for equitable tolling
because prisoner "failed to request a copy of the limitations provisions... [and] had access
to an inmate research assistant... [who was] 'aware of the AEDPA limitations period and
routinely advised inmates of same,"' when asked); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714-15
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that prison's delay in making text of AEDPA available to pro se
prisoners did not call for equitable tolling of statute of limitations under the
circumstances); Paige v. United States, 171 F.3d 559, 560-61 (8th Cir. 1999) (declining to
extend prison mailbox rule to excuse delay caused by either a prison mail system or the
United States postal service at the time Paige's brother mailed a draft of Paige's section
2255 motion to him from a different prison in which the brother was incarcerated); Miller
v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (denying request for equitable tolling of
AEDPA's statute of limitations, even though the private correctional facility in which the
pro se petitioner was incarcerated did not have a copy of the new statute or case law
interpreting it, because the petitioner (still proceeding pro se) "provided no specificity
regarding.., the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims"); Gaines v. Newland,
1998 WL 704418, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1998) (holding that prison mailbox rule did not
apply because "petitioner alleges that, per his request, prison officials sent the petition to
his grandmother" to file in court; rule is triggered only by delivery to "prison authorities
for mailing to the clerk of court"); Parker v. Johnson, 988 F. Supp. 1474, 1476-77 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) (denying pro se prisoner's motion to hold federal habeas petition, filed on last
day before one-year statute of limitations expired, in abeyance pending exhaustion of state
remedies on subset of unexhausted claims, thus forcing petitioner either to (1) give up his
federal remedies on the unexhausted claims, which could only thereafter be brought to
federal court in a "second or successive petition" barred by AEDPA, or (2) dismiss his
petition as a whole pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims, after which all of the
claims would be barred by the federal statute of limitations).
75. Cf. Ira P. Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas Corpus?: Observations on the
Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 111 F.R.D. 265, 293-301 (1986).
76. See, e.g., Stephens v. Kemp, 464 U.S. 1027, 1031-32 (1983) (Powell,J., dissenting
from the grant of a stay of execution). In Stephens, Justice Powell argued:
That Stephens is innocent of the brutal, execution-style murder, after kidnapping
and robbing his victim, is not seriously argued .... In the nearly nine years of
repetitive litigation by state and federal courts there has been no suggestion that
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Because time anywhere on earth is what the typical capital prisoner wants
most-unlike the typical noncapital prisoner, whose litigation time is limited by the length of her prison term-the capital litigant wins something
precious even by losing.7 7 And because litigating and losing imposes
costs on states, courts, victims, and the public, such litigation is thought
to require "special" commands in capital cases (then, by undeserved association, in noncapital cases) to take fewer steps faster. Eventually, that is,
the abolitionist campaign caused the Court to replace its mantra that
"death is different in its irrevocability, so we need to initiate and to give
more procedural protections there," with the lament that "death is different in the amount of delay it foists on the system, so we need to initiate
the destruction of, and give fewer, procedural protections there."
Although opposite in intention and effect, the death-driven expansion of rights that Fund lawyers sought and secured for a time, and the
death-driven contraction of rights their opponents secured more recently, share the same premise: Procedural rights, including post-trial
procedural review, are the enemy of substantive capital punishment.7 8
the death sentence would not be appropriate in this case ....
Once again,... a
typically "last minute" flurry of activity is resulting in additional delay of the
imposition [sic] of a sentence imposed almost a decade ago. This sort of
procedure undermines public confidence in the courts and in the laws we are
required to follow.
Id. Professor Amsterdam has responded as follows:
[Justice Powell] nowhere tells us why it makes the least earthly difference to
anybody but the condemned inmate whether the death sentence, if finally held
valid, is executed three or four years rather than, say, two years after imposition.
During the interim, the death-sentenced inmate is neither at large and dangerous
nor unpunished; he is securely housed in a maximum security facility. When the
last review in his case is over, he is still there for the state to execute at its
convenience. If there is any evidence showing that any supposed deterrent
efficacy of the death penalty is abated in the slightest by four-year delays instead
of two-year delays in executions, I have not seen it.... So wherein lies the special
evil of delay in capital cases? It is difficult not to see the answer peeping out
between the lines of Justice Powell's text. We-the Supreme Court of the United
States-said seven years ago that the death penalty is constitutional. We are a
serious court, and we meant what we said very seriously. But nobody seems to be
taking us at all seriously; people are simply not getting executed, and here are all
these lawyers running around making the system look foolish. That is not to be
tolerated. Delay, injustice Powell's words, "undermines public confidence in our
system of justice ....
" It compounds the crime of murder by the crime of lese
majeste.
Amsterdam, supra note 48, at 52 (citations omitted).
77. In fact, because most appellate and habeas victories result only in a new trial,
which in noncapital cases often in turn results in a new conviction and the same sentence,
many noncapital prisoners will not pursue review even before their term ends. In the case of
capital prisoners, the prospect of an unsuccessful new trial and the review it will then
engender is less daunting and even (compared to the grave) attractive. Moreover, retrials
following reversals more often result in different and more favorable verdicts in capital
cases than in noncapital ones. See infra notes 84, 124.
78. See Steiker, Excessive Proceduralism, supra note 2, at 315-16 (describing the
impulse to "excessive proceduralism" on both sides of the debate).
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"Effective Death Penalty Act" supporters repeatedly expressed this assumption, 79 and it suffuses an Act that in fact has nothing to do with the
occasions or standards for imposing death sentences and everything to do
with the occasions and process for reviewing them.
That assumption seems to be confirmed, moreover, by
skyrocketing
executions during the last fifteen years-jumping from five in 1983 to
seventy-four in 1997, and to ninety-eight in 1999 8 0-as procedural protections have plummeted. On the standard account, cutting across all political views, proceduralism triumphed from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s,
causing capital punishment to collapse or barely function, while capitally
punitive substance has reigned ever since, fueling a collapse of capital
(and by association noncapital) proceduralism and a consequent rise in
executions.
There is much to say for the view that procedural rights defeat substantive capital punishment, and vice versa. In the rest of this Article,
however, I suggest that the perverse result of reforms premised on this
assumption has been to give post-trial proceduralism a substantively crucial role in administering the nation's capital laws. Those reforms have
led our capital system to impose many more death sentences than are
deserved (as measured by capital jurisdictions' substantive lights) and to
be utterly dependent for the necessary additional winnowing on post-trial
review procedures that are far more expensive and less effective than is
practicable (as measured by just about everyone's procedural lights).
II.

SUBSTANTIVE CAPITAL DECISIONMAKING AND THE DIFFERENCE POST-

TIAL REVIWW MAKES

Theorizing about the results of a comprehensive study colleagues
and I conducted of all 4578 capital state appeals, 248 state post-conviction
reversals, and 599 capital federal habeas cases decided between 1973 and
1995,81 the rest of this Article contends that the reality of the modem
79. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H3602 (1996) (AEDPA is necessary to remedy "a habeas
corpus procedure that forbade the final solution to the death penalty problem; namely,
the execution of the killer"); 141 Cong. Rec. S7659 (1995) ("[T]he far left in this country
is fighting [the] habeas corpus reform [provisions of AEDPA]. . . because they hate the
death penalty. . . . [Tihey have adopted a strategy [under the pre-existing habeas
provisions] to make death penalty litigation so costly and so protracted that capital
punishment is eliminated de facto.").
80. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A., Summer
2000, at 9 [hereinafter Death Row USA]; U.S. Executions Hit 45-Year High, Chi. Trib.,
Sept. 28, 1999, at N16.
81. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al., A Broken System], abridged and reprinted
in James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, 78
Tex. L. Rev. 1839 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al., Capital Attrition]. A Broken System,
supra, is available electronically at <http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/
liebman/> (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Because many state post-conviction
decisions are not published and are difficult to obtain, we limited our study of cases at that
stage to known reversals of capital verdicts. To obtain state post-conviction reversal rates,
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American death penalty contradicts the assumption that post-trial procedural review is anathema to substantive capital punishment. In fact, our
death-sentencing system now depends on an elaborate process of state and
federal post-trial review. To be sure, state and federal statutes generally
limit post-trial review to procedural scrutiny of capital convictions and
sentences.8 2 But in the guise of making the proceduraljudgments those
statutes permit, state and federal post-trial review has come to be an integral part of the modern American system of deciding who lives and who
dies. More particularly, because trial actors have strong incentives to overproduce death sentences-putting two to as many as six or more individuals on death row for every one who would be there if trial actors bore the
cost of their mistakes-it has fallen to state appellate and federal habeas
judges to provide a crucial second stage of life-or-death screening.
This, however, is no defense of modem capital punishment or posttrial review. The system is perverse. It is immensely expensive because it
requires multiple layers of repetitive substantive deliberation; 3 penologically risky because it garbles the deterrent and retributive message of a
jury's imposition of a death sentence; egregiously prone to substantive
error that its proceduralist review mechanisms are not designed to cureinevitably letting people who are innocent or do not deserve the penalty
die;8 4 paralyzing to the courts because of the amount of their energies it
we took those reversals as a percentage of the capital verdicts known to have survived state
direct appeal. Doing so produces extremely conservative estimates of state post-conviction
reversal rates because it inflates the denominator by substituting the number of cases
available for review for the smaller number actually reviewed. See Liebman et al., A Broken
System, supra, at 26-27, 135 n.132, app. C-1-C-3.
82. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. I\ 1998); Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1993) (noting that habeas generally is limited to
procedural, not substantive, review). For example, after initially suggesting that state
appellate courts, possibly backstopped by federal habeas courts, had an Eighth
Amendment duty to review capital sentences for substantive accuracy and statewide
consistency, see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874-80 (1983) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976), the Supreme Court then absolved all of those courts of that duty,
see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1993) and Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-46
(1984), and nearly all state courts promptly abandoned such review as a matter of state
law. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High
Courts After Gregg- Only 'The Appearance ofJustice'?, 87J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130,
131-34 (1996); PennyJ. White, Can Lightening Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts
After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 813, 816-17 (1999).
83. It is one thing to back-stop a trial process that its decisionmakers' local loyalties
strongly dispose to focus on substantive issues of guilt and punishment with a post-trial
process that its distance from the local scene and commitment to national law strongly
inclines to protect procedural rights. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1047-50 (1977); 1
Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 2.6, at 101. It is quite another thing to rely on both
processes to make the same substantive judgments.
84. Between 1972 and the beginning of 1998, 70 people were released from death row
on the grounds that their convictions were faulty and there was too little evidence to retry
them for murder or for any other homicide offense. See Michael L. Radelet et al.,
Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13
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T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 907, 916, 964 tbl.2 (1996). For similar figures, see Samuel R. Gross,
Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1998, at 125, 130-32 [hereinafter Gross, Lost Lives]; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
The Verdict: Dishonor, Chi. Trib., Jan. 10, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Armstrong & Possley,
Verdict Dishonor]; Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, The Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1999, at 66,
68 [hereinafter Berlow, Wrong Man] ("[S]ince . . . 1976, more than eighty death-row
inmates have been freed from prison.., by evidence of innocence. That... is... equal to
almost 15 percent of those actually executed-not good odds... given the stakes."). As of
July 2000, the number of inmates released from death row as factually or legally innocent
since 1973 was 87, including nine released in 1999 and the first half of 2000 alone. See
Richard C. Dieter, Letter to the Editor, Death-Row Innocents, N.Y. Times, July 14, 2000, at
A24. An 88th and 89th death row exoneration were announced as this Article was going to
press. See Man Wins Acquital in Retrial of Capital Case, Nat'l L.J. Nov. 6, 2000, at A7
(discussing acquital of William Nieves after 5.5 years on Pennsylvania's death row); Brooke
A. Masters, DNA Clears Inmate in 1982 Slaying, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 2000, at Al
[hereinafter, Masters, DNA Clears Inmate] (discussing DNA-based exoneration of Earl
Washington who previously spent 9.5 years on death row and an additional 7 years under a
life sentence imposed by a governor's reprieve based on earlier doubts about Washington's
guilt).
The 68 individuals released as of 1998 represent 1.2% of the 5879 individuals
sentenced to death during the 1973-1998 period. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra, at 128 n.13,
130. Even (heroically) assuming that all innocent people sentenced to death are
exonerated before being executed, that 1.2% figure "almost certainly undercount[s] the
number of defendants erroneously convicted and sent to death row. .. ." Id. at 131. One
reason the figure is an undercount is that, at any given time, the capital judgments of over
50% of the individuals on death row are still under judicial review-a process that now
lasts, on average, about 11 years. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Bulletin: Capital Punishment 1998, NCJ 179012 at 1, 12, 13 & tbl.12, app.tbl.1 (Dec. 1999)
[hereinafter BJS 1998 Report]; infra notes 95-100, 219, 245 and accompanying text. The
1.2% figure, accordingly, should at least be doubled to show the proportion of prisoners
condemned between 1972 and 1998 who, followingfull-scale judicialreview, will eventually be
released for lack of enough evidence to retry or reconvict them. My own data suggest that
5% of death row inmates are proven not guilty following full review. See Liebman et al.,
Capital Attrition, supra note 81, at 1849-52 & fig.1 (finding that 68% of all capital verdicts
fully reviewed between 1973 and 1995 were overturned by courts, and (based on retrial
outcomes following reversals at the state post-conviction stage, where outcomes are known)
that 7% of the capital verdicts that were retried were replaced by not-guilty verdicts, so that
5% of the original death verdicts (.07 x .68 = .048) were replaced by not-guilty verdicts).
Of the 89 post-Furman exonerations as of October 2000, 14 occurred in Illinois
alone-two more than the number of executions the state carried out in the same period.
See Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Another Death Row Inmate Cleared, Chi. Trib., Jan. 19,
2000, at N1 [hereinafter Mills & Armstrong, Another Cleared]; Lynn Sweet, Death Row
Debate Spurs Wave of Bills, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 13, 2000, at 28 (reporting admission on
direct appeal by Cook County, Illinois, State's Attorney that one of six killings on which
Hubert Geralds's death sentence was based was committed by another man); Lorraine
Forte, Death Row Inmate to Receive New Trial, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 11, 2000, at 12
(reporting that Geralds's IQ "is somewhere between 46 and 51" and that the unrecorded
confession allegedly given to police by Geralds was false). Other exonerations seem well
on their way in Illinois and elsewhere. See Bruce Balestier, Latham Attorneys Take on
Texas's Infamous Death Row, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 2000, at 24 ("Thirteen years after he was
condemned to die for a crime it now seems he did not commit, Ernest Ray Willis suddenly
has a glimmer of hope as he tries to accomplish the near-impossible and walk off of Texas's
death row."); Holly Becka & Howard Swindle, DNA Test Doesn't Link Condemned Man to
Girl: Hair Evidence Was Factor In Blair Murder Trial, Dallas Morning News,June 21, 2000,
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at Al ("A new round of DNA testing has called into question a second piece of physical
evidence that condemned Michael Blair to death row nearly six years ago for the abduction
and murder of Ashley Estell."); Steve Mills, Law School Team Says Wrong Man Convicted:
Group Hopes to Clear Death Row Inmate, Chi. Trib., Jan. 26, 2000, at N1 (discussing
motion filed in the Illinois Supreme Court by a law professor and his students claiming (1)
that death row inmate Edgar A. Hope, Jr. was wrongfully convicted of a 1982 murderbased on testimony by witnesses who now say Chicago police detectives coerced them into
falsely identifying Hope as the killer-and (2) that they know who the real killer is);
Brendan Riley, Emotional Mazzan Released, Las Vegas Rev.-J., May 7, 2000, at 1 (reporting
reversal of John Mazzan's conviction in Mazzan v. Warden, 993 P.2d 25 (Nev. 2000), and
his release on bail, 18 years after he was sentenced to die, based on proof-discovered
when a police clerk inadvertently gave a defense investigator the wrong file-that the
police chief and prosecutor had suppressed evidence that two other men committed the
killing). Florida leads the nation in death row exonerations. See Sydney P. Freedberg,
Bush Rejects Idea of Death Penalty Ban, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 15, 2000, at 5B ("In
Florida,. .. [t]wenty inmates have walked off death row-in three cases within 16 hours of
execution-after evidence emerged that they were wrongly convicted. No state has
released more condemned prisoners from death row."); see also Sydney P. Freedberg, ExDeath Row Inmate Gets Walking Papers, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 17, 2000, at IA
(discussing release of 21st former Florida death row inmate).
The number of innocent individuals put to death since Furman is anyone's guess. See,
e.g., Armstrong & Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra (discussing Sonia Jacobs of Florida,
who was eventually freed [due to prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence] but
whose boyfriend, convicted on virtually identical evidence, had already been executed by
the time her appeal prevailed); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra, at 68-69 (collecting statements
from public officials who took steps to secure the execution of several named individuals
whom those officials later came to believe or suspect were innocent); George F. Will,
Innocent on Death Row, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 2000, at A23 (conservative columnist and longtime death penalty supporter drawing the "inescapable inference," based on a review of
Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from
the Wrongly Convicted (2000), "that some of the 620 people executed" since Furman "were
innocent"); infra notes 142, 160, 237 (discussing the Stoker, Stockton, and O'Dell cases).
My confidence that some innocent people have been executed is based on two factors.
The first is the astonishing lack of confidence that state prosecutors exhibit by fighting
tooth and nail to keep from releasing DNA and other evidence that would verify the
accuracy of capital convictions-if they are accurate. See, e.g., Frontline, The Case for
Innocence (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 11, 2000), transcript at 1-2, 18-20 (statements
of Ofra Bikel) (visited November 5, 2000) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/case/etc/script.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing resistance
of public officials to DNA testing of possibly innocent prisoners and media efforts to assist
prisoners in obtaining such testing); Joe Lambe, Inmate Wins Fight to Obtain DNA Test,
Kansas City Star, Mar. 11, 2000, at Al (noting that DNA "tests have overturned dozens of
convictions, but only Illinois and New York have laws that give prisoners a right to obtain
them," and that as a result inmates claiming they were wrongly convicted "find themselves
battling the legal system for a test that can clear or condemn"); Brooke A. Masters, DNA
Testing in Old Cases Is Disputed, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al (discussing opposition
of prosecutors to post-conviction DNA tests on grounds that it "is expensive and that
reopening old cases upsets victims and diverts resources needed to solve new cases"); infra
notes 118, 237. The second is the huge element of luck characterizing the discovery of
many miscarriages of justice that put people on death row-for example, (1) the discovery
of suppressed police files exonerating a Florida death row inmate as a result of a burglary
of a district attorney's office, see Berlow, Wrong Man, supra, at 70, 74, or because a police
clerk mistakenly released the wrong file, see the Mazzan case discussed above; (2) the
various cases "broken" by the media and even journalism students after defense lawyers

2000]

THE OVERPRODUCTION OF DEATH

2051

diverts to a tiny subset of cases;8 5 and destructive of public support for the
and the courts missed the errors, see, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The American Bar
Association's Recognition of the Sacrifice of Fairness for Results: Will We Pay the Price for
Justice, 4 Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 183, 184 (1996) [hereinafter Bright, Sacrifice of
Fairness] (giving four examples of men released from death row as innocent after 60
Minutes, a filmmaker, and Northwestern University journalism students disproved or
highlighted weaknesses in the cases against the inmates); Frontline, supra, at 5-6, 9, 20,
24-25 (providing other examples); Gross, Lost Lives, supra, at 151 (discussing exoneration
of Randall Dale Adams after "documentary filmmaker Errol Morris ran into Adams by
chance in 1985 . . . [and] went on to produce a movie about Adams's case, The Thin Blue
Line.... [which] drew national attention to the case and resulted in Adams's release...
twelve years after he had been sentenced to death"); Beth Hawkins & Kristin Solheim, The
Wrong Man, Tucson Wkly., Dec. 8-14, 1993, at 1 (helping to break the Carriger case,
discussed infra note 148); Evan Moore, Cloud of Doubt, Hous. Chron., Sept. 12, 1999, at
18 (describing role of press and member of the clergy in exposing egregious police and
prosecutorial misconduct, leading eventually to exonerative DNA analysis and the freeing
of Kerry Max Cook from Texas's death row after 20 years); see also Armstrong & Possley,
Verdict Dishonor, supra ("catching prosecutors who have engaged in [unlawful] deception
[at homicide trials] can be extremely difficult," and in the past has occurred, e.g., "only
after a judge directed the U.S. marshal to seize the prosecutors' documents, or because
newspapers sued under the Freedom of Information Act, or because of anonymous tips,
conversations accidentally overheard or papers spied in a prosecutor's hand"); and (3)
several exonerations occurring after the actual killer took the almost unbelievably againstinterest step of confessing to a crime the police and the courts had claimed to have solved
by convicting and condemning someone else, see cases discussed in Bright, Sacrifice of
Fairness, supra, at 184; Gross, Lost Lives, supra, at 150; infra note 149 (discussing the
Munsey case); infra note 151 (discussing the Ochoa case). In the words of Justice, now
Chief Justice, Moses Harrison of the Illinois Supreme Court in a 1998 opinion:
If these men dodged the executioner, it was only because of luck and the
dedication of the attorneys, reporters, family members and volunteers who
labored to win their release. They survived despite the criminal justice system,
not because of it....
One must wonder how many others have not been so
fortunate.
Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death RowJustice Derailed, Chi. Trib., Nov. 14, 1999, at NI
[hereinafter Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed] (quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179,
228 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
85. See, e.g., Hon. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On
Sentence, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 & n.70 (1995) [hereinafter Kozinski &
Gallagher, Run-On Sentence] (discussing demands placed on federal habeas courts by
challenges to state capital verdicts and citing estimate that one-third of 11 th Circuit's staff
resources are dedicated to processing death penalty cases); William C. Vickrey, Opinion
Filings and Appellate Court Productivity, 78 Judicature 47, 50 (1994) (finding that during
1987-1993, capital cases accounted for 26% of the California Supreme Court's opinions
and nearly 56% of its headnotes; also finding that capital cases presented, on average,
more than three times as many issues requiring analysis by the court as noncapital cases;
concluding that "capital cases as a class pose a great burden on the court"); S. V. Date, The
High Price of Killing Killers, Palm Beach Post,Jan. 4, 2000, at IA ("[T] he Florida Supreme
Court . . . devotes approximately half its time to death penalty cases . . ."); Martin
Dyckman, Death Penalty Repair, St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 7, 1997, at ID (describing
proposal of Gerald Kogan, ChiefJustice of the Florida Supreme Court and former head of
the Miami District Attorney's capital prosecution unit, "to seriously reconsider whether the
death penalty is truly a viable remedy for first degree murder in the state of Florida," in
part because capital punishment causes the Florida Supreme Court to "spend an
inordinate amount of time . . . when there is so much out there that affects the average
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courts, which, while in fact serving as the substantive saviors of the death
penalty, are perceived by many as its sworn proceduralist enemies.
After presenting a statistical snapshot of American "Capital Punishment as a System," 8 6 suggesting that capital trials vastly overproduce
death sentences, I consider why that may be so.
A. A Brief Sketch of our Actual System of CapitalPunishment
Since Furman, an average of about 300 of the approximately 21,000
homicides committed in the United States each year have resulted in a
death sentence.8 7 Close to 100% of those sentences are reviewed on state
direct appeal and, if affirmed, in a state post-conviction proceeding, and,
if affirmed again, on federal habeas corpus.8 8 Remarkably, during the
twenty-three-year period of our statistical study, 1973-1995, the result of
this process was the reversal by state direct appeal or state post-conviction
courts of at least 47% of the capital judgments they reviewed, 89 and federal habeas reversal of 40% of the capital judgments that survived state
review. 90 During the study period, that is, state courts (mainly) and fedcitizen much more"); Paul Elias & Rinat Fried, A Failure to Execute, The Recorder, Dec.
15, 1999, at 12-14 (quoting Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court stating that his
court's practice of denying all capital post-conviction petitions with a one-line order is
necessitated by "the enormous amount of work" required simply to adjudicate each of the
hundreds of pending capital petitions, leaving no time thereafter to "write full-blown
opinions ... and still keep up with its other work"; also quoting the Chief (federal) Judge
of the Central District of California describing the "intensive" expenditure of time by
federal district judges (who in that district follow a policy against referring capital cases to
magistrates), in adjudicating each capital habeas petition, 80 of which were pending in that
district alone as of December 1999); Jonathan E. Gradess, Execution Does Not Pay;
Barbarism Aside, the Death Penalty Simply Isn't Cost Efficient, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1988,
at C5 ("The United States Court of Appeals for the l1th Circuit in Atlanta, deep in the
heart of the nation's death-penalty belt, complains that more than 30 percent of its docket
is tied up with death-penalty cases."); Stan Swofford, A Reasonable Doubt: Are There
Innocent People on North Carolina's Death Row, Greensboro News & Rec., Aug. 6, 2000,
at Al (reporting estimate of former North Carolina Chief Justice Jim Exum that, as of
1994, his last year on the bench, the "justices were spending 70 percent of their time on
death penalty cases").
86. See Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 Yale LJ. 908, 908 (1982).
87. See Table 4, infra. An average of 287 admissions to death row occurred each year
during the period from 1984 (by which point most of the post-Furman death-sentencing
states had managed to adopt presumptively constitutional statutes) to 1998.
88. See infra note 90 (discussing frequency with which capital prisoners appeal and
pursue post-conviction remedies).
89. I say "at least" because we underestimated state post-conviction reversals. See
supra note 81.
90. See Liebman et al., Capital Attrition, supra note 81, at 1849, 1850 & n.37, 1851 &
fig.1, 1855 & n.51 (finding that 41% of American capital verdicts finally reviewed at the
state direct appeal stage between 1973 and 1995 were reversed; very conservatively
estimating that 10% of the capital verdicts that survived direct review and were finally
reviewed at the state post-conviction stage were reversed at that second stage; finding,
therefore, that at least 47% of capital verdicts reviewed in the state courts were reversed
(.41 + .10 (.59) = .47); finding that 40% of capital verdicts that survived state review and
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were fully reviewed by federal habeas corpus courts were reversed; and finding, therefore,
that overall, at least 68% of all American capital verdicts finally reviewed by state and
federal courts during that period were overturned by the courts (.41 + .10 (.59) + .40 (.53)
= .68); also finding that of 2370 total reversals, 2133 (90%) were by state judges). For
additional details, see Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 28-30.
Compare the 41% capital direct appeal reversal rate we found to the noncapital direct
appeal reversal rate, which is certainly less than 15% and probably far less than 10%.
Discussing the "fragmentary evidence on state court criminal reversals" on appeal,
Professor Arkin cites a 23% reversal or sentence modification, rate of the criminal
judgments that Legal Aid lawyers appealed in the First and Second Departments of New
York State in 1984, a 14% reversal or sentence modification rate among criminal appeals
taken in the First District of California in 1974, and a 10% reversal and 12% modification
rate for appeals taken in the California state courts between 1978 and 1981. See Marc M.
Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 503,
516 (1992); see also Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments
and Questions 35 (8th ed. 1994) (estimating that the reversal rate in run-of-the-mill
criminal appeals to state intermediate appellate courts is 5-10%);Joy A. Chapper & Roger
A. Hanson, Understanding Reversible Error in Criminal Appeals, Final Report, National
Center on State Courts 5 (1989) (reporting criminal appellate reversal rates ranging from
18% to 29% based on similarly fragmentary data).
These figures are vastly inflated, compared to the capital direct appeal and habeas
corpus reversal rates revealed by our study, for the following reason; State law in nearly all
states requires that capital judgments be appealed to the highest state court, see Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 173-74 & n.1 (1990) (citing statutes), and as a matter of fact,
virtually all capital judgments are appealed, see id. at 174-75 ("[S]ince the reinstitution of
capital punishment in 1976, only one person, Gary Gilmore, has been executed without
any appellate review of his case."). If upheld on direct appeal, virtually all capital
judgments are, in turn, challenged in state and federal post-conviction review procedures.
See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-57 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (describing typical post-trial course of proceedings in capital cases);
Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 19-21. By contrast, only a small subset
of noncapital criminal convictions are appealed. (The vast majority of convictions based
on guilty pleas, for example, which constitute the vast majority of all convictions, are not
appealed.) And only a tiny proportion of cases that are appealed are challenged in state
and federal post-conviction proceedings. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2524 (1993) (estimating that
only three to four of every 1000 noncapital state prisoners file a federal habeas corpus
petition). A reversal rate of at most 25% of the at most 20% of noncapital verdicts that are
appealed adds up to at most a 5% reversal rate for all noncapital judgments imposed at
trial, compared to the at least 68% reversal rate for all capitaljudgments imposed at trial.
In addition, the reversal rates for appeals taken by Legal Aid lawyers in New York are likely
to inflate the rate in appeals generally, given the comparatively higher quality of such
lawyers than of private appointed lawyers who handle criminal cases in the state. See, e.g.,
Chester L. Mirsky, The Political Economy and Indigent Defense: New York City,
1917-1998, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 891, 948, 971 (presenting a number of critiques of
private appointed criminal defense lawyers in New York City as "attorneys of questionable
competence" who "lower[ed] the quality of representation"); Jane Fritsch, Legal Aid is
Given Bigger Court Role, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1994, at Al (reporting decision of the New
York City administration to shift cases of indigent defendants away from private appointed
lawyers and back to Legal Aid to ensure "better monitoring of legal work" and avoid the
"opportunity for egregious failure"); Jane Fritsch & Matthew Purdy, Option to Legal Aid
for Poor Leaves New Yorkers at Risk, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1994, at Al (claiming that the
explosion of private appointed criminal defense lawyers has created a flawed system and
raised questions about the quality of work); David Rohde, Critical Shortage of Lawyers for
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eral courts reversed 68%-i.e., more than two of evey three-of the capital
judgments that were fully reviewed. 9 1
Poor Seen, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1999, at 59 (recounting view of criminal justice officials
that assigned private appointed criminal defense lawyers in New York City were providing
the "lowest-quality legal representation in decades"). And reversal rates for appeals taken
only to intermediate courts are probably inflated, because they do not report the fate of
intermediate court decisions that are appealed to the highest state court-a larger
proportion of which are probably appealed to the highest court by state's attorneys who
lost at the intermediate stage than by defense lawyers who did so. The reversal/sentence
modification rates for the small subset of criminal judgments that were appealed in
California state courts during the period between 1978 and 1981 may also be somewhat
unrepresentative because they cover a period when the California Supreme Court,
presided over by ChiefJustice Rose Bird, was relatively sympathetic to criminal defendants'
appeals. See Bright, Sacrifice of Fairness, supra note 84, at 184.
The noncapital reversal rate on state post-conviction is close to zero. On habeas
corpus, it is almost certainly less than five percent. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Benjamin
Civiletti, et al., in support of the Respondent at app.A, n.1, Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277
(1992) (No. 91-542) (reporting findings of studies of reversal rates in noncapital habeas
cases); Meltzer, supra note 90, at 2524 (estimating that reversal rate in capital and
noncapital habeas cases combined is 3.2%).
For these reasons, the overall error rate in noncapital cases, which colleagues and I
(deliberately erring on the high side) estimated to be 15%, in Liebman et al., Capital
Attrition, supra note 81, at 1854-55 n.49, is probably less than one-third that amount.
91. See Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 4-5, 28-30. Because state
direct appeal courts review all capital judgments and state post-conviction courts review
nearly all those that survive direct review, while federal courts review only those judgments
that survive both stages of state court review, the state and federal court systems' relatively
similar reversal rates (47% and 40%, respectively) produce many more state court reversals
(about 90% of the total) than federal court reversals (the remaining 10%). See id. at 9,
28-29. For a state-by-state compendium of overall (combined state and federal court)
capital reversal rates, ranging from 18% in Virginia to 91% in Mississippi, see id. at 74-76,
app.A. For impressionistic press accounts of high reversal rates in a variety of states, see,
e.g., Ames Alexander & Liz Chandler, Errors, Inequities Often Cloud Capital Cases in the
Carolinas, Charlotte Observer, Sept. 10, 2000, at IA ("Since 1977, when the Carolinas
restored the death penalty, more than half of all death sentences have been thrown out
because of flawed trials."); Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, Half of State's Death-Penalty
Cases Reversed, Chi. Trib., Jan. 22, 2000, at I ("An Illinois Supreme Court ruling on Friday
pushed the number of death-penalty cases in Illinois that have been reversed for a new trial
or sentencing hearing to 130-exactly half the total of those capital cases that have
completed at least one round of [state] appeals. . . ."); Mike Carter, Court Orders Retrial
in 1986 Murder Case, Seattle Times, July 15, 1999, at B1 (noting that state and federal
courts have reversed three Washington State capital convictions and an additional seven
Washington State capital sentences since 1999-in a state with only 14 men on death row
as of the end of 1998, see BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 14, app.tbl.2); Lee Davidson,
Death Row the End? Most Get Out Alive, Deseret News (Salt Lake City), Dec. 13, 1999, at
BI (of 16 prisoners who have left Utah's death row since that state reinstated the death
penalty in 1973, 6 were executed and 10 (63%) had their convictions or sentences
overturned by the courts); Elias & Fried, supra note 85 ("Since 1978, when . . .
California... reinstitut[ed] the death penalty, 647 men and women have been sentenced
to death. Only eight have been executed. Nearly four times as many California death row
inmates have died in San Quentin of causes other than execution. Fifty-seven sentences
have been overturned."); Howard Mintz, The Capital Punishment Gridlock in California,
San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 12, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Mintz, California Gridlock]
(reporting that between 1993 and 1999, California's death row grew from 350 to about 550
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This one-in-three figure, however, greatly overestimates the likelihood
of execution, as is revealed by additional statistical windows on the system. For example, the Justice Department's annual study of the death
penalty reports the outcome, as of the study date, of death sentences imposed in each prior year since 1973. Consider the outcomes of death
sentences imposed in 1989.92 The cases of 103 of the 263 people sentenced to die that year had been resolved by the end of 1998 (when the
last Justice Department report ends). 9 3 Among those 103 inmates, 78
(76%) had their capital judgments overturned by a state or federal court;
only 13 (<13%) had been executed (compared to 9 who died of other
causes) .94 By this measure, for every one death row inmate whose case
inmates, but it only executed six men; in the same period, federal courts overturned 13
death sentences, and by a separate count, state courts overturned at least five death
A Broken System,
sentences and probably considerably more than that, see Liebman et al.,
supra note 81, at app.C-10); Rene Stutzman, High Court Puts Death Cases Back into Play,
Orlando Sentinel, Aug. 24, 1999, at DI (reporting that in the first eight months of 1999,
the Florida Supreme Court found trial errors requiring retrial, resentencing, or imposition
of a life sentence in 83% (10/12) of the first-time death penalty appeals it reviewed; the
figure for all of 1998 was 77% (20/26)); Sean Whaley, ACLU Attorney Finds Flaws in Many
Death Row Cases, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Feb. 7, 2000, at IB (stating that since 1993, eight
Nevada death row inmates have had their convictions reversed in the courts, including
three who were thereupon released from prison and another who may be released "soon"
following the state supreme court's February 2000 reversal of his conviction because local
"prosecutors withheld evidence at his 1979 trial that could have led to his acquittal"; since
1979, eight men have been executed in the state, all but one after giving up their appeals
and volunteering to be executed, see Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 8). See also
Spencer Hunt, Death Penalty Process Remains Slow and Unsteady, Cincinnati Enquirer,
Sept. 10, 2000, at A17 (noting that, although "Ohio courts have sent 200 people to death
row over the past 19 years[,] . .. the state has executed only one person in that time, and
that one only because... [he] wanted to die"; also reporting the state chiefjustice's doubts
"whether anyone on the state's death row actually will be put to death"); Duncan
Mansfield, The Price of Death Penalty, Maybe Millions, Associated Press Newswires, Mar.
26, 2000 ("Tennessee, with 97 people on death row [who have accumulated over at least 21
years] is [still awaiting] its 1st execution since 1960.").
The 68% "reversal rate" in capital cases understates the actual "error rate." See
Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (noting that in addition to reversing
half of the capital judgments it has reviewed, "the Illinois Supreme Court has upheld
scores of death sentences while forgiving trial errors that benefited prosecutors, dismissing
the errors as harmless," including in Anthony Porter's case where the court based the
harmlessness findings on the "[o]verwhelming" evidence of his guilt; Porter was later
released as innocent because another man confessed to his crime); infra note 239 and
accompanying text.
92. For this purpose, 1989 was an average year, although, notably, it was the year in
which the Supreme Court pulled the rug out from under the Great Writ. See Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 289-91 (1989) (discussed supra notes 41, 47, 51 and accompanying
text).
93. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 13, app.tbl.1.
94. See id. It might be that the 103 cases decided as of 1998 will prove to have a
higher proportion of reversible error than the 160 cases awaiting review, so that the
executions-to-reversals rate will eventually be higher than the one to six rate revealed after
"only" nine years. One might expect inspections to find considerably fewer defective
products later in the inspection process than earlier in the process when clear defects are
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was finally reviewed during that nine-year period and who was executed,
exactly six inmates had their cases overturned in the courts.
This one-in-seven statistic still overestimates the likelihood of execution. It ignores the fact that there was no outcome as of nine years later
for 160 (61%) of the 263 people sentenced to die in 1989. 95 That is because the amount of state and federal judicial review needed to uncover
the astonishingly high number of reversible legal errors found in capital
96
judgments takes on average about eleven years per capital judgment.
No wonder, then, that the approximately 3600 people on death row as of
1999 had been there while their cases underwent review in the courts for
an average of 7.4 years. 9 7 And no wonder that those 3600 death row inmates comprised well more than half of the approximately 6700 individuals sentenced to die in the preceding twenty-seven years.9 8 So, not only are
a large majority of capital judgments ultimately found to be seriously legally flawed by the courts; worse, all of them are suspended for eleven
years on average while the massive error-detection operation proceeds.
From this perspective, the best description of our capital punishment system is that of the 6700 people sentenced to die between 1973 and 1999,
only 598-less than one in eleven-were executed. 99 About four times as
many had their capital judgments overturned or were granted
clemency. 100
What most condemned men and women do after being sentenced to
die is wait-for eleven years, on average. And what most of them, in realquickly spotted and removed. The study colleagues and I conducted of the rates of error
discovered in capital verdicts reviewed first on state direct appeal, then, if no reversible
error was found at that stage, in state post-conviction proceedings, and then, if no
reversible error was found, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, does not bear out this
hypothesis. Rather, we found that (1) from 1973 to 1995, the third, federal habeas, stage
of judicial inspection found reversible error in 40% of capital verdicts reviewed at that
stage, compared to 41% at the first, direct appeal stage and more than 10% at the second,
state post-conviction stage; and (2) rates of error discovered in earlier (state) and later
(federal) inspections are remarkably similar, whether the two rates are compared
nationally over the entire 23-year study period, by state, or by year. See Liebman et al., A
Broken System, supra note 81, at 26-27, 29-30, 38 fig.3, 62-66 & figs.9 & 10, 135 n.132.
These data suggest that the executions-to-reversals rate revealed after the relevant death
sentences are "only" nine years old is a decent predictor of the rate that will exist after all
the relevant judgments have been finally reviewed.
95. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 13 & app.tbl.1.
96. See id. at 12, tbl.12; infra notes 219, 245.
97. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 1, 14 app.tbl.2; Death Row USA, supra note
80, at 1.
98. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 13 app.tbl.1 (reporting that 6431
individuals were sentenced to die between 1973 and 1998, and revealing that the average
annual number of new admissions to death row from 1989 to 1998 was 288, thus
generating the 6700 estimate for death sentences as of 1999).
99. See id. (reporting that 500 persons were executed from 1973 to 1998); Death Row
USA, supra note 80, at 1 (reporting that 98 persons were executed in 1999). Returning to
our 1989 example, of the 263 people sentenced to die in 1989, only 13-less than one in
20-had been executed by 1998.
100. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 13 app.tbl.1.
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ity, are waiting for is not execution, but reversal of their capital judgments
because of serious legal error.
Is this, though, old news? Given that the number of executions has
risen dramatically as of late, 10 1 aren't these one-in-three, one-in-seven,
and one-in-eleven estimates a thing of the past? Not so. Even in a banner
year like 1999, when the number of executions reached a nearly fifty-year
high of ninety-eight10 2 only one death row inmate was executed for every
three people added to the row in the same year.1 03 Thus, as we will see
next, it is not a dramatic new will to kill, but the monotonous quartercentury drip, drip, drip of men and women accumulating on death row
and gradually exhausting their appeals, that has caused executions to
rise.
B. A Hint of Overproduction
Whatever one thinks of the death penalty, the numbers just discussed are disturbing. Any system generating two or more duds for every
keeper-and requiring more than a decade to find it-is irrational and
10 4
cries out for explanation.
101. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
102. See infra Table 1.
103. Given the current death row population and rate of death row admissions, it
would take 54 years, at a rate of one execution a day, 365 days a year, to reduce the number
of death row inmates to zero. See also David Bruck, On Death Row in Pretoria Central,
The New Republic, July 13 & 20, 1987, at 19 (estimating, in 1987, that it would take one
execution per day, every day, to eliminate the then-existing death row backlog, estimated at
1900, by the year 2000); BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 13 app.tbl.1 (reporting a death
row population of nearly 3500 in 1998, nearly double the reported 1987 population).
104. Two explanations besides those considered in the text deserve attention. The
first, suggested by a famous debate about eighteenth-century England-where, to overstate
things slightly, almost every crime was a felony subject to mandatory capital punishment,
but almost no one convicted of a felony was executed-prompts the question whether
evident irrationality obscures a highly functional system. In Douglas Hay's elegant and
controversial view, the eighteenth-century English death penalty was in fact a brilliant
method of preserving social control and hierarchy in a time of intense social dislocation of
the peasantry on its way to becoming the working class. See Douglas Hay, Property,
Authority and the Criminal Law, in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in EighteenthCentury England 17, 20, 25 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975). In Hay's view, letting the local
gentry decide which among the many criminals who could be prosecuted capitally were, and
which death sentences would be commuted by the crown, enabled the ruling class to
maintain social control by simultaneously terrorizing the lower classes with death sentences
and a few executions and co-opting them with myriad merciful dispensations. See id. at
46-49.
A similar ascription of method to the madness that otherwise bedevils the modern
American death penalty might focus on deterrence. Punitive deterrence classically
involves a trade-off between the diminished liberty of the punished miscreant and the
enhanced liberty of a more secure public. The theory thus prefers penalties that sacrifice
less of the convict's liberty without diminishing public safety. Assume, therefore, that
potential offenders to whom the deterrent regime addresses the cautionary tale of D's
punishment pay a lot more attention when D is sentenced to death than when he is
executed, and pay vastly more attention to both events than to D's release from death row
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on a legal ground years later. If that is so, it might make deterrent sense to sentence many
offenders to death with great fanfare, execute a small number with similar fanfare, while
sneaking the rest off death row when no one is looking-thus enhancing the lucky
prisoners' liberty while incurring little or no deterrent penalty.
This thesis has two problems. First, there is no evidence that the American system of
capital punishment is even modestly focused on deterrence. Most people who support the
death penalty do so despite doubts that it deters. See Samuel R. Gross, Update: American
Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1448, 1459
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 437-39
(1999). These doubts are well-founded. See, e.g., David Lester, The Death Penalty: Issues
and Answers 83-100 (2d ed. 1998) (concluding that economic studies provide inconclusive
evidence of the deterrent effect of the death penalty); Ruth D. Peterson & William C.
Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of
Social Science Research, in America's Experiment with Capital Punishment 157, 173-74,
177 (James R Acker et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that "evidence against capital punishment
as an effective deterrent is extensive and cannot be dismissed"); Michael L. Radelet &
Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1, 7-9, 12-15 (1996) (reporting that 94% of criminologists surveyed
found weak or no empirical support for the deterrent effects of the death penalty). More
important, unlike eighteenth-century England's mandatory death penalty, which was
carried out in properly deterrent-meaning brutal and terrorizing-fashion, in the town
square on market day, preceded by fiery sermonizing on the object lesson intended
thereby, see Hay, supra, at 31, the late twentieth-century American death penalty seems
designed to minimize deterrence. To begin with, the imposition of death sentences today is
highly discretionary (mandatory death sentencing being constitutionally forbidden, see
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)), and occurs in only a tiny
proportion of murder cases, see infra Table 4. Moreover, the sentence is executed using
"humane" methods that dispatch "mad-dog" killers via technologies developed to "put" the
beloved Fido "to sleep." See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (noting that executions by lethal injection rely on drugs and
procedures initially developed to euthanize family pets); Bill Dedman, Supreme Court to
Review Use of Electric Chair, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1999, at A24 (34 of 38 capital-sentencing
states now use lethal injection as the sole or principal method of execution). Finally,
modern executions occur in secret, in the wee hours of the morning, at a prison in the
middle of nowhere, with the public, via the electronic media, sedulously excluded (see
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 1995 WL 489485 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 1991); ACLU of Northern
California, Press Release, ACLU Challenges San Quentin's Secret Execution Procedures,
Feb. 14, 2000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (criticizing California's rule barring
reporters from viewing important stages of lethal injection process); cf. Jef I. Richards & R.
Bruce Easter, Televising Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Public Hangings, 40
UCLA L. Rev. 381, 420 (1992) (arguing that regulations forbidding media coverage of
executions violate the First Amendment)), and with only the family of the victim present, if
they please, see Thomas Zolper, Whitman Adds to Victims' Families' Rights, The Record
(Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 24, 1999, at A4 (discussing New Jersey law permitting kin of
murder victims to witness executions). See generally Jonathan S. Abernethy, The
Methodology of Death: Reexamining the Deterrence Rationale, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 379, 422 (1996) (arguing that, given legislators' explanation of the death penalty as
necessary for deterrence purposes, "death penalty states ought to publicize and dramatize
their executions in an attempt to instill fear in those who might be tempted to commit
murder... [and] to utilize severe methods of killing capital offenders," but "contrary to
what logic seems to dictate, the attempt over time has been to make the penalty of death
gentle, hidden, and antiseptic"). Nor are death-sentence reversals the low-impact events
that this deterrence theory imagines. On the contrary, the passionate dissenting opinions,
media frenzy, and venting of spleen by local officials that accompany many such
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An obvious explanation is suggested in Part I: Post-trial review is the
enemy of substantive capital punishment, neutralizing two (or more) of
every three death sentences imposed.
I have two reasons for questioning this explanation. To begin with,
the numbers suggest that trial and post-trial criminal procedural rights
and the administration of substantive capital criminal law are not as inversely related as observers have long thought. Although a steady accretion of procedural and post-trial review rights through the early or mid1980s has been followed by their steady diminution ever since, the number of executions each year has been more volatile than a strictly inverse
relationship would predict, as Table 1 shows. And the number of executions per capita remains well below the levels reached prior to the Crimi105
nal Procedure Revolution, as Table 2 reveals.
reversals-often equaling or outstripping the publicity given to death sentences when
imposed and carried out-surely does more deterrent harm than liberty-hoarding good.
See, e.g., infra note 236.
A second explanation might be the highly retributivecharacter of a modern American
"death" sentence. More accurately described, that penalty is "life in prison without
possibility of parole but with the uncertain and unpredictable possibility of execution some
years later." The highly retributive nature of this psychologically agonizing penalty can
hardly be doubted. Indeed, under accepted human rights norms, this penalty is the
equivalent of torture. See, e.g., Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769,
770-71 (P.C. 1993) (holding that detention longer than five years between death sentence
and execution is presumptively cruel and inhuman); Soering v. United Kingdom &
Germany, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989) (upholding refusal to extradict
capitally charged individuals to the United States because an American capital sentence
would involve suffering of "exceptional intensity or duration" in violation of human rights
norms); see also Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (urging Court to grant review of claim that confinement on death row
for 23 years prior to execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Jones v. State,
740 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that prompt action by court in capital cases is
required by "judicial economy and a sense of justice"); Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate
Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 147, 211 (1998) ("Under [Supreme Court's] objective
criteria. .. inordinate delay between the imposition of a sentence and the actual execution
of a capital defendant violates the Eighth Amendment."). Even so, this second proffered
explanation of American capital punishment as a system is not convincing. If the penalty is
designed to be more retributive than death, it fails. Only a small fraction of death row
inmates volunteer to be executed immediately to avoid the delay and uncertainty to which
the theory's claim of hyper-retribution is tied. See Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 9-20.
And allowing prisoners to opt out of delay and uncertainty by consenting to be executed is
hardly consistent with an intention to maximize those, by hypothesis, retributive aspects of
the modern death penalty. If, instead, the penalty is designed to be less retributive than
death, but more than life without parole, for those who end up escaping execution, there
still would have to be some proportionality-based logic to the allocation of death and the
lesser penalty, which there evidently is not. And "delay" would be perceived as a good
thing by all except those on death row, not the other way around.
105. This is so, even though per capita incarceration is now much higher than when
executions per capita were at their peak. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics 1998, at 490 tbl.2 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore, eds.) (per capita
incarceration rates in the 1930s and 1940s, when per capita executions were at their peak,
ranged from 98 to 137 per 100,000 residents; from 1990 to 1997, incarceration rates rose
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from 297 to 445 per 100,000 residents).
Consider also that two of the 38 American death-sentencing states, Texas and Virginia,
account for nearly half of the executions during the 1990s period of increased executions.
When only executions in the other 36 capital-sentencing states are considered, the increase
is not so dramatic, and only once (1999) has exceeded an average of one execution per
state for the year:

Total Executions
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total

23
14
31
38
31
56
45
74
68
98
478

Executions in States
Other than
Texas and Virginia
16
7
15
16
15
32
34
28
35
49
247 (52%)

Id. at 537 tbl.6.92; Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 11-19; see Frank Green, Virginia
Bucks Death Row Flow, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 13, 2000, at Al. That 11 of the
Supreme Court's last 16 decisions on the merits in capital cases have occurred in cases in
which the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have affirmed Virginia capital
judgments provides some support for the argument offered below that post-trial review
serves the function of winnowing excess death sentences following their "overproduction"
at the trial stage. Because the Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have the
lowest reversal rates in capital cases of, respectively, any state supreme court or federal
circuit court in the nation, see Green, supra; Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note
81, at 47-49, 57, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68-72, 103-07 & tbls.4, 7, 10, 25 & figs.8-13, 33, the
Supreme Court may feel that the winnowing task falls to it in Virginia capital cases. See
Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 2114 (2000) (affirming 4th Circuit decision); Terry
Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1495 (2000) (reversing 4th Circuit decision); Michael
Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1479, 1479 (2000) (reversing 4th Circuit decision in part);
Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 727, 727 (2000) (affirming 4th Circuit decision); Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 265 (1999) (affirming 4th Circuit decision, but rejecting most of
lower court's analysis); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 116 (1999) (reversing Virginia Supreme Court decision); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998) (per curiam) (affirming 4th Circuit decision); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 270 (1998) (affirming
4th Circuit decision); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 152 (1997) (affirming 4th Circuit decision); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 154 (1996) (vacating 4th Circuit decision); Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 11 (1995) (per curiam) (vacating 4th Circuit
decision). See also Greenhouse, supra note 71 (noting an "unusual flurry" of four certiorari grants in capital cases in the Supreme Court's 1999 Term, three of which were in
Virginia/4th Circuit cases); Brooke A. Masters, 4th Circuit Is Steering Hard to the Right,
Wash. Post, July 5, 2000, at B1 (finding in recent Supreme Court decisions a message "that
the 4th Circuit had gone too far in death-penalty cases"); Tim McGlone, State's Death-Row
Cases Draw High-Court Scrutiny, The Virginian-Pilot, Dec. 9, 1999, at Al (describing recent Supreme Court decisions as "applying the highest level of scrutiny in modern times to
[Virginia's] handling of death penalty cases").
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TABLE

1966-76
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

1:

ANNUAL EXECUTIONS BETWEEN

Nonconsensual Executions
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
5
21
14
17
23
10
14
16
14
30
31
27
49
37
70
58
88

1966

AND 1998106

Total Executions
0
1
0

2
0
1
2
5
21
18
18
25
11
16
23
14
31
38
31
56
45
74
68
98

106. Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 21-23. This table considers nonconsensual
executions as well as total executions (which include those occurring voluntarily in
advance of full judicial review) because the former provide a more appropriate focus
whenever, as here, the question is how many death sentences have been deemed by a full
complement of courts to be free of reversible legal error.
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AVERAGE EXECUTIONS PER CAPITA IN THE UNITED STATES,

1930-1996107

Year

Population

Executions

Executions per
million population

1930
1940
1950
1960
1965
1970
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

123,076,741
132,122,446
152,271,417
180,671,158
194,302,963
205,052,174
211,908,788
213,853,928
215,973,199
218,035,164
220,239,425
222,584,545
225,055,487
227,224,681
229,465,714
231,664,458
233,791,994
235,824,902
237,923,795
240,132,887
242,288,918
244,498,982
246,819,230
249,464,396
252,153,092
255,029,699
257,782,608
260,327,021
262,803,276
265,228,572
267,783,607
270,248,003
272,690,813

155
124
82
56
7
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
5
21
18
18
25
11
16
23
14
31
38
31
56
45
74
68
98

1.26
0.94
0.54
0.31
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.10
0.04
0.06
0.09
0.06
0.12
0.15
0.12
0.21
0.17
0.28
0.25
0.36

107. Execution data is from Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 9; 1997 Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 65, at 538 tbl.6.88. Population data is from U.S.
Census Bureau, Historical National Population Estimates (last modified June 28, 2000)
<http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt>.
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TABLE 3: AvERAGE ANNUAL NONCONSENSUAL EXECUTIONS

1966-76
1977-83
1984-91
1992-94
1995-98
1999

0
1
16
29
53
88

Even acknowledging that it is possible to smooth out the curve (as
Table 3 does by analyzing average annual executions in uneven groups of
years), there is reason to doubt whether events in recent years (the demise
of proceduralism) as opposed to ones in earlier years (when proceduralism was in full flower) account for most of the increase. Consider that
the post-Furman record number of executions in a year, set in 1999-88
nonconsensual executions (98 if volunteers count) 1 08 -represented less
than three percent of those on death row. Consider also, as noted above,
that with 300 new death sentences each year for decades, but with many
fewer executions, inmates have been steadily piling up on death row:
The individuals executed against their will in 1998 (the last year in which
the relevant data are available) were sentenced on average about eleven
(and in some cases more than twenty) years before. 10 9 As the number of
prisoners "awaiting execution" rises, one would also expect executions to
rise simply because of the pile-up (i.e., due to events going back decades,
when current inmates were first admitted to death row). Instead of the
raw number of executions each year, it thus makes sense to consider the
prnportion of death row inmates executed each year.
The right-most two columns in Table 4 present that information, revealing that the proportion of death row executed annually has not risen
nearly as fast or as steadily as the raw number of executions (shown in
Table 3). Indeed, as Figure 1 demonstrates, although the number of executions (the middle curve) has risen substantially, the rate of death row
inmates executed (the bottom curve) has been remarkably low and flat.
(As Figure 2 shows-by magnifying the rate of death row inmates executed ten-fold-that rate has not been entirely flat. But it has been much
flatter than the number of executions.) Thus, what appears to be dragging the number of executions (the middle curve) upward is not an increase in the nation's deadly intestinal fortitude but, instead, the sharp
and steady rise in the number of death row inmates (the top curve) as a
result of the nation's ongoing inability to get death sentences right at trial
or to catch the many errors in less than a decade each. The bare fact that
108. See Death Row USA, supra note 80, at 21-23; supra note 106.
109. See BJS 1998 Report, supra note 84, at 12, tbl.12; supra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text. As of December 31, 1998, there were 45 people on death row who had
been there for more than 20 years. See id.; see also Elias & Fried, supra note 85 (reporting
that, of the 555 men and women on California's death row, 109 (20%) have been there for
15 years or longer).
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nonconsensual executions in the modern era have never topped 2.5%
(one inforty) of the inmates on death row in a given year, and in the 1990s
have averaged about 1.3% (one in seventy-six) of those inmates, is itself a
telling datum about the anemic relationship between the number of people put on death row and the number we "mean" to execute. 110
Results from the study colleagues and I conducted provide further
reason to doubt the explanatory power of the zero-sum, substance-procedure assumption. For one thing, from 1983 through 1995 (the last year
data are available), state direct appeal and federal habeas corpus reversal
rates in capital cases were rather stable-combined, they hovered around
sixty percent-while state post-conviction reversals may have increased,
notwithstanding the supposed collapse during those years of the procedural rights on which the obstructionism theory rests."1 ' For another thing,
110. The San Jose Mercury News's recent analysis of the aftermath of California death
sentences provides a telling case study:
Since [1978], the state's death row has mushroomed to 564 condemned inmates,
the largest in the nation. But its enormity is misleading: The state's capital
punishment system is collapsing under its own weight, the victim of a paralyzed
legal system ....
[Darrell] Rich, who spent 19 years [on death row] despite his failure to win a
single appeal, is scheduled on Wednesday to become just the eighth man put to
death since the state's voters restored capital punishment in 1978. He most likely
will be the only inmate executed in California this year [1999].
A Mercury News examination of California's capital punishment system shows
that Rich's case is no aberration. In fact, given the odds, there was a much better
chance Rich would die of natural causes than lethal injection ... : 17 condemned
inmates have simply expired on death row . . . . An additional 13 death row
convicts have committed suicide ....
There are more than 100 inmates at San Quentin who have spent 15 years or
more on death row ....
Nearly half the condemned population has been on
death row for at least 10 years ....
Mintz, California Gridlock, supra note 91. Although California prosecutors and juries have
long put about 36 inmates on death row each year-exhibiting "the eagerness of 'death
belt' states like Texas and Florida"-the state supreme court decides only 14 capital cases a
year. Id. (Even when conservative Malcolm Lucas headed the court, and it affirmed 96%
of the death cases it reviewed in 10 years, it still only processed 24 cases a year.) And each
case remains under review in the state courts for an average of eight to ten years-three to
five years devoted to finding a lawyer able to take the appeal; a year or two more to process
the record; the rest in briefing and deliberation-followed by the same period in the
federal courts. Id. No executions occurred in California between 1978 and 1991; between
1992 (when the death row population was 350) and 1999 (when the number reached
about 550), seven executions occurred, compared to approximately 22 state and federal
court reversals. See id.; Elias & Fried, supra note 85; see also Green, supra note 105
("Twenty-four years after the U.S. Supreme Court allowed states to bring back the death
penalty, 38 have chosen to do so, but only one, Virginia, is now executing the condemned
at a faster pace than they enter death row"; whereas Virginia added 7 people to its death
row and executed 14 in 1999, Texas, California, and Florida added, respectively, 48, 36,
and 15, but only executed 35, 2, and 1; Illinois with 161 and Pennsylvania with 223 people
on death row each executed only I person); supra note 91 (discussing comparable
situation in other states).
111. See Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 35-39 & figs.3-4.
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POPULATION, EXECUTIONS, AND PERCENT

EXECUTED,

1973-1999

Initial Death New Death Total Death
Total
Nonconsen.
% Noncon.
Row Pop.
Sentences
Row Pop. Executions Executions % Executed Executions

Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

334
134
244
488
420
423
483
595
697
863
1073
1216
1421
1589
1800
1964
2111
2232
2346
2466
2575
2716
2890
3064
3242
3328
3452

42
149
298
233
137
187
152
174
229
268
254
283
268
299
289
291
263
252
264
289
291
321
322
317
274
285
300

376
283
542
721
557
610
635
769
926
1131
1327
1499
1689
1888
2089
2255
2374
2484
2610
2755
2866
3037
3212
3381
3516
3613
3752

0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
5
21
18
18
25
11
16
23
14
31
38
31
56
45
74
68
98

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
5
21
14
17
23
10
14
16
14
30
31
27
49
37
70
58
88

0
0
0
0
.18
0
.31
0
.11
.18
.38
1.40
1.07
.95
1.20
.49
.67
.93
.54
1.13
1.33
1.02
1.74
1.33
2.10
1.88
2.61

0
0
0
0
0
0
.16
0
0
.09
.38
1.40
.83
.90
1.10
.44
.59
.64
.54
1.09
1.08
.89
1.53
1.09
1.99
1.61
2.37

Sources: BJS 1998 Cap. Pun. Study (death row pop.; 1999 is est.); Death Row U.S.A., Winter 2000
(executions)

our study found evidence that states that impose more death sentences
per capita or per homicide tend to carry out the death sentences they
impose less frequently, suggesting a correlation between overuse of the
death penalty and commission of the kinds of reversible errors that keep
1 12
death sentences from being carried out.
Preliminary results from a follow-up study provide additional hints of
what is at work here besides procedural obstructionism, namely, trial-level
overproduction of death sentences and post-trial substantive winnowing.
The data indicate that the likelihood of relief on state direct appeal and
federal habeas corpus are positively correlated with:
1. each other-suggesting that federal habeas relief is not driven by
problems on state direct appeal (or by figments of federal judges' imaginations), but that relief at both post-trial stages is driven by the same kinds
113
of trial "errors";

112. See id. at 78-87.
113. See id. at 62-66 & figs.9-10.
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2. a state's death sentences per capita, per homicide, and per dollar
spent on the criminal justice system and how quickly after Furman the
state adopted a death sentencing statute, sentenced under it, and executed someone under it-suggesting that post-trial relief is a function of
a state's (meaning, its prosecutors') propensity to use the death
1 14
penalty;
114. See id. at 96-99 & figs.29-30; see also John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg,
Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 465, 469 (1999) ("The [per-murder] rate at which states impose [death] sentences
strongly correlates with the rate at which [post-sentence] relief was obtained from those
sentences."). There is no doubt that some prosecutors use the death penalty at vastly
higher rates than others. As Richard Willing and Gary Fields report, "[f]ifteen counties
account for nearly a third of all prisoners sentenced to death [in the United States] but
only one-ninth of the population of the states with capital punishment":
Baltimore [Maryland] ... has averaged 320 murders a year in the 1990s, but it
had only one person on death row lastJan. 1. Suburban Baltimore County, which
has averaged 29 murders a year during the same period, had four on death row.
Hamilton County, Ohio, which includes Cincinnati, had 50 people on death row
as of lastJan. 1. Up Interstate 71, prosecutors in Franklin County, which includes
Columbus, had only 11 on death row, though the county's population is 14%
larger than Hamilton's and it has twice as many murders. Tiny Baldwin County,
Ga., population 42,000, had five people on death row, one more than Fulton
county, which includes Atlanta and has 722,400 people. Fulton County averages
230 murders a year, Baldwin County about two. . . . In Texas, Harris County
(Houston) ... accounts for... 140... of the state's death row inmates.... Dallas,
with a higher murder rate, has only 37 people on death row ....
Oklahoma
City... accounts for 62 of its death row inmates .... Tulsa..., with a population
80% the size of Oklahoma [City's] and a murder rate nearly as high, sentenced
only 19 killers to death.
Richard Willing & Gary Fields, Geography of the Death Penalty, USA Today, Dec. 20, 1999,
at ]A; see also Brief of Virginia College of Criminal Defense Attorneys and Virginia Trial
Lawyers Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *6-*8, Williams v. Taylor,
120 S. Ct. 1479 (No. 98-8384) (2000) ("More defendants [6.5% of the state's total] have
been sentenced to death in the Circuit Court of the City of Danville [with .8% of the state's
population] than in any otherjurisdiction in Virginia."); Barry Nakell & Kenneth A. Hardy,
The Arbitrariness of the Death Penalty 125-29 (1987) (noting that a study of charging
decisions in 661 potentially capital cases in North Carolina found different capital
indictment rates that "cannot be explained by the quality of the evidence in the cases");
Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27, 327 (1988) (concluding based on
statistical analysis that prosecutorial decisionmaking in 703 potentially capital cases in New
Jersey "varie[d] greatly across counties and result[ed] in an overall capital case processing
system which is impermissibly arbitrary"); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of
Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1067, 1074 (1983) (concluding based on statistical study that "the chances of
a first degree [i.e., capital] indictment for otherwise comparable cases were significantly
greater in the central region than elsewhere in Florida"); Norman Lefstein, Reform of
Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its Implications for
the Nation, 29 Ind. L. Rev. 495, 530 (1996) (contrasting capital charging and sentencing
practices in Houston (population 2.8 million, 174 death penalty jury trials between 1984
and 1993, 64 such trials between 1992 and 1994, 108 death row inmates as of 1994) and
Dallas (population 1.8 million, 35 death penaltyjury trials between 1984 and 1993, 5 such
trials between 1992 and 1994, 31 death row inmates as of 1994));John M. Baer, Faulkner,

2000]

THE OVERPRODUCTION OF DEATH

2069

3. state judges' vulnerability to partisan political discipline and other
political measures-suggesting a relationship between relief and incentives to over-convict and over-sentence;1 15 and
4. the relative weakness of the evidence and low levels of aggravation
net of mitigation in the case-suggesting that post-trial review focuses in
part at least on substantive as opposed to procedural considerations.1 16
Mumia in Mix, State Senate Hearing Set on Moratorium for Death Penalty, Phila. Daily
News, Feb. 21, 2000, at 7 (noting that Philadelphia, with 13% of Pennsylvania's population,
is responsible for 55% (126/230) of the state's death row population; 88% of the inmates
the Philadelphia district attorney put on death row are African American or Latino); Tina
Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. Times, July 16, 1995, (Magazine), at 21, 42, 46 (describing
Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham's policy of seeking the death penalty in all
homicide cases with a statutory aggravating circumstance present-including many
domestic homicides that virtually no other prosecutor in the country treats as potentially
capital-with the result that her county's "death-row population of 105 [as of mid-1995] is
the third largest of any county's in the nation, close behind Houston's Harris County and
Los Angeles County [which are] far more populous and murderous than Philadelphia";
noting that prosecutors in Pittsburgh's Allegheny County sought the death penalty in only
eight cases in 1994, compared to Philadelphia prosecutors, who did so in at least 59, and
that prosecutors in Houston (itself a high death-sentencing county) sought the death
penalty in only seven cases and succeeded only 6 times in 1991, compared to Philadelphia
where prosecutors sought the death penalty at least 59, and succeeded 12, times in 1991);
cf. Richard Willing, Reno Shows Reserve on Death Penalty, USA Today, June 14, 1999, at
8A [hereinafter Willing, Reno Shows Reserve] (reporting that although her predecessor
Attorneys General approved proposed capital prosecutions 90% of the time, Attorney
General Janet Reno has done so only 30% of the time).
Statewide factors also contribute to higher or lower death-sentencing rates. See
Rosenberg, supra, at 25 (noting that Pennsylvania's large number of statutory aggravating
circumstances (originally 10; subsequently increased to 17), and the practice there of
charging all killings as potentially capital "criminal homicides" and allowing jurors to select
the degree, rather than requiring prosecutors from the start to choose between capital
murder or a lesser, noncapital degree, make it much easier for prosecutors there than in
other states to proceed capitally). For impressionistic evidence that high capital
sentencing jurisdictions have high capital error rates, see Ken Armstrong, "Cowboy Bob"
Ropes Wins-But at Considerable Cost, Chi. Trib., Jan. 10, 1999, at N13 [hereinafter
Armstrong, Cowboy Bob] (discussed infra notes 172-173 and accompanying text); Ken
Armstrong & Steve Mills, Flawed Murder Cases Prompt Calls for Probe, Chi. Trib., Jan. 24,
2000, at NI [hereinafter Armstrong & Mills, Flawed Cases] (noting that Cook County
prosecutors tried eight of the 13 men falsely sentenced to die in Illinois between 1978 and
early 2000); Eric Zorn, Daley's Oversight of Prosecutors Didn't Do Justice to the Job, Chi.
Trib., Nov. 16, 1999, at Ni [hereinafter Zorn, Daley's Oversight] (reporting that 76 of
Illinois's 285 death row inmates in the post-Furman era (as of 1999) were put there by
lawyers under Cook County state's attorney Richard M. Daley before he was elected Mayor;
46 of those cases (61%) were thereafter reversed by state and federal courts).
115. See Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 93-96 & figs.27-28
(developing evidence suggesting that political pressure on judges may contribute to high
death sentencing rates which, in turn, may contribute to high error rates which, in turn,
may lead to low rates at which death sentences are carried out). See also Stephen B. Bright
& PatrickJ. Keenan,Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 776-80 (1995) (showing that
judges in nearly all capital punishment states are elected).
116. Initial analyses by colleagues and myself suggest that federal habeas reversals are
correlated to relatively weak evidence of guilt and low levels of aggravation net of mitigation.
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The last datum is hardly news, moreover, given (1) the substancefocused sufficiency-of-the-evidence, prejudice, materiality, and harmless
1 17
error standards that now dominate much of capital post-trial review;
(2) the expanding post-trial use of DNA and other investigative techniques for exonerative purposes during post-trial proceedings; 118 (3) the
Supreme Court's and Congress's increasingly frequent treatment of innocence and "innocence of the death penalty" as "gateways" to habeas review and relief (albeit only upon a concurrent finding of a procedural
violation);' 19 (4) the Court's halting recognition of a right not to be exe117. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-96 (1999) (finding that capital
prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence was not unconstitutional because
withheld evidence was not "material" in the sense that it probably affected the outcome);
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627-38 (1993) (replacing harmless error standard
that previously had applied in habeas proceedings with more demanding outcome-focused
standard taken from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-302 (1991) (applying harmless error analysis to admission
of coerced confession at capital trial); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988)
(applying harmless error standard to the unconstitutional admission of expert testimony at
capital trial); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984) (holding that
incompetent representation by counsel did not warrant reversal of conviction or death
sentence because error did not demonstrably affect the outcome); Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 313-24 (1979) (denying habeas relief based on constitutional sufficiency-ofevidence claim because evidence permitted rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt).
118. See, e.g., Bill Dedman, DNA Evidence Frees Two in Murder Case, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, Apr. 25, 1999, at 20 (discussing two Oklahoma inmates' release from life and
death sentences based on DNA exoneration and noting that "the men are the 61st and
62nd inmates in the nation to be exonerated by DNA evidence, according to the Justice
Department," and that "Williamson is the 78th person in the country since 1970 to be
cleared after being on death row"); John McCormick, Coming Two Days Shy of
Martyrdom, Newsweek, Feb. 15, 1999, at 35 (discussing success of investigative journalism
class conducted by Professor David Protess of Northwestern University in helping to clear
death row inmate Anthony Porter and four other inmates by recreating crime scenes,
tracking down alternative suspects, reinterviewing witnesses, and the like); cf. Henry
Weinstein, Many Resist DNA Testing for Inmates, L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 2000, at Al
[hereinafter Weinstein, Many Resist DNA Testing] (reporting that many prosecutors resist
requirements to save biological samples and to make them available for DNA testing by
convicted felons who claim they are innocent, notwithstanding the 64 DNA-based
exonerations as of then in the United States, and the growing chorus of support for
liberalized prisoner access to DNA testing).
119. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b),
2254(e) (Supp. IV 1998) (permitting habeas review despite otherwise preclusive failure to
raise or develop claim earlier when there is clear and convincing evidence that, but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the
crime); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-14 (1995) (permitting habeas review of
otherwise defaulted claim upon sufficient showing that petitioner is actually innocent);
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1992) (forbidding habeas review of procedurally
defaulted claim attacking death sentence because "actual innocence" exception to
procedural default bar requires proof, at least, that but for a constitutional violation, the
defendant would not have been eligible for the death penalty, and is not satisfied by proof
that but for the violation the defendant would have presented additional mitigating
evidence, or even by proof that but for the violation the mitigating circumstances would
likely have outweighed the aggravating circumstances, warranting a life sentence); Jordan
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cuted when innocent; 20 and (5) its recognition of a right to, typically
appellate, resentencing upon a conclusion that the jury may have sentenced the defendant to die without a proper determination of whether
he satisfied the minimum levels of culpability, 12 1 aggravation, 122 and aggravation net of mitigation required for a death sentence.12 3 Given these
substance-driven innovations, it no longer is accurate to associate posttrial review exclusively with enforcing procedural rights as opposed to
1 24
substantive defenses to conviction or a death sentence.
Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 308, 375-80 (1993)
(exploring the new "innocence-focus" of modem habeas law and asking whether it
supports habeas review of "bare-innocence" claims); cf. Steiker, Excessive Proceduralism,
supra note 2, at 327 (noting "absurdity" of fact that making a colorable showing of
innocence "is only an occasion for reaching the merits of [the] constitutional claims," so
that if those "claims turn out to be unpersuasive, the court must deny relief" to a likely
innocent prisoner). The relevance of innocence is a recent innovation. See Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (habeas applies "regardless of the heinousness of the crime ...
[or] the apparent guilt of the offender"); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923)
(Holmes, J.) ("[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas] is not the petitioners' innocence
or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved.");
1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 2.5 (discussing the relevance of innocence to habeas
corpus relief), Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 142 (1970) (acknowledging but criticizing doctrine
limiting habeas to procedural error irrespective of guilt or innocence).
120. See Schiup, 513 U.S. at 314 n.28, 315-16 & n.32, 317 ("In Herrera,we assumed for
the sake of argument that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of actual
innocence . . . would render the execution . . . unconstitutional, and warrant federal

habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim"; "[iun such a
case.., it is appropriate to apply an extraordinarily high standard of review," requiring "a
truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence" (internal quotations omitted)).
121. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (ruling that death
penalty is proper only if the defendant was an active accomplice in events leading up to,
and was at least grossly reckless with regard to, the killing); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 798 (1982) (holding that death sentence was excessive penalty for defendant who was
minor participant in events leading to killing and did not kill or intend or attempt to kill).
122. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360-66 (1988) (holding that
death sentence was invalid because it was premised on statutory aggravating circumstance
that was unconstitutionally vague); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980)
(holding that death sentence was invalid because it was based on a statutory aggravating
circumstance that did not meaningfully distinguish defendants who should live from those
who should die because it was not defined or applied in a principled manner).
123. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1992) (ruling that appellate
court that has struck down an aggravating circumstance on which a death sentence was
based may affirm the death sentence if, and only if, it reweighs valid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances or conducts harmless error review); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S.
308, 319-20 (1991) (similar); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 751-52 (1990)
(similar); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1986) (ruling that, on remand, some
state court must determine whether defendant had sufficient culpability to permit death
sentence under Enmund, but permitting state supreme court to make the necessary factual
determination itself, without remanding to trial level for a new sentencing hearing).
124. Also suggesting that post-trial review is crucial to the substantive functioning of
the system are: (1) multi-layered, repetitive review (suggesting that so little quality control
during the production process requires so many inspectors in succession at the end of the
process to find the duds); (2) reforms that do all sorts of things except decrease the number
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These empirical results are too preliminary to be relied upon here.
They have, though, set me thinking about a second reason to doubt the
view that trial-level actors usually "get it right" substantively only to have
their handiwork diminished by the discovery of "merely technical" violations on post-trial procedural review. That reason-the focus of the rest
of this Article-emerges from an effort to identify the probable extent,
and allocation, of the rewards and harms of imposing undeserved death
sentences. This effort suggests that the rewards and harms are immense,
but that the benefits go almost entirely to trial-level actors-police, prosecutors, trial judges, and jurors-and are largely undiminished by anything defense counsel do at trial, while the costs fall almost entirely elsewhere. In other words, if you were a capital prosecutor, it might be in
your interest to obtain as many capital sentences as possible-including
even undeserved ones-along with the political capital (pun intended)
they bring with them, because the onus of any mistakes you make will fall
elsewhere.

of layers and actually add layers, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) (3), 2254(b) (3) (Supp. TV
1998) (AEDPA provisions adding new "gate keeping" layer of court of appeals review in
advance of district court review in successive petition cases and directing federal habeas
courts to require exhaustion of state remedies even when lawyers for state fail to object to
lack of exhaustion in timely manner); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1999)
(holding that exhaustion of state remedies sufficient to permit habeas review requires
petition for discretionary state supreme court review of lower state court decision, even
though state law discourages such petitions); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982)
(concluding that district court may not adjudicate claims in habeas petition as to which
state remedies have been exhausted if petition also contains other claims as to which
exhaustion has not occurred; instead, "district court must dismiss such 'mixed petitions,'
leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of
amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims," thereby
waiving the excised claims); Howard Mintz, The Capital Punishment Gridlock: Federal
Reform Fails to Speed Up Process, San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 13, 2000, at 8A
[hereinafter Mintz, Capital Punishment Gridlock) (discussed infra note 253 and
accompanying text); (3) emphasis on substance-focused "materiality" and/or "prejudice"
tests that require evidence of innocence or nondesert of the death penalty that did not
come out at trial, see Steiker, Excessive Proceduralism, supra note 2, at 318; leading (4) to
an overall system in which courts have multiple ways to avoid adjudicating the validity of
procedures when there is no "desert" issue that cries out for relief, but multiple ways
around those barriers where qualms about "desert" do impel relief; and (5) evidence that
the effect of a post-trial reversal of a capital verdict is often not a new trial with the same
outcome, but a lesser punishment upon settlement or a lesser verdict on retrial, see, e.g.,
Liebman et al., Capital Attrition, supra note 81, at 1851-52 & fig.1 (reporting that
nationally 82% of retrials following reversals of capital verdicts on state post-conviction
review between 1973 and 2000 resulted in a sentence less than death or no sentence at all,
including 7% that resulted in acquitals); Moore, supra note 84 (discussing Kerry Max
Cook's four trials for rape and murder, the first three of which ended in death sentences
and the fourth in a plea bargain to time served); Rhett Morgan, Killer's Death Sentence
Overturned, Tulsa World, Apr. 4, 2000, at 23 (discussing decision of Oklahoma jury to
sentence Benny Dwight Jones to life without parole at his third trial; both prior trials had
resulted in death sentences that the Oklahoma high court overturned due to legal error).
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C. Why Overproduction Might Occur
In considering why the overproduction of death sentences might occur, it is helpful to contrast what might be called the "dedicated prodeath penalty forces" and the "dedicated anti-death penalty forces." The
dedicated pro-death penalty forces are local police and prosecutors.
They care deeply about getting death sentences; they are competent and
energetic and thus quite good at accomplishing that goal; and there are a
lot of them, with a fair amount of resources that are concentrated at the
trial level. By contrast, the anti-death penalty forces are made up mainly
of privately funded death penalty lawyers; they care deeply about stopping executions; they are competent and energetic and thus quite good
at accomplishing that goal; but there are only a few of them-certainly no
more than 250, even when hangers-on are counted-and very early on
they made a crucial (probably disastrous, though probably unavoidable)
strategic decision to concentrate their efforts at the post-conviction stages,
causing the state to expend huge amounts of resources at those same
stages to counter their efforts. The result is that the pro-death penalty
forces have their way at trial, essentially generating as many death
sentences as it is professionally rewarding to generate, while anti-death
penalty lawyers are able at the later stages of the process, if not to have
their way, then at least to have substantial success exposing the astonishingly high amounts of error rates documented above. Let me explain,
beginning with the anti-death penalty bar.
1. The Anti-Death Penalty Strategy: Keep the Powder Dry. - The antideath penalty bar has three crucial traits: It is small and poorly
funded,1 25 competent and strategic, and attracts large amounts of opposing resources when and where it chooses to intervene. Arrayed before
125. See generally Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 535, 537-43 (1995) (describing the patterns of capital representation in the
South and in California and the "infamously low" fees for such work that are provided in
some states); Richard J. Wilson & Robert L. Spangenberg, State Post-Conviction
Representation of Defendants Sentenced to Death, 72 Judicature 331, 333-37 (1989)
(detailing the results of a study of state law governing appointment of counsel in capital
state post-conviction proceedings and the poor compensation of court-appointed attorneys
in that context). On the shortage of counsel, see McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1262
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing availability of
counsel in Texas capital post-conviction proceedings and concluding that "[c]apital
defendants . . .must rely almost exclusively on volunteer private counsel . . .who are
increasingly difficult to find"); John C. Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death
Sentenced Inmates, Lecture delivered before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (Apr.
29, 1987), in 42 Rec. of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 859, 866 (1987) ("Most
states have had no effective means of appointing or supplying counsel at the state habeas
level [of capital cases]."); Esther F. Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The Last Best Hope:
Representing Death Row Inmates, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 213, 217 (1989) (arguing that "the
courts, the legal profession and society face a growing crisis in securing counsel" in capital
cases, particularly at the appellate and post-conviction levels); Kozinski & Gallagher,
Honest Death Penalty, supra note I (noting that the capital context is "the one area where
there aren't nearly enough lawyers willing and able to handle all the current cases").
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these lawyers is an immense pyramid of cases, in only a few of which they
can intervene. At the pyramid's broad base are homicide cases in death
penalty states in which a prosecutor might decide to bring a capital
charge. 126 Stacked on top of that layer are progressively narrower but
still broad layers of cases. First comes a layer of cases in which defendants
have been capitally charged but their trials may or may not eventuate in a
capital conviction and, if they do, may or may not prompt a capital sentencing hearing. Second is a layer of cases in which death sentencing
hearings are held, among which are many, hard-to-preselect cases that are
unlikely to result in a death sentence no matter who the defense lawyer is.
In the third layer are cases in which a death sentence has been imposed
and a state direct appeal is about to occur that, again, in some hard-topredetermine number of cases will result in reversal regardless of the
quality of the lawyering. 127 Next come cases in which the appeal has
been denied but state post-conviction relief is being sought. Above those
layers are now relatively small groups of capital cases in which all potentially available state relief has been denied and in which only
United States Supreme Court review on certiorari or, thereafter, federal habeas review remains to be tried. At the tip of the pyramid are capital cases in which the Supreme Court has granted review. As one moves
up the pyramid, four things happen: (1) the pool of cases shrinks;
(2) the defendant's access to state-compensated representation also
shrinks or evaporates; 128 (3) the defendant gets closer and closer to
126. Prosecutors in death penalty states have more homicide cases per capita to
choose from than those in noncapital states. See Does Death Work?, Economist, Dec. 10,
1994, at 27 (noting that (1) although most southern states have the death penalty, they also
have higher murder rates; (2) Louisiana, a capital state, has the highest murder rate in the
nation; and (3) among southern states, only Florida has a murder rate below the national
average); Stephanie Salter, Hold Executions for 'Closure' in a Stadium, S.F. Examiner,
May 2, 1999, at ClI ("In the 12 states that prohibit capital punishment, the murder rate is
3.5 per 100,000 population. In the 38 states that allow executions, the rate is ... 6.6 per
100,000."); Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 43 (comparing population
and homicide rates and concluding that "death-sentencing states account for about 76% of
the nation's population and about 80% of its homicides").
127. Over 40% of the thousands of death sentences reviewed on direct appeal in the
United States between 1973 and 1995 were overturned at that stage and never reached the
state and federal post-conviction phases of review. See Liebman et al., Capital Attrition,
supra note 81, at 1847.
128. Although indigent capital defendants have a constitutional right to statecompensated counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), and
on state direct appeals as of right, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963);
cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ("Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts."),
they have no such right nor any statutory right to state-compensated counsel in certiorari
proceedings in the Supreme Court following direct appeal, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 611-12 (1974), or in most state post-conviction proceedings, see Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); see also Godbold, supra note 125, at 861 (discussing the absence in
many states of any system for providing capital prisoners with counsel in state postconviction proceedings); Lardent & Cohen, supra note 125, at 216-17 (discussing
Giarratano'sholding); Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death Row: M.L.B. and the
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actual execution; and (4) it becomes easier for expert outsiders to inter129
vene.
For these four reasons, cases at or near the top of the pyramid are
the best use of the anti-death penalty bar's modest resources. And that,
indeed, is where death penalty lawyers have targeted their efforts. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, they achieved a "moratorium" by securing Supreme Court review of cases raising "systemic" issues present in most or
Indigent's Right to Counsel at Capital State Postconviction Proceedings, 107 Yale L.J. 2211,
2236 n.198, 2237 n.204 (1998) (discussing effect of exceedingly low compensation for state
post-conviction counsel in Georgia and Mississippi). Although there is no constitutional
right to counsel in capital habeas corpus proceedings, see, e.g., Oxford v. Delo, 59 F.3d
741, 748 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal habeas petitioner "had no constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceedings"); Jenkins v.
Gramley, 8 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the Constitution does not create any
right to counsel in [state or federal] post-conviction proceedings"), Congress created a
statutory right to federal habeas counsel in 1988, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (4) (B) (1994); see
also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854-57 (1994) (interpreting federal statute to
establish a right on the part of indigent capital habeas petitioners to appointed counsel to
assist in the preparation, filing, and litigation of their habeas petitions). By doing so,
incidentally, Congress weakened somewhat the anti-death penalty bar's gap-filling
justification for putting its private resources into federal habeas as opposed to state triallevel or post-trial representation.
129. Indicative of the difficulties outsider lawyers face in seeking appointments to
represent indigent capital defendants at the trial level are a series of Georgia cases in which
volunteer lawyers who had secured federal habeas relief for death row clients were at least
temporarily prevented from representing the defendants on retrial as court-appointed
counsel. See Roberts v. State, 438 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Ga. 1994) (noting that trial court
refused to appoint out-of-state lawyer who had prompted retrial by securing federal habeas
relief for defendant); Birt v. State, 387 S.E.2d 879, 879 (Ga. 1990) (noting that trial court
ordered lawyer who represented defendant on a volunteer basis in prior habeas
proceedings to continue representing defendant at retrial pro bono publico, without court
appointment or compensation by the state); Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181, 181-82 (Ga.
1989) (noting that trial court insisted on appointing local counsel to represent defendant
on retrial, and permitted the volunteer lawyers who had represented him in habeas, and
whose appointment he sought on retrial, to participate only at their own expense). At the
beginning of the state post-conviction process, however, outsider lawyers face little or no
competition from local lawyers, given the absence of a right to the appointment of counsel
and to compensation at that stage. See supra note 128. Outsider lawyers face even less
competition from local lawyers at the federal habeas stage given (1) the paucity of local
lawyers with federal habeas experience or expertise, (2) federal judges' usual willingness to
let petitioners select their own counsel, and (3) the federal judiciary's reliance on
professional criteria and liberal pro hac vice policies when called upon to appoint federal
habeas counsel (in contrast to the patronage considerations and strict pro hac vice
restrictions that often apply at the state trial level in capital and other cases).
It is also easier to recruit experienced lawyers (especially big-firm lawyers) for state
and federal post-conviction proceedings than for capital trials, because (1) there are more
lawyers (especially big-firm lawyers) with the skills and experience needed to handle the
kind of litigation typically encountered in "civil" post-conviction proceedings, see infra
note 134 and accompanying text, and (2) unlike capital trial lawyers, who have to be
psychologically prepared to make things drastically worse for their clients by playing
midwife to their capital convictions and sentences, civil post-conviction lawyers almost
literally cannot make things worse and (if only by keeping the litigation, and thus the client,
alive) can only make things better.

2076

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:2030

all cases further down in the pyramid 3 ° In the late 1970s and early
1980s, that strategy was supplemented (with the help of volunteer lawyers
from large corporate firms in the nation's largest cities131 ) by an effort to
cover all capital federal habeas cases. In the late 1980s, when systemic
issues had dried up and the numbers reaching the federal habeas stage
started to burgeon, the fort was temporarily held with the help of a set of
"death penalty resource centers" that the state and federal governments
briefly funded. Finally, in the mid-1990s and beyond, when the resource
centers fell victim to the Gingrich Revolution, anti-death penalty lawyers
were left to scramble as best they could to cover a portion of the habeas
132
and Supreme Court cases.
As a result of this allocation of resources, several things happened.
Pretrial, trial, and direct appellate proceedings were neglected. 133 Consequently, in its litigation, strategic thinking, and (importantly) training of
nonmovement lawyers, the anti-death penalty bar focused mainly on the
procedural issues that are fair game in habeas proceedings, not the substantive issues that are the staple of the earlier stages. The huge amount
of opposing legal resources that the anti-death penalty bar attracts when
130. See Meltsner, supra note 5, at 106-25 (detailing the development of the Fund's
successful "moratorium" strategy).
131. See, e.g., Ann Woolner, Counsel Comes South to Test Fairness in Ga. Death
Cases, Fulton County Daily Rep., Oct. 18, 1999, at 1; supra note 84 (discussing Willis case);
infra notes 245, 246 (discussing various cases).
132. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense
Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 863, 906-07, 912-15,
919-20 (1996) (discussing the crucial function the resource centers played, especially in
federal post-conviction representation of capital petitioners in the late 1980s and early
1990s, and the difficulties caused by the centers' defunding in the mid-1990s); Berlow,
Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 84 ("In 1995 Congress weighed in on the need for speedier
executions when it eliminated the $20 million annual budget for Post-Conviction Defender
Organizations, which had provided some of the most sophisticated and effective counsel
for death-row inmates in twenty death-penalty states."). Characteristics of the stages at
which anti-death penalty lawyers intervene help explain why they are a magnet for high
levels of opposing resources. First, the later in the process the intervention occurs, the
more likely it is that public attention will have begun to focus on the possibility of an
execution, hence the more importance the state is likely to attach to going forward with
the execution the anti-death penalty lawyers are attempting to stop. Second, high-intensity
anti-death penalty litigation in the Supreme Court must be countered with at least equal
effort by the lawyers for the states, else the results are likely to affect many more cases than
the one at hand. Indeed, in nearly all cases, a grant of certiorari in a capital case not only
involves the particular state in question in expensive Supreme Court litigation but also
triggers one or more supporting amicus briefs from state attorneys general in other states.
See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of 35 States, Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495
(2000) (No. 98-8384). Finally, the habeas corpus practice in which the anti-death penalty
lawyers specialize is an expensive form of civil litigation at which the big-firm lawyers who
assist the anti-death penalty lawyers are particularly adept. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text; infra note 134 and accompanying text.
133. The main exception is retrials after anti-death penalty lawyers secure federal
habeas relief for their clients, when those lawyers often either continue representing their
clients or interest expert defense counsel in doing so. See, e.g., Georgia cases cited supra
note 129. On capital defendats' high success rates on retrial, see supra notes 84, 124.
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it intervenes followed those lawyers to the habeas and Supreme Court
stages and were focused on limiting the procedural rights the death penalty lawyers were attempting to enforce. The pitched legal wars that all
those resources funded also vastly protracted the post-conviction process,
particularly given the civil setting of habeas litigation-complete with motions practice, discovery, evidentiary hearings, interlocutory appeals, extensive briefing, rehearing and other post-trial practice, appeals, and a
constellation of satellite litigation over stays of execution, the right to
(and to use ex parte proceedings to request) counsel, and the right to
funds for experts and investigators.1 3 4 Finally, the rate of reversals of capital convictions and sentences burgeoned, influenced by factors discussed
below and also, to a lesser degree, by the competence and dedication of
the movement lawyers and their volunteer big-firm colleagues and by the
conviction of federal habeas judges, fueled most dramatically by eleventhhour litigation over stays of execution (with direct lines kept open from
the judge's chambers to the executioner's), that it was those judges-far
more than jurors, trial judges, and governors-who had the responsibility
13 5
to decide who would live and who would die.
At first blush, this sounds like success. And, indeed, the top-of-thepyramid strategy seemed so successful that movement lawyers diverted
into it whatever extra resources they could muster-including the
donated time of big-firm lawyers and the death penalty resource centers-thus attracting still more opposing resources and putting still more
134. See 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, §§ 2.2, 6.3, 11.6-11.8, 12.2-13.6, 17.3,
19.2-20.1, 21.1; 2 id., §§ 29.1-29.3, 34.1-39.2.
135. See Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers 120 (Penguin Books 1999) (1998)
(describing activity at Supreme Court upon receipt of applications for stays of imminent
executions, during which clerks engage in "tense assessments and reassessments of an
inmate's final claims, frantic arguments with clerks in other Chambers over the merits of
the case, and rounds of reluctant and stilted phone calls to a Justice's home, often
continuing past midnight, about where matters stood as the last grains of sand passed
through someone's hourglass"); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale LJ.
1601, 1609-10 (1986) (discussing reviewing judges' reaction to a sense of complicity in the
state violence implied by capital sentences); Robert F. Utter, Unjust Laws, 19 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1035, 1038 (1997) (describing decision by the author, a former state supreme court
justice, to leave the Washington Supreme Court after it permitted the state to execute its
first death row inmate since Furman); see also Ninth Circuit Judge John T. Noonan's
description of the last 36 hours of Robert Alton Harris's life before his execution, during
which a flurry of last-minute court filings resulted in the granting, then vacation, of several
stays of execution:
The word [of the penultimate order vacating a stay] reached the warden at San
Quentin at about 3:30 a.m. (PCT).
Harris was escorted into the gas chamber. His lawyer ... made one more
effort. He found a Ninth Circuit judge, Harry Pregerson, notable both for
courage and magnanimity, who issued a new stay of execution at about 5:30 a.m.
(PCT). Harris was removed from the chamber. At 6:00 a.m. the Supreme Court
replied.... The horses of the night had galloped. Harris was put to death at 6:30
in the morning.
John T. Noonan,Jr., Horses of the Night: Harrisv. Vasquez, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1011, 1017-20
(1993).
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pressure on federal habeas judges to be the final arbiters of life and
death.
2. The Pro-DeathPenalty Strategy: Full Steam Ahead. - To see why the
strategy, perhaps inevitably, backfired, consider now what was happening
at the trial stage.
a. The Offense. - Consider "a generalized fact pattern often encountered in capital cases":
An outsider only recently arrived in the community-often a rural or small-town community-is charged with taking the life of
a local citizen. Typically, the outsider is young, poor, urban,
male, and African American or Latino; if he is white, he is probably a drifter and probably has a criminal record in another
State. The victim, on the other hand is probably white, a
respected member of the community, most usually a merchant
or law enforcement officer. The accused and the victim do not
know each other; the latter had no particular reason to expect
that the crime would occur as and when it did; in all likelihood,
the homicide occurred in the course of some other serious felony, usually a robbery. The evidence against the accused seems
strong.
Such an offense obviously will shock, frighten, and enrage
the community. That of course is why the community reserves
its most severe punishment for such offenses. But inherent in
the "local spirit" aroused by such egregious crimes against the
community at the hands, apparently, of someone so thoroughly
outside the community is the temptation-indeed, at times, the
compulsion-for the legal arm of that community to move more
swiftly and directly toward that punishment than [the law]
1 36
permits.
Enter now the "dedicated pro-death penalty forces"-police and
prosecutors on whose shoulders falls the task of protecting the community and punishing the criminal. The impact on these actors of a crime
such as this has been documented by Ken Armstrong and colleagues at
the Chicago Tribune, Alan Berlow, Stephen Bright, and Samuel Gross and
needs only to be summarized here. 13 7 Local law enforcement is under
136. 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 2.6, at 101-02.
137. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 115, at 759-816; Gross, Lost Lives, supra note
84, at 133-36; Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are
Common in Capital Cases, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 469, 475-79 (1996); Armstrong, Cowboy Bob,
supra note 114; Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts, Chi. Trib.,
Nov. 15, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Armstrong & Mills, Inept Defenses]; Armstrong & Mills,
Justice Derailed, supra note 84; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be
Promoted, Chi. Trib.,Jan. 14, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules];
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Reversal of Fortune, Chi. Trib., Jan. 13, 1999, at NI
[hereinafter Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of Fortune]; Armstrong & Possley, Verdict
Dishonor, supra note 84; Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84; Mills & Armstrong, Another
Cleared, supra note 84; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Convicted by a Hair, Chi. Trib., Nov.
18, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Mills & Armstrong, By a Hair]; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong,
The Inside Informant, Chi. Trib., Nov. 16, 1999, at Nl [hereinafter Mills & Armstrong,
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tremendous pressure to solve the crime and punish the perpetrator,
harshly.' 3 8 If the sheriff and district attorney do so, they can run for ofInside Informant]; Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, A Tortured Path to Death Row, Chi.
Trib., Nov. 17, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path]; Steve Mills et
al., Flawed Trials Lead to Death Chamber: Bush Confident in System Rife with Problems,
Chi. Trib.,June 11, 2000, at NI [hereinafter Mills et al., Flawed Trials]; Maurice Possley &
Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, Chi. Trib.,Jan. 11, 1999, at N1 [hereinafter
Possley & Armstrong, Flip Side]; Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial
in DuPage, Chi. Trib., Jan. 12, 1999, at NI [hereinafter Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution
on Trial]; see also Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 41-238 (discussing prosecutorial and
other failings that contribute to the conviction of innocent defendants in capital and
noncapital cases).
Much of the support for claims made here about the prosecution and defense of
capital cases come from press reports, not scholarly works. There are four reasons for this
choice of authority. First, for the reasons discussed below, which are themselves an
important part of the problem addressed here, judicial opinions systematically underreport the incidence, nature, and effects of capital overcharging and sentencing. See infra
notes 237-239 and accompanying text. Second and consequently, legal scholars, who
typically rely on judicial opinions, are way behind investigative journalists, who use a wider
variety of live and documentary sources, in documenting the problem discussed here and
its results. Third, an assurance of accuracy on a par with that achieved by law review
editing and cite-checking practices is provided by the controversial and often embarrassing
nature of the journalists' findings, particularly in an era of wide public consensus on the
need to be tough on crime, and by a combination of the consuming public's tastes,
journalists' vulnerability to political attack, editorial ethics and discretion, and libel
liability. Finally, and most importantly, a crucial prerequisite for any solution to the
problem discussed here is a readiness on the part of voters and lawmakers disposed to be
tough on crime to take the problem of the overproduction of death seriously. See infra
notes 260-262, 264 and accompanying text. Evidence of concerted media attention to
important aspects of the problem (be that attention the cause or consequence of public
concern) is probably a better indication of that public readiness than is scholarly scrutiny.
138. See, e.g., Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 135 ("Death produces strong
reactions-in this context, a desire to punish and to protect."); Ken Armstrong & Steve
Mills, Death Row Conviction in Cop Death Overturned, Chi. Trib., Jan. 28, 2000, at N1
[hereinafter Armstrong & Mills, Conviction Overturned] (discussing "pressure cooker[ I"
atmosphere and "high" emotions affecting police and prosecutorial tactics in Cook County
cases involving police killings); Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (noting
that the cases that tend to be charged capitally in Illinois are "so-called heater case[s],
one[s] that newspapers and television stations prominently recount[ ]," including
multiple-murder-victims cases (accounting for 37% of capital verdicts in Illinois since
1978), child killings (15%) and police killings (5%)); Mills & Armstrong, By a Hair, supra
note 137 (criticizing Illinois prosecutors for capitally convicting Cecil Sutherland based on
unreliable comparisons of human hair, dog hair, fibers, and tire-tracks that prosecutors
described at trial as having "c[o]me from the defendant's car," when in fact the evidence
only had characteristics that "could have" come from the defendant, or from many
thousands of other people; authorities resorted to these tactics only after they for months
"had been unable to unravel" the murder of a 10-year-old victim, "generat[ing] outrage
among local residents and pressure on authorities to find the killer" and prompting the
director of the state police to "vow[ ] that no expense would be spared in solving the
case"); Possley & Armstrong, Flip Side, supra note 137 (quoting explanation of the Cook
County trial judge who had the most convictions reversed during the 1977-1998 period
due to prosecutorial misconduct (17 out of 207), that "[m]ost of the reversals involved
death penalty cases" and "very brutal murders," which led "aggressive" prosecutors to
become "inflamed"); Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 21-23 (explaining Philadelphia district
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fice on their success; if they fail, they risk being run out of office at the
next election. 1 39 This often means that the more death sentences a local
attorney Lynne Abraham's self-confessedly "passionate" commitment to capital
punishment as demanded by her constituents (three-fourths of whom vote for her) in "a
law-and-order city where politicians like Frank Rizzo could thrive"; although Abraham does
not believe the death penalty deters crime, she seeks it more often, per homicide, than any
other prosecutor in the nation because it gives citizens "the feeling of control demanded by
a city in decay": "'We feel our lives are not in our own hands.... This is Bosnia.'"); David
Kohn, 48 Hours: Impossible Mission (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 1, 1999) (transcript
on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on pro bono efforts of five prominent
private investigators (former law enforcement officials and death penalty supporters) to
show that Florida death row inmate Crossley Green is innocent, efforts prompted by what
one of the private investigators describes as a "systematic . . . problem we have with the
death penalty [in] this country" that causes police and prosecutors to "rush tojudgment to
convict people and punish them . .. to ease the tension in the community" that brutal
killings generate); infra note 143. Some procedures that District Attorneys use to make
capital charging decisions greatly increase the pressure on them to bring capital charges
and to make the charges stick. See Richard Willing, Prosecutor Often Determines Which
Way a Case Will Go, USA Today, Dec. 20, 1999, at 6A [hereinafter Willing, Prosecutor
Determines] (comparing Oklahoma City's Robert Macy, "known for pursuing the death
penalty aggressively," who bases his capital-charging decision on his opinion of the
"ferocity" of the murder, formed while "visit[ing] the murder scene shortly after the crime
is discovered," to low-death-sentencing prosecutors in Austin and Jacksonville, who forbear
bringing capital charges until a committee of assistants reviews the case and makes a
recommendation).
139. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 114, at 1076-77 (listing factors that Florida capital
prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers believe affect prosecutorial decisions whether to
bring a capital charge and whether to take such a charge to trial rather than accepting a
noncapital plea, including pressure from the police, media coverage, public opinion, and
the political and racial climate); Lefstein, supra note 114, at 511-12 (reporting statements
by Indiana capital prosecutors in confidential interviews that "a prosecutor does not want
to risk losing [a capital case] because that generates negative publicity and is seen as 'a
knock on the prosecutor'"; because "'winning is quite important to the prosecutor'"; and
because "it is not 'good politics' for prosecutors to lose death penalty cases"); Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death
Sentences, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 329, 332-33, 396 n.323 (1995) (arguing that in "a death penalty
system .. .administered at the local level by popularly-elected prosecutors and judges ...
[t]he fear of voter backlash from an electorate that overwhelmingly supports the death
penalty colors the way in which discretion is exercised by the central decision-makers in the
capital punishment system" (citing various examples)); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84,
at 78 (describing political gains reaped by elected officials who portrayed themselves as
"'tougher' with respect to the death penalty than their opponents"); Bob Herbert, The
Wrong Man, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2000, at A27 (criticizing Brooklyn, New York, district
attorney for (unsuccessfully) trying an innocent man for the capital murder of a popular
storekeeper and leaving the "real killer ... at large"); Michael Janofsky, Prosecutor in the
Ramsey Case Says He Plans to Leave Office, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2000, at A12 (discussing
possible effect of Boulder, Colorado, district attorney Alex Hunter's three-year failure to
indict anyone for the notorious killing of JonBenet Ramsey on Hunter's decision not to
seek election to an eighth four-year term); Nightline: Crime and Punishment, A Matter of
Life and Death (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 13, 2000) (transcript on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (replaying political campaign advertisements by district attorneys
seeking votes based on the number of men they caused to be executed or to be sentenced
to die); Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 137 (suggesting that district
attorney's failure for 13 months to solve "a 'heater' [capital murder] case," i.e., one "in
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prosecutor can obtain, the more votes he will get.'140 And as Felix Frankwhich the political stakes are high," contributed to his defeat at the polls in the next
election and increased pressure on police to solve the case); Rosenberg, supra note 114, at
46 (noting that in 1994, the Democratic candidate for Pennsylvania governor, Mark Singel,
moved "overnight" from a seven point lead in the polls to losing the election by five points
after it was made public that an inmate named McFadden, who was released while the
candidate was head of the state's parole board, had committed a series of violent offenses
in New York: "All prosecutors and judges have hundreds of potential McFaddens lurking
in their pasts; Singel[ I . . . [looked for] cases . . . [where his opponent, Tom] Ridge, a
former prosecutor, had taken anything short of the toughest stance. There is only one way
to be safe: Always take the most hard-line position possible"; unsurprisingly, in Ridge's first
seven months in office, he signed 15 death warrants, more than any of his predecessors
had signed in their full terms in office). For examples of "humiliating failure[s]" to solve
brutal murders that eventually led police and prosecutors to manufacture evidence against
innocent capital defendants, see infra note 143; see also Symposium, Politics and the
Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political
Pressure?, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 239, 240, 266-68, 270-73 (1994) [hereinafter,
Symposium] (giving examples of savage and "grizzly" political attacks on candidates for
public office based on their conscientious opposition to, or even just their failure in
particular instances to take the hardest possible line in favor of, the death penalty, and
claiming that "it is becoming more and more difficult" for elected state judges to "survive
[politically] if they sometimes overturn death sentences"); infra notes 195-199 and
accompanying text (detailing political pressures on judges who preside over capital cases).
140. See, e.g., Armstrong, Cowboy Bob, supra note 114 (discussing Oklahoma City
district attorney Robert Macy; quoted infra text accompanying note 173); Rosenberg,
supra note 114, at 23-24 (noting, in explaining Philadelphia district attorney's practice of
seeking the death penalty in 85% of homicide cases that, "since crime became a hot public
issue in the late 1960's, Philadelphia has had a series of ... media-savvy, ambitious District
Attorneys-including Senator Arlen Specter and Mayor Ed Rendell-who have ....
learned that aggressiveness is rewarded", creating an ethic in which leniency in capital
cases is so embarrassing that the chief of the appellate division of Philadelphia's public
defender office could think of only one prosecutor in Abraham's office who had taken less
than the "toughest stance" and had "shown personal humanity" in charging potentially
capital defendant; the public defender refused to name the responsible prosecutor,
explaining that "to say someone's humane might get them into trouble"); id. at 46 ("Its
political value is the unstated dark side to prosecutors' argument that they use the death
penalty because their public demands it. One thing the most fervent district attorneys
share is political ambition." (giving a variety of examples in Illinois, Louisiana, and
Pennsylvania)); Willing & Fields, supra note 114 (giving examples of prosecutors such as
Robert Macy of Oklahoma City who seek and obtain far more death sentences than their
counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions and "campaign[ ] for re-election on . . . success
in prosecuting killers"; quoting Jacksonville, Florida, prosecutor Harry Shorstein,
explaining that "local political pressure cannot be discounted: 'If you've got ajury that's
tough enough and ajudge that's up for re-election, then all it takes is a demagogue.'"). In
Eric Zorn's view, in a column discussing the record of former Cook County state's attorney
and current Chicago mayor Richard M. Daley:
The number of innocent men Daley's deputies were striving to execute in the
1980s-a number almost certain to be greater than [the then current] six when
the courts are finally through reviewing those . . . says a lot about the perils of
mixing politics with justice and . . . allowing the position of state's attorney or
attorney general ever to be a steppingstone or holding area for those with great
ambition but modest legal credentials.
Zorn, Daley's Oversight, supra note 114. As Zorn predicted, the number of death row
inmates tried by Daley's staff who later were shown to be innocent rose to seven just two
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furter noted, "[w]hen life is at hazard in a trial, it sensationalises the
1 41
whole thing almost unwittingly; the effect ... [is] very bad."
b. The Investigation. - Nor is there a dearth of investigative corners
to cut when needed to get capital convictions and sentences' 42 -some
months later. See Mills & Armstrong, Another Cleared, supra note 84.
141. Felix Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 81 (1956), quoted in Gross, Lost Lives, supra
note 84, at 129.
142. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 135. Gross notes:
[T]he pressure to solve homicides . . . can . . . produce mistakes. If the murder

cannot be readily solved, the police may be tempted to cut corners, to jump to
conclusions, and-if they believe they have the killer-perhaps to manufacture
evidence to clinch the case. The danger that the investigators will go too far is
magnified to the extent that the killing is brutal and horrifying and to the extent
that it attracts public attention-factors that also increase the likelihood that the
murder will be treated as a capital case.
Id.; see also Armstrong & Mills, Conviction Overturned, supra note 138 (discussing
decision of Illinois Supreme Court in January 2000 overturning capital conviction despite
"overwhelming" evidence that defendant killed a police officer: "[c]ases involving the
murder of a police officer tend to be pressure cookers, where emotions run high," and
"include several where the Illinois Supreme Court later concluded that police and
prosecutors engaged in overzealous tactics to convict and condemn the defendant");
Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (reporting on detailed study of all 285
death sentences in Illinois between Furman and November 1999, which found that 40%
were achieved using (1) an appointed defense attorney "who has been disbarred or
suspended," (2) testimony of a jailhouse informant, (3) "notoriously imprecise" forensic
evidence based on "visual comparisons of hairs," or (4) all-white juries trying a black
defendant for an offense against a white victim; "[s]ometimes, all of the elements appear
in a single case," including that of "Dennis Williams, who is black, [and] was sentenced to
die by an all-white Cook County jury; prosecuted with evidence that included a jailhouse
informant and hair comparison; and defended, none too well, by an attorney who was later
disbarred"; Williams was released as innocent in 1996 after serving 18 years, most of them
on death row); Mills et al., Flawed Trials, supra note 137 (reporting similar findings from a
study of the 131 Texas cases leading to executions during George W. Bush's tenure as
governor: 43 of the defendants were represented by attorneys "who had been or [were]
later disbarred, suspended or otherwise sanctioned for misconduct," 40 were represented
by attorneys who "presented no evidence whatsoever or only one witness during the trial's
sentencing phase," 23 were convicted based at least partly on visual hair analysis, "a kind of
evidence so inexact that it is restricted or barred in some jurisdictions," 23 were convicted
based at least partly on testimony ofjailhouse informants, and 29 were sentenced to die
based at least partly on a psychiatrist's predictions of future dangerousness, a form of
testimony that "the [American] Psychiatric Association has condemned . . . as unethical
and untrustworthy"; discussing David Wayne Stoker's case "illustrat[ing] many of the
problems in Texas's death penalty system," including: (1) an absence (in the police chief's
words) of any "'direct tie' between Stoker and the crime"; (2) a decision to go to trial with
such a small amount of evidence that the police chief admitted being "really surprised we
did what we did with [it]"; (3) crucial testimony against Stoker by a paid informer in return
for dropped charges and $1000, about which the informant and the state investigator who
paid him were permitted to lie at trial; (4) representation by one attorney who
"surrendered his law license less than two years after Stoker's trial and pleaded guilty to
criminal charges" for forging signatures of clients on checks and of a judge on a falsified
court order, and by a second attorney who was less than a year at the bar; (5) witness
allegations of prosecutorial pressure to testify falsely; (6) possibly planted physical
evidence; (7) compromised future-dangerousness testimony; (8) and nagging doubts
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peculiar to homicide cases, and especially capital ones;1 43 others as available there as in criminal cases not involving homicides. 144 Often, suspiabout Stoker's guilt).
143. After a painstaking analysis, marshaling substantial statistical and impressionistic
evidence, Professor Gross concludes that "[t]he steady stream of errors we see in cases in
which defendants are sentenced to death is a predictable consequence of our system of
investigating and prosecuting capital murder." Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 149.
The "extraordinary amount of attention" the public and public servants give to capital
cases and their highly publicized nature "generate[ ] many more mistakes than would
occur if capital murders were handled as casually as run-of-the-mill robberies and assaults,"
thus placing a heavy burden on the system thereafter to "correct[ ] deadly judicial errors."
Id. at 127-28; see also Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 266 app.2 (reporting that 46% of the
DNA-induced exonerations during the 1990s occurred in cases involving a sentence of
death or life in prison); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 132 (noting that, although
murder cases account for only about 7% of all convictions of violent felonies, they account
for 45% of all demonstrated "miscarriages of justice" (i.e., convictions of demonstrably
innocent defendants); likewise, capital murder cases account for only about 0.2% of all
violent felony convictions but 12% of all demonstrated miscarriages of justice); Possley &
Armstrong, Flip Side, supra note 137 (reporting that nearly half of the 207 Cook County,
Illinois, convictions that courts reversed between the end of 1977 and the end of 1998
based on prosecutorial misconduct were homicide convictions; eight of the reversals were
in capital cases; on retrial, six of the eight previously capital cases resulted in non-death
sentences). See generally Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in
America's Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past, Present and
Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction 417, 424-25 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998)
(citing studies showing that cases of capital defendants "are more likely than those of
defendants not facing execution to have been infected by distortions arising from racism,
the incompetence of defense counsel, their own mental limitations, public passion,
political pressures, or jury prejudice or confusion," prompting "a dangerous increase in
the risk that the system will make a fatal error").
For examples of cases in which the pressure to solve a murder led, or encouraged, law
enforcement officials to secure a death sentence via manufactured evidence, see Gross,
Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 135-36 ("[u]nder intense pressure" following their
"humiliating public failure" to solve the "stunning[ly] brutal[ ]" 1983 rape-murder of a 10year-old girl, Naperville, Illinois, police "manufactured evidence to convince prosecutors"
that Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez had committed the offense; Cruz was later
acquitted and both were released after police admitted they lied); id. at 136 n.52
(discussing false capital conviction of Walter McMillian in 1987 that police in Monroeville,
Alabama, "manufacture[d] . . . out of whole cloth"-pressuring a defendant in an
unrelated, potentially capital murder case to implicate McMillian falsely-after an "eightmonth investigation [had] turned up no leads" and "no suspects"); infra note 145
(discussing the Rolando Cruz case); infra note 151 (discussing the Earl Washington case).
144. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 129. Mistakes can have a variety of
effects; convicting and condemning the innocent is only the most dramatic:
A [capital] conviction can be "wrong" in many ways. It might be excessive-for
example, if the defendant is really guilty of second-degree murder but was
convicted of first-degree murder; or the jury might have been right to conclude
that the defendant committed the fatal act, but wrong to reject a defense of
insanity or self-defense; or a conviction that is factually accurate might have been
obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.
Id. A capital judgment also is wrong if the offense, although first-degree murder, was not
accompanied by the level of culpability or the kind of aggravating circumstance required
by state law or the Eighth Amendment to make the offense death-eligible. See Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988) (overturning a death sentence based on an
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cion focuses immediately on a single suspect meeting something like the
profile described above. At this point, the effort can stop being a search
for stronger suspects and become that of pinning the offense on the one
who already has appeared.1 45 The absence of both the victim and eyewitunconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance that did not sufficiently narrow the
category of death-eligible murders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)
(reversing a death sentence imposed on an accomplice to a robbery that resulted in a
killing because the defendant did not intend or contemplate that a killing would occur
and thus did not have the level of culpability required by the Eighth Amendment).
Similarly, a capital sentence may be said to be wrong if mitigating circumstances outweigh
aggravating ones, as the Court found, or at least suggested was the case, in, e.g., Parker v.
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1991) (concluding that nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances may have been sufficient to outweigh aggravating circumstances and thus to
rule out a capital sentence) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1981)
(vacating a capital sentence because the trial judge improperly refused, as a matter of law,
to consider what the Court thought was compelling mitigating evidence of defendant's
abuse as a child). See generally infra note 237 (discussing underinclusiveness of
innocence-focused measures of miscarriages of justice in capital cases).
A good example of alleged corner-cutting to inflate the offense from murder to
capital murder and secure a death sentence is Philip Workman's Tennessee case.
Workman admitted robbing a north Memphis fast food store and shooting in the direction
of pursuing police officers, one of whom died of a single gunshot wound. If Workman
fired the fatal shot, his offense was capital murder; if one of the other pursuing officers
fired the shot, the offense was noncapital murder. At Workman's 1982 trial, Harold Davis
testified that he saw Workman fire the fatal shot, the state's ballistics evidence was
consistent with that theory, and Workman's lawyers accordingly admitted that he fired the
shot and pleaded drug impairment. In late 1999 and early 2000, however, Davis recanted
his eyewitness account, claiming that police pressured him into saying he saw the shooting.
Then, the state (inadvertently, it seems, in a passing remark in an affidavit filed in
opposition to a clemency petition) disclosed the existence of long-suppressed x-rays of the
victim which disproved the only theory on which the state could base its claim that
Workman's pistol and bullets caused the exit wound, namely, that the bullet fragmented
inside the victim's body before only one piece of it made the exit wound. See Jon Yates,
Five Jurors Say Workman Needs a Second Trial, Tennessean, Mar. 13, 2000, at IA; see also
Workman v. Bell, 2000 WL 1253760, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (en banc) (splitting
evenly over question whether state's reliance on fragmented-bullet theory while
suppressing evidence that the bullet did not fragment constitutes "fraud on the court"
sufficient to justify reopening the prior denial of habeas relief which was premised in part
on the fragmented-bullet theory).
145. Shoddy police work based on premature conjecture is tragically illustrated by
Kerry Max Cook's case. After Linda Jo Edwards was killed in a brutal rape-mutilationmurder, suspicion momentarily focused on James Mayfield, a respected university librarian
with whom the 22-year-old victim had carried on a lengthy relationship until a breakup a
few weeks earlier. After Mayfield denied any part in the killing, claiming he had not had
sex with Edwards for weeks, and giving an alibi, the police arrested Cook, a bisexual petty
criminal living in the same apartment complex with Edwards whose fingerprint was found
on her screen door. The police then "coerced" an expert to testify-falsely, he admitted,
years later-that the fingerprint was less than 12 hours old (something forensic science
cannot discern), found a jailhouse informant nicknamed "Shyster" to say Cook confessed
the crime to him (Shyster later recanted), and prevailed on an eyewitness to change her
story from having seen Mayfield to having seen Cook in Edwards' apartmentjust before the
killing. After three trials, three death sentences, three reversals on procedural grounds, 20
years on death row, and repeated sexual abuse of Cook in prison, his fourth retrial ended
with a plea bargain for time served. Two years after convincing Cook to accept that deal,
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the prosecutor revealed that he had conducted DNA tests on semen-stained clothes of the
victim (which police had previously maintained had been lost before trial), learning (1)
that Cook could not have been the source of the semen (something the prosecutor
evidently knew but did not disclose when he proposed the plea bargain), and (2) that the
semen matched Mayfield's. See Moore, supra note 84.
For other cases, see, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273-75 & n.5 (1999)
(describing how police helped mold key eyewitness's initially "vague" and "sometimes
muddled memories" of what and whom she had seen, as reflected in statements withheld
from the defense, into her testimony in "great detail" at trial about seeing a man she could
now confidently identify as the defendant abduct the victim near a shopping center); Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 423-29, 432, 441-49 (1995) (granting habeas relief from capital
conviction because, in investigating robbery-murder of supermarket customer in store's
parking lot, New Orleans police (1) accepted the word of a longtime criminal and police
informant named Beanie, whom police found in possession of the victim's car, that Curtis
Kyles had sold him the car, while suppressing a variety of statements by Beanie that were
inculpatory, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with Beanie's trial testimony, and revealed
a course of dealing between Beanie and the police that cast serious doubt on the
investigation; then (2) manipulated eyewitnesses into identifying Kyles at trial,
inconsistently with their initial but thereafter suppressed descriptions that much more
closely matched Beanie; a majority of jurors in three successive retrials voted to acquit
Kyles, whom prosecutors finally released, see Death Penalty Information Center,
Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Executing the Innocent, July
1997 (visited Aug. 10, 2000) <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/inn.html> [hereinafter
DPIC]); Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1510-11, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting
habeas relief because the prosecution suppressed evidence that at least three other men
were previously arrested for the crime with which petitioner was charged, that two of them
had been positively identified by eyewitnesses, and that the cellmate of one of the
previously arrested suspects claimed that suspect had confessed to the crime); Monroe v.
Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1984) (granting habeas relief because the state
failed to disclose that police obtained information after trial that someone other than
petitioner may have committed the capital murder); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334,
1351-53 (10th Cir. 1984) (granting habeas relief because the prosecution suppressed
evidence that might have led the jury to believe that the capitally sentenced petitioner did
not commit the killing); 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 11.2c, at 457-58 (discussing
unpublished decision in Miller and Jent v. Wainwright, Nos. 86-98-Civ.-T-13 and 85-1910Civ.-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 1987), granting habeas relief because the prosecutor
exhibited "callous and deliberate disregard for ... truth" by suppressing police reports
identifying numerous witnesses who were fishing at the location where the victim's body
was found at the only time the two capitally sentenced petitioners (who had an otherwise
airtight alibi defense) could have deposited the victim's body and who saw nothing amiss;
the defendants thereafter were released and subsequently were compensated by the Pasco
County Sheriffs Department for damages arising from official misfeasance, see DPIC,
supra, app.); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 137 (quoted supra note 142); Sasha
Abramsky, Trial by Torture, Mother Jones (wire edition) (Mar. 3, 2000) <http://
www.motherjones.com/newswire/chicops.html> (quoting former head of the Chicago
Police Department, Richard Brzeczek, describing the motivating assumptions that led
Chicago police officers during the 1980s to arrest suspects-typically ones who were, "to
put it mildly, no saint[s]"-then to cut corners to prove them guilty: either " ' we know he
did it, but we have to circumvent these goofy rules of due process, either by lying or
fabricating evidence, whatever it takes to convict this person'" or "'even though [we know
he] didn't commit the offense . . . it's OK, because he's going to do the time for all the
crimes he didn't get caught for'"); Balestier, supra note 84 (quoting statement to press of
Ft. Stockton, Texas prosecutor at time of Ernest Ray Willis's conviction and death sentence
for an arson-murder to which another death row inmate subsequently confessed, that
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ness testimony that helps police solve most nonhomicide crimes, and the
preexisting relationship between killer and victim that helps them solve
most noncapital homicides, 146 makes it easier than otherwise for police
"[w]e were very surprised" and "tickled pink" about "even [getting a conviction]," the
"chances [of which] were about 10% going into it," given that "[w]e didn't have any
eyewitnesses ... [or] know what type of flammable material was used," and "[i]t was all
circumstantial material"; a Texas trial judge subsequently overturned Willis's conviction
due to ineffective representation and prosecutorial suppression of (1) a psychological
report the state had commissioned, which concluded that "this was [not] a good death
penalty case" and (2) the fact that jailers involuntarily medicated Willis during trial with
"massive doses of anti-psychotic drugs"); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 66-67
(offering two theories to explain "[wihy prosecutors were so zealous in their pursuit of
[Rolando] Cruz," who subsequently was released from death row after 10 years based on
DNA evidence showing that another man, who had previously confessed to the crime, had
indeed committed it: first, "there was enormous public and political pressure on the state
attorney's office to solve the highly publicized Nicarico case," a brutal rape-murder of a 10year-old girl; second, "it is quite possible that the police and prosecutors became convinced
of Cruz's guilt before they had accumulated the facts to prove it, and then stuck with their
hunch," which they initially based on Cruz's attempt to provide false information in order
to collect a $10,000 reward, but on no physical evidence, "even as the holes in their case
multiplied"; concluding that, "[s]hort of unimpeachable exculpatory evidence,
prosecutors are loath to back away from an indictment, much less a conviction"); Herbert,
supra note 139 (describing how Brooklyn, New York, police officers focused on rap singer
Antowine Butts as the perpetrator of a killing of a popular storekeeper and a teenage
employee in an apparently botched robbery despite Butts's strong alibi witnesses, then
built a capital murder case against him using the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom
claimed she "had just happened to be passing by when the murders occurred, saw Mr.
Butts and decided, on the spot, to accompany one or two other men who she said were
involved," and also just happened to be present at a meeting the day before at which the
witness said the killing was planned; the other witness was "a criminal with a long record"
who admitted "that in the 12 to 24 hours leading up to the crime he had been smashed out
of his mind on crack cocaine, marijuana and alcohol," that his "mind wasn't there," and
that he "can't remember people. How am I going to remember time?"; Butts was
acquitted); Paul McKay, Brandley's Charges Dropped After Ruling, Hous. Chron., Oct. 2,
1990, at Al (discussing prosecutor's decision to drop charges against death row inmate
Clarence Lee Brandley after state courts reversed his conviction at a trial the courts said
"'lacked the rudiments' of fairness" and was based on a "police investigation [that] took on
a 'blind focus' aimed at convicting Brandley rather than finding the killer"); Mills et al.,
Flawed Trials, supra note 137 (describing Stoker case, which is discussed supra note 137);
see also Frontline, supra note 84, at 9-10, 12-13, 24 (providing apparent examples, and
expert confirmation, of tendency of law enforcement officials, once having settled upon a
suspect and a theory of the offense, to defend their case against the suspect even after the
theory collapses, including by proposing alternative theories that they did not advance at
trial and that are contradicted by evidence that was introduced or was in the officials' files).
Although it might seem efficient for police to limit their efforts to proving the guilt of
the first suspect against whom they have significant evidence, even if the evidence is not
initially sufficient to convict (e.g., because some of it is inadmissible at trial), doing so will
often produce error. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Convicted by juries Exonerated by Science:
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, xxviii (1996)
[hereinafter Exonerated by Science] (noting that DNA analyses established that 2012 (or
25%) of the 8048 "primary suspects" in rape and rape-murder cases referred to the FBI for
DNA testing between 1995 and 1998 were innocent).
146. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 127 (reporting data demonstrating that
"[i]n most homicides, the killer was known to the victim... mak[ing] most homicides easy
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and prosecutors to rely on evidence that is inaccurate or false. 1 47 Such
evidence often takes the form of (1) the testimony of people who themselves are implicated in the crime and face death if they can't shift or
moderate the blame,1 48 or ofjailhouse informants lured by attractive plea
to solve," but that capital murders are typically more difficult to solve because they are so
much more likely to involve killings by a stranger).
147. Professor Gross states:
But killers must be pursued, and, in the absence of eyewitness evidence, the
police are forced to rely on evidence from other sources: accomplices; jail-house
snitches and other underworld figures; and confessions from the defendants
themselves. Not surprisingly, perjury by a prosecution witness is the most
common type of evidence that produces erroneous capital convictions, and
coerced or otherwise false confessions are the third most common cause.
Id. at 137 (citing data from Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 57 (1987)). Cf. Gross, Lost Lives,
supra note 84, at 136-37 (although 52% of wrongful convictions, in a study of criminal
cases generally, were attributable to faulty eyewitness identification (citing Arye Rattner,
Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 Law &
Hum. Behav. 283, 291 (1988)), only 16% of miscarriages in murder cases stem from that
defect, according to Bedau & Radelet, supra, at 57, 61 n.184).
148. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 138 ("The threat of death can be a
powerful motivator [to lie] when [the threat] is concrete," as when "the police seem to be
closing in."); see, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445-49, 454 (overturning capital conviction based
on evidence, suppressed by the police, suggesting that key witness against petitioner had
himself committed the capital offense; on retrial, charges against Kyles were eventually
dropped, see supra note 145); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (granting habeas relief due to prosecutor's failure to disclose information in
state's files showing that prosecution's central witness-who later confessed to the murder
he successfully pinned on petitioner at trial-had a "long history" of violent crimes and
assaultive acts and "of lying to police and shifting blame to others"; Carriger was
subsequently released after the county attorney declined to retry him, citing a lack of
evidence of guilt, see Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 139-40; Noel Levy, Decision Not
to Retry Inmate Carefully Made, Ariz. Republic, May 26, 1999, at B9); Brown v. Wainwright,
785 F.2d 1457, 1464-66 (11th Cir. 1986) (granting habeas relief because state officials
deliberately withheld fact that chief witness against Brown lied on the stand about not
having been granted leniency in return for testifying against Brown; Brown was released
from prison after the charges against him were dropped, see DPIC, supra note 145); Gross,
Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 136 n.52 (discussing the McMillian case); Associated Press,
Inmate Freed After 5 Years on Death Row, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1994, at All (describing
release of Joseph Burrows from Illinois's death row after five years when the principal
witnesses against him recanted their testimony and one confessed to the crime); John
Hinton, Rivera Is Acquitted in Two Killings, Winston-Salem J., Nov. 23, 1999, at Al
(describing acquittal of Alfred Rivera, who spent two years on North Carolina's death row
for killing two men; the state supreme court ordered a new trial because the trial court
improperly forbade Rivera to adduce evidence, supported by additional testimony at
retrial, that one of Rivera's three codefendants, all of whom pleaded to lesser offenses in
return for testifying against Rivera, had deliberately framed him); Zorn, Daley's Oversight,
supra note 114 (discussing Illinois capital murder trial of William Franklin at which
"[p]rosecutors told jurors.., that the star witness to the murder was a bystander when in
fact he was an accomplice"). Police pressure to make statements helpful to the state's case
is not limited to those who are themselves charged with a capital crime. See, e.g., Guerra v.
Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that police and prosecutors
"intimidated" two eyewitnesses, one who initially said that petitioner's companion fired the
fatal shots and one who had said she did not see the shooter but saw petitioner with his

2088

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:2030

bargaining and sentencing benefits, 149 and publicity hounds seeking the
empty hands on the hood of a car immediately after the shots were heard, into
corroborating the prosecution's theory that the petitioner fired the shots; police told one
witness that her common-law husband was at risk of parole revocation if she did not
cooperate and told the other witness that her infant daughter could be taken from her if
she refused to cooperate).
149. See Mills & Armstrong, Another Cleared, supra note 84 ("Although prosecutors
use such witnesses regularly, jailhouse informants are considered among the least reliable
witnesses in the criminal justice system. Such witnesses typically say another inmate
confessed to them. In exchange, jailhouse informants frequently receive a variety of
benefits, such as having pending criminal charges dropped or sentences reduced."). For
examples of the use ofjailhouse informants to secure faulty convictions generally, see, e.g.,
Bill Moushey, Selling Lies, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Nov. 30, 1998, at Al (documenting efforts by
inmates, sometimes with the knowing complicity of law enforcement officials, to 'jump on
the bus," i.e., to concoct perjured testimony and "sell" it to prosecutors in exchange for
reduced sentences).
"[I]f the witness is lying to get favors unrelated to the crime at issue, he will do much
better if it is a big case, which usually means a murder, or better yet, a capital murder."
Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 138. For examples of the use ofjailhouse informants to
secure faulty convictions in capital cases, see, e.g., Crivens v. Roth, 172 F.3d 991, 998 (7th
Cir. 1999) (overturning conviction because the prosecutor improperly failed to disclose
that its key eyewitness had a criminal history and had used an alias in past, thereby
"demonstrat[ing] a propensity to lie to police officers, prosecutors, and even judges");
Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 156 ("Because of tales told by jailhouse snitches, Ron
Williamson was nearly [executed] by the state of Oklahoma and Dennis Fritz was
imprisoned for twelve years. So were thirteen other men ultimately freed through DNA
exonerations, some 21% of the [Cardozo Law School's] Innocence Project [exoneration]
cases [between 1988 and 1999]."); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 136 n.52 (describing
police pressure put on one Myers, who was under arrest for an unrelated murder, to
implicate Walter McMillian in a killing McMillian did not commit but for which "he spent
six years on death row before the frame-up was exposed"); Armstrong & Mills, Justice
Derailed, supra note 84 ("In at least 46 cases [of the total 285] where a defendant was
sentenced to die [in Illinois since 1977], the prosecution's evidence included ajailhouse
informant . . . ."); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 77 ("One troublesome and
increasingly frequent source of perjured testimony [in capital cases] is the jailhouse
snitch'-the convicted felon who will testify to just about anything for the prosecution in
exchange for a reduced sentence."); Liz Chandler, Jury Ruled Death for Innocent Man,
Mistakes in Case Expose System's Vulnerabilities, Charlotte Observer, Sept. 10, 2000, at
12A (reporting on role played by jailhouse informant Timothy Hall in the capital
conviction of Charles Munsey, who was later shown to be innocent; Hall was permitted to
testify that Munsey confessed to him when both were incarcerated in Central Prison, even
though the prosecutor had records in his file showing that Hall "had never been to Central
Prison"; Munsey died of lung cancer in jail before he could be released following the actual
killer's confession to the offense); Athelia Knight, Blinded by the Light, Wash. Post, Oct. 6,
1999, at Cl (describing release of Ellen Reasonover, who served 16 years in prison in
Missouri for capital murder, after it was discovered that police suppressed (1) information
about benefits the twojailhouse informants, whose testimony at her capital trial sealed her
conviction, had received in return for their testimony; and (2) tapes secretly recording
conversations between one of those informants and Reasonover, and between Reasonover
and another cellmate, in which she consistently maintained her innocence); Mills &
Armstrong, Another Cleared, supra note 84 (discussing exoneration of death row prisoner
Steve Manning, whose conviction was premised on his alleged jailhouse confession to
Tommy Dye, a known "con man and chronic liar who fabricated stories even under oath";
although Dye surreptitiously taped six hours of conversations with Manning and was the
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attention 150 to be reaped from helping police solve the "big one"; (2)
forced or fabricated confessions;15 1 (3) forensics evidence that can easily
subject of numerous reports by FBI agents investigating Manning on other charges,
neither the tapes nor the reports, but only Dye's trial testimony, mentioned Manning's
supposed confession to murder (which Dye claimed "occurred during two brief gaps in the
tapes")); Mills & Armstrong, Inside Informant, supra note 137 (criticizing Illinois capital
prosecutors for frequently using "jailhouse informants . . . in cases where the evidence of
guilt was flimsy or during sentencing to demonize a defendant with inflammatory accounts
of the crime"-as exemplified by their use of informant Tommy Dye to secure Steve
Manning's conviction, although a federal prosecutor previously had described Dye as "a
pathological liar . . . not worthy of this court's trust," prosecutors knew Dye "lies about
almost everything, even his own name," including repeatedly under oath in state and
federal court, and even though Dye had been exposed as a con artist "so many times that
the late Chicago Tribune columnist Mike Royko wrote about him in 1989 and 1990" (three
years before Manning's trial), and as also is exemplified by the use of "snitch testimony...
[to] convict or condemn 4 of the 12 [other] Illinois Death Row inmates who were later
exonerated"; documenting means by which jailhouse informants-who have "little to lose
by lying on the witness stand" because they are "[r]arely... charged with perjury" and who
have "something very real to gain: time shaved off their sentence, creature comforts in jail
or some other favor"-"fabricate stories" in capital murder cases, using "details ... from
newspapers or another inmate's legal papers" or sometimes when "prosecutors and
police ... provid[e] them with false stories to tell"); see also, e.g., Gross, Lost Lives, supra
note 84, at 139 (reporting statistics suggesting "that witness perjury is a far more common
cause of error in murders and other capital cases than in lesser crimes"); Kohn, supra note
138, at 3-4 (describing the recantation by a witness against death row inmate Crossley
Green; the witness now says he lied when he told the jury that Green confessed to him,
because "Man told me if I don't say what they want me to say, I go right back to the
slammer"); supra note 145 (discussing the Coot case); infra note 160 (discussing Ford
Heights Four case).
150. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273-75 & n.5 (1999) (finding that the prosecution
in a capital case suppressed evidence that its key witness progressively embroidered her
story in order to assist the police in solving the crime); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945,
947, 949-51 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that police withheld the fact that before petitioner's
arrest for the offense for which he was convicted and sentenced to die, the chief
prosecution witness-who at trial identified petitioner, an African American man , as the
assailant-had told police that the assailant was white).
151. Because interrogation leading to confession "is extremely time consuming""[i]t is likely to take hours, perhaps days, to break down a suspect who resists"-"extended
interrogation is largely reserved for big cases in which confessions are necessary for
successful prosecution. Typically, that means homicides, and especially the most heinous
homicides . . . [that] the police are most anxious to solve, and yet, because the victim is
dead," have the most trouble solving. Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 140-41. As a
result, false confessions "are three to four times more common as a cause of miscarriages
ofjustice for homicide cases than for other crimes." Id. at 141. See, e.g., Kordenbrock v.
Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1094-98 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (overturning capital conviction,
on habeas, based on confession obtained after police (1) ignored petitioner's statements
that he wanted the interrogation to stop, (2) threatened to arrest petitioner's girlfriend
(against whom they had no evidence), (3) threatened to send petitioner to Ohio, where,
police said, he could be held incommunicado and put through "an ordeal [he] may not
forget for a long time," then (4) suppressed the tape-recorded version of the confession
and pieced together a written statement giving a far more inculpatory account than the
actual confession); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 940-42 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(overturning a capital conviction, on habeas, based on findings that police obtained two
very different confessions from the mentally deficient petitioner during a 40-plus-hour
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period of interrogation without counsel; the exculpatory version of the confession, not
admitted at trial, appeared to be in the defendant's words; the inculpatory version, used at
trial, had prose beyond defendant's ken); United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 1078, 1095 & n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (granting evidentiary hearing to capitally
sentenced habeas petitioner and denying presumption of correctness to state court's
voluntary-confession finding because the state suppression-hearing judge "did not have
access to the voluminous [subsequently disclosed] information about the systematic ...
abuse [of suspects by the Area 2 police unit that interrogated Maxwell-the same unit
and Maxwell's
discussed in Abramsky, Mills & Armstrong, and 60 Minues II, infra] ....
attorney never had the opportunity to use that information to cross-examine the officers
who testified at the suppression hearing . . . ."); Robert Perske, Unequal Justice? 54-56
(1991) (discussing Earl Washington case that also was the subject of the PBS Frontline
program discussed below); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 147, at 139-40 (discussing
Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee, who were released from Florida's death row after many years
and pardoned when another man confessed to the multiple murders to which they had
been beaten into confessing); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 141-42 (describing
confession of Melvin Reynolds, "a twenty-five-year-old man of limited intelligence" who was
repeatedly questioned, including under sodium amytal, culminating in a final 14-hour
session laced with threats and promises, prompting Reynolds to confess-because "you
[the police] want me to"-to a murder another man committed and, four years later,
admitted); Abramsky, supra note 145 (discussing the Area 2 Chicago police unit: "Dozens
of other prisoners [including 10 death row inmates] have come forward saying they were
tortured into confessing by police officers from . . . Area Two" and presenting "hairraising-and remarkably consistent [claims] . . . of alligator clips attached to their ears,
noses, mouths, penises, and testicles; of electric shocks to the genitals; of being burned
atop radiators" and of "mock executions" and "bags put over their heads for minutes at a
time, a technique known as the 'Dry Submarino.'"); Frontline, supra note 84 (describing
the confession of Earl Washington, a retarded man, to virtually every unsolved sexual
assault in Culpeper, Virginia; the subsequent dismissal of all charges save one, when it
became clear that Washington could not have committed the crimes; the successful capital
prosecution of Washington on the one charge that was not dropped-the rape-murder of
a 5' 8" white woman-based on Washington's confession to killing (but not raping) a short
black woman; Washington was picked up after having been awake all night drinking, was
grilled for two additional days, and willingly agreed to take police to the scene of the crime
but took them to the wrong place and exhibited no recognition of the actual location until
told by the police that the crime had occurred there; asked later why he told police the
victim was black, the retarded defendant answered, "I didn't see a picture of her in the
newspaper when she got killed or nothing, [so] I just figured she was black"; the later
discovery that Washington could not have been the source of the semen and seminal fluid
found on various articles of clothing and bedding at the scene of the crime led to
Washington's release from death row after 11 years and to his formal exoneration after 18
years, see Masters, DNA Clears Inmate, supra note 84); Frank Green, Question of Life or
Death: Illinois Exonerations Spark Capital-Punishment Debate, Richmond TimesDispatch, Apr. 2, 2000, at Al (discussing the 18-hour interrogation, complete with false
police claims that the suspect had failed a lie detector test and a variety of other
psychological ploys, that led Gary Gauger (a recovering alcoholic) to falsely admit killing
his parents during a "blackout"; he was later exonerated when members of a motorcycle
gang admitted killing Gauger's parents and later laughing about "writ[ing] a book about
how to do the perfect murder and not get caught"-by having the police get "the son [to]
admit[ ] to it"); Brook A. Masters, Lucky Release from a Life Behind Bars, Wash. Post, Apr.
28, 2000, at A23 (discussing confession defendant David Vasquez gave in a Virginia capital
murder case after "detectives yelled, cajoled and lied to" the developmentally disabled
suspect, "saying they had found his fingerprints inside [the victim's] house"; DNA later
proved another man committed the offense); Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra
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note 137 (conducting independent investigation of the 14 capital convictions the Area 2
police unit in question secured (i.e., five percent of all post-Furman death sentences in
Illinois, see Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84), and finding evidence of
coercion-often accompanied by other misconduct, including witness intimidation and
suppressed evidence-in five of the 14 cases in addition to the five the courts already had
overturned; noting that confessions forced by other Illinois officers accounted for two of
the 12 (now 14) exonerations of innocent death row inmates in Illinois over the last
decade); Sweet, supra note 84 (discussing fabricated or coerced confession of Hubert
Geralds); 60 Minutes II, Torture in Area 2 (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 7, 1999)
(transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing systematic pattern of electroshock and suffocation torture of suspects to produce confessions by officers in Area 2
Chicago police unit between the early 1980s and 1993; unit was supervised by Jon Burge
who was repeatedly promoted until being fired in 1993 for torturing a suspect into
confessing to a crime that put him on death row; the torture ring was broken up only after
someone inside the unit used police stationery anonymously to tip off a defense attorney);
Jim Yardley, Texas Inmate's Confession Slips Through the Cracks: Letter to Bush in 1998
Didn't Elicit Action, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2000, at A20 (discussing Christopher Ochoa's
confession to a rape and murder he did not commit in return for a deal permitting him to
avoid the death penalty for those crimes; also describing the confession years later,
following a religious conversion, of another man who DNA showed did commit the crimes
but who in the meantime was left at liberty to, and did, commit other serious crimes); see
also Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 78-106, 263 & app.2, (demonstrating that false
confessions contributed to 24% of the miscarriages in capital and other cases that were
corrected by DNA evidence during the 1990s); Richard Jerome, Suspect Confessions, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 1995 (Magazine), at 28 (giving various additional examples of apparently
forced or manufactured confessions). See generally Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Ofshe,
The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 passim
(1998) (study of 60 cases in which police-induced confessions were later shown to be
actually or probably false; half proceeded to trial or to a pretrial plea bargain (typically
accepted in order to avoid the death penalty); 36% resulted in conviction).
152. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J. of Soc. Pol'y & L. 439
(1997); Paul C. Giannelli, "Junk Science": The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 105 (1993) (both articles cataloguing chronic malfeasance and misfeasance in
the handling of scientific evidence by police and state experts in serious felony cases).
153. Berlow states:
In Texas, the nation's execution capital, where more than seventy-nine people
have been executed in the past three years, prosecutors relied for years on the
expert testimony of Ralph Erdmann, a forensic pathologist, who repeatedly
falsified autopsy reports to support prosecution arguments in death-penalty cases.
A special prosecutor's investigation of Erdmann concluded, "If the prosecution
theory was that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what Dr.
Erdmann reported."
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 77-78. See State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1001 n.5
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that Texas eventually took away Erdmann's medical
license, and that he pled guilty to seven felonies in connection with corrupt autopsies); see
also Exonerated by Science, supra note 145, at 15 (noting that in a majority of cases in
which DNA evidence ultimately exonerated a prisoner, the prosecution had relied upon
less conclusive forensic evidence that "narrowed the field of possibilities to include [the
defendant]," then relied upon expert testimony to suggest the "reliability and scientific
strength" of the nonetheless inconclusive evidence).
In another Texas case, a man was convicted of capital murder in 1986, based in part
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regard to inherently suspect hair comparisons,15 4 carpet sweepings, tire
on the testimony of a state expert that forensic evidence at the scene of the rape-murder
matched the defendant, even though, of the 28 forensic clues found at the scene, only one
was determined to be consistent with any trait that could be associated with the defendant.
See Frontline, supra note 84. The other 27 items of evidence went unmentioned at trial,
and the one "matching" trait-O blood type-also "matches" 40% of the population.
When DNA testing later revealed that the O-type blood was not the defendant's, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals declined to order a retrial on the ground that a DNA test could
not provide "compelling" evidence of innocence. See id.
154. See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557-58 (E.D. Okla. 1995),
aff'd, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997) (overturning capital conviction based on, inter alia,
(1) faulty hair analysis that was so "scientifically unreliable" that it should not have been
permitted as evidence of guilt and (2) claims that hairs found at the crime scene
"match[ed]" the defendant's, although hair analysis can never support that categorical a
claim); Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1991) (granting state post-conviction relief
from a capital conviction because the state suppressed FBI analyses establishing that the
limb hair the state's expert had used to connect defendant to the crime lacked sufficient
characteristics for microscopic analysis; Nelson was thereupon released from prison and
not retried because, as the district attorney admitted, there was no valid evidence
implicating him in the offense, see Jingle Davis & Mark Curriden, Man Condemned for
Murder of Girl Is Freed, Atlanta Const., Nov. 7, 1991, at E6); Scheck et al., supra note 84, at
158-71, 262 & app.2 (discussing contribution of "Defective or Fraudulent Scien[tific]"
analysis of forensic evidence, mainly, bogus microscopic hair comparisons, to 34% of
miscarriages revealed by DNA analysis during the 1990s); Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of
Fortune, supra note 137 (discussing contribution to false capital convictions and sentences
of four innocent men in Illinois of "bad science, concealment of evidence and misleading
rhetoric": the state hair expert claimed that three scalp hairs found in a defendant's car
were "similar" to the scalp hair of one or the other victim, and that "similar" meant that
only one of every 4500 people have scalp hair with the relevant characteristics, after which
prosecutors argued that hairs "matched"-and, eventually, that the hairs were-the victim's
hairs; in fact, as a different police examiner later revealed, the hairs were not similar (one
of them was not a scalp hair at all, hence was not amenable to forensic analysis), and the 1/
4500 figure required a match between 23 separate characteristics of the hairs being
compared-"an exhaustive comparison that [the first expert] had not performed"); Becka
& Swindle, supra note 84 (reporting on DNA tests showing that hairs used at trial to link
death row inmate Michael Blair to the killing were not his; also reporting that the state
suppressed evidence that the state forensic witness who drew the links-based on which,
the prosecutor argued, "You can call it a link, you can call it association, you can call it a
match" and that "[t]he evidence is . . . absolutely overwhelming"-was involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital by his state crime lab supervisors shortly before Blair's trial
because "they considered him a danger to himself and possibly others" due to "depression
and alcoholism"; the witness "was released from the lockdown unit at [a Dallas hospital]
twice to testify in capital murder trials"); Mills & Armstrong, By a Hair, supra note 137
(describing study of all Illinois post-Furman capital convictions revealing that at least 20
were premised on hair-comparison evidence, notwithstanding its "notorious[ ]
untrustworth[iness]" because human hair lacks unique qualities, and consequently (1)
generates forensic analyses that (a) necessarily depend on subjective comparisons that
often lead "experts" to disagree with each other about the same hair comparisons and (b)
are entirely unreliable absent intensive analysis of a larger range of factors than many state
forensics laboratories actually consider; (2) at most permits the conclusion that the
evidentiary hair "could have" come from the suspect's head-but also from that of many
other individuals-though the evidence often is inaccurately characterized by prosecutors
in closing argument as "matching" the suspect's hair or even as being the suspect's hair;
and providing a compendium of examples of false convictions based on hair "matches,"
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tracks, shoe prints,1 5 5 and predictions of future dangerousness, 156
but also in regard to more reliable fingerprint, 1 57 ballistics,1 58 and
including Williamson, 904 F. Supp. at 1529, in which subsequent DNA testing ruled out
Williamson and his codefendant as the perpetrators of the rape-murder and also as the
donors of the hair found at the scene).
155. Armstrong & Possley describe an Illinois capital murder case in which the misuse
of shoe-print experts and other foul play contributed to the conviction of two innocent
capital defendants. The lead prosecutor directed one shoe-print expert to "keep his
mouth shut about his conclusion" that the shoe print of the man who kicked down the
victim's door did not match either defendant's shoes. Only after two additional experts
said they could not link the print to a defendant was the prosecutor able to find a fourth
expert who was willing to do so. That "expert," who claimed the ability to identify a
person's race from his shoe print, was later exposed as a fraud. Another prosecutor failed
to reveal that a different state footprint expert had determined that the shoe prints relied
on to prove that the male defendants had cased the victims' home ahead of time actually
belonged to a woman much smaller in size than the defendants. See Possley & Armstrong,
Prosecution on Trial, supra note 137; see also id. (discussing the contribution to the same
false convictions of other law enforcement misconduct, including two police officers'
concoction of a statement by one defendant reporting having a "vision" of the offense;
another police officer's admittedly false testimony as to when the other two officers
informed him of the alleged confession; prosecutors' presentation of the two officers'
testimony, even though there was no written record of the "vision" statement and it was
never mentioned in testimony to the grand jury that indicted the defendant; and two
prosecutors' suppression of a confession to the crime by another man who was serving time
for a nearly identical offense and was subsequently linked to the crime by DNA evidence);
supra note 138 (describing presentation of faulty expert testimony about fiber, tire-track,
and hair evidence in process of convicting Cecil Sutherland of offense he did not commit).
156. Alan Berlow reports:
[To prove "future dangerousness" as a crucial step in imposing the death penalty
under the Texas capital-sentencing statute,] Texas prosecutors . . . repeatedly
relied on James Grigson, a psychiatrist who became known as "Dr. Death" because
his expert opinion [that the defendant would be dangerous in the future] in 124
capital cases contributed to 115 death sentences. One of those sentenced was
Randall Dale Adams, whose wrongful conviction was the subject of the movie The
Thin Blue Line. Grigson testified at Adams's 1977 trial that the defendant had a
"sociopathic personality disorder" and that "there is no question in my mind that
Adams is guilty." Asked if Adams was likely to kill in the future, given the
opportunity, Grigson replied, "He will kill again." In fact Adams was innocent,
and had never killed anyone. He came within seventy-two hours of execution.
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 78. See Mills et al., Flawed Trials, supra note 137.
See also Saldano v. Texas, 120 S. Ct. 2214 (2000) (per curiam) (vacating death sentence
that had been premised on an expert witness's conclusion that the defendant posed a
danger to the community in the future in part because of his Latino ethnicity); Kathy Walt,
Debate Over Death Penalty Is Renewed; Predicting Future Threat Raises Question of Flaws,
Hous. Chron., July 9, 2000, at 1 (reporting Texas Attorney General John Cornyn's
acknowledgement that at least seven people had been placed on the state's death row
based in part on expert testimony relying on the prisoners' race or ethnicity as a reason to
conclude that they posed a danger of violent behavior in the future).
157. See Moore, supra note 84 (discussing conviction and capital sentence of Kerry
Max Cook that was based in large part on the forensically impossible conclusion that the
defendant's fingerprint found at scene of crime was less than 12 hours old).
158. See supra note 144 (discussing the Workman case).
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DNA 159 evidence; and (4) blatant police and prosecutorial misconduct.160
159. See, e.g., W.C. Thompson, Subjective Interpretation, Laboratory Error and the
Value of DNA Evidence: Three Case Studies, 96 Genetica 153 (1995) (pointing to
uncertainty in interpretation of test results and laboratory errors as "factors that
profoundly affect the value of" DNA and other scientific evidence in criminal cases);
Weinstein, Many Resist DNA Testing, supra note 118 (discussed supra note 118).
160. See, e.g., Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000) (overturning
murder convictions because in "the State's zeal to obtain multiple murder convictions," it
violated the Due Process Clause by (1) relying at Smith's trial on one of two versions of the
events, provided by a participant in the burglary-murder, which implicated Smith in the
killing; (2) impeaching that witness's contrary testimony that another man and not Smith
was to blame; then (3) relying at a subsequent trial on the same witness's "diametrically
opposed" version of the events to blame the killing on that other man); Bowen v. Maynard,
799 F.2d 593, 599-602, 610-13 (10th Cir. 1986) (overturning murder convictions because
Oklahoma prosecutors suppressed a sheaf of investigative reports that a suspect other than
the capitally sentenced petitioner had murdered the victim); State v. Munson, 886 P.2d
999, 1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (overturning capital conviction because the
prosecution deliberately withheld 165 photographs and up to 500 pages of reports, most of
it exculpatory; on retrial, Munson was acquitted, see Randall Coyne, Abe Munson's NearDeath Experience, Okla. Observer, Apr. 25, 1995, at 9);JoeJackson & William Burke, Dead
Run: The Untold Story of Dennis Stockton and America's Only Mass Escape from Death
Row 240-46 (1999) (concluding that Dennis Stockton, whom Virginia executed in 1995,
was probably innocent of the crime for which he was executed and was framed by police
and prosecutors who singled him out based on his long criminal record, then suppressed
evidence showing he was innocent); Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 107-25, 172-82
(detailing repeated and systematic misrepresentation and suppression of exonerative
evidence by police, prosecutors, and state forensic experts in capital and other cases; "[f] or
63 percent of the DNA exonerations analyzed by the Innocence Project study, misconduct
by police or prosecutors played an important role in the convictions," including
suppression of evidence of innocence, knowing use of false testimony, witness coercion
and other evidence fabrication, and false statements to the jury); Armstrong & Mills,
Conviction Overturned, supra note 138 (reporting unanimous decision of Illinois Supreme
Court overturning conviction and death sentence of defendant, notwithstanding
"overwhelming" evidence that he killed a police officer in a shoot-out in front of a police
station, because Cook County prosecutors engaged in "infantile" behavior, made a
"'transparent' play to emotion rather than the evidence" by hauling into court a "headless
mannequin wearing the victim's police uniform, which had blood and brain matter on it"
and by "improperly present[ing] evidence and arguments that focused on the loss suffered
by [the victim's] family and the police force, rather than restricting their case to the
evidence against" the defendant); Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (over
"10 percent of Illinois' death-penalty cases have been reversed for a new trial or sentencing
hearing because prosecutors took some unfair advantage that undermined a trial's
integrity"; among other things, prosecutors in Illinois "repeatedly exaggerated the criminal
backgrounds of defendants[,] . . . lied to jurors, [ ] ... browbeat[ ] jurors, saying they must
return the death sentence, or they will have violated their oaths or lied to God[,] ...
misstat[ed] the law or evidence . . . , br[oke] a promise to a defendant not to seek the
death penalty [and] . . . allowed their star witness to tell what they knew to be a lie");
Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of Fortune, supra note 137 (describing events leading to the
false convictions of the Ford Heights Four, two of whom spent 17 years on Illinois's death
row before being released in 1995: "court rulings, sworn affidavits and interviews with key
participants indicate that prosecutors concealed that [their three key] witnesses had
received a host of undisclosed benefits for testifying ... rang[ing] from get-out-of-jail-free
cards for Jackson and Gray to a newjob [as a security guard] for McCraney": "in exchange
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for [Jackson's] testimony a burglary charge against him was dropped," but prosecutors let
him testify that "he'd been promised nothing"; prosecutors charged Gray, a retarded
woman, with murder when she recanted her claim that she accompanied the defendants
during the rape-murder, then agreed to (and did) set her free if she would implicate the
defendants (which she did) but let her testify that no deal existed); id. (detailing chronic
prosecutorial misconduct by Cook county prosecutor Scott Arthur in capital and other
homicide cases; discussed infra note 229); Armstrong & Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra
note 84 (reporting findings of Chicago Trzbune's study of 381 homicide convictions
overturned between 1963 and 1998 as a result of prosecutorial concealment of evidence of
innocence and presentation of false evidence of guilt; 67 of the 381 cases studied resulted
in death sentences and many others were tried capitally; of 67 capital judgments
overturned based on prosecutorial concealment of the truth, 30 eventuated in the inmates'
exoneration and release from death row after anywhere from 5 to 26 years; concluding that
"although prosecutors often downplay individual cases involving such deceit as aberrations,
the body of cases turned up by the Tribune's search reveals that it happens frequently and
in nearly limitless ways":
With impunity, prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the
law, committing the worst kinds of deception in the most serious of cases. They
have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers were white[,] ... a
wife, hiding evidence that her husband committed suicide[,] ... parents, hiding
evidence their daughter was killed by wild dogs[, and numerous others detailed
in the article, hiding evidence strongly implicating different suspects, revealing
that state witnesses were lying and were even pressured by police to lie, and that
defense witnesses the state discredited were in fact telling the truth].);
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 70, 74 (discussing discovery of James Richardson's
innocence (he spent 21 years on Florida's death row), following a theft from the
prosecutor's office of the file in Richardson's case, which showed that the local sheriff and
other witnesses had lied under oath to secure Richardson's conviction ("[n]o lawenforcement official was ever held accountable" for lying); proof of Anthony Porter's
innocence (he spent 16 years on Illinois's death row and was nearly executed) after
journalism students discovered evidence that police ignored suspects identified by a
relative of a victim and pressured witnesses and other suspects to implicate Porter, and
after the students secured a taped confession by another man; and release of Walter
McMillian (he spent six years on Alabama's death row) following proof that "prosecutors
withheld [the fact that] ... the state's principal witness avoided a capital murder charge by
testifying against McMillian; . . . other witnesses were paid thousands of dollars for false
testimony; and... the state's three primary witnesses all later recanted," leading "Alabama
eventually [to] admit[ ] it had made a terrible mistake"); Spencer Hunt, Clouded Cases:
Prosecutors' Conduct Risks Reversals, Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 10, 2000, at Al
(reporting, based on study of court records, that "the Ohio Supreme Court repeatedly has
criticized Hamilton County [Cincinnati] prosecutors for making improper courtroom
statements to win 14 death penalty cases over the past 12 years," mainly statements "that
play on jurors' sense of outrage and emotions, that stray from facts in evidence or that
paint defense lawyers as dishonest"); Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra note 137
("Charges of police misconduct-from manufacturing evidence to concealing information
that could help clear suspects-are central to at least half of the [then] 12 Illinois cases
where a man sentenced to death was exonerated."); Moore, supra note 84 (discussing
police framing of Kerry Max Cook, discussed supra notes 145, 157); Rosenberg, supra note
114, at 22-24 (discussing "man who spent four years on death row only to be found to have
been framed by the Philadelphia police"; crediting the Philadelphia district attorney's
policy of "toughness" and heavy use of the death penalty with encouraging the high
incidence of "prosecutorial misconduct" in Philadelphia, particularly by the chief of the
city's homicide unit, Barbara Christie, whom courts repeatedly criticized for "hiding
evidence that indicated a defendant's innocence, and . .. knocking blacks off juries");
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Where there: -are eyewitnesses, they can be led by suggestive photo
arrays and line-ups to misidentify known suspects-a risk in all cases but
especially in ones where contradicting eyewitnesses are scarce and the
impulse to solve a heinous crime is great. 16 1 Whatever the prosecution's
theory and evidence, the highly publicized nature of capital cases assists
police and prosecutors in selling their theory to potential jurors even
162
before the defendant has been formally charged and the trial begins.
supra notes 138, 142-145, 148-151, 153-155; see also Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84,
at 68 ("The reasons [innocent individuals are sentenced to die] range from simple police
and prosecutorial error to the most outrageous misconduct, such as the framing of
innocent people, and everything in between: perjured testimony, erroneous eyewitness
testimony, false confessions (including the confessions of innocent defendants), racial
bias, incompetent defense counsel, and overzealous police officers and prosecutors... .");
Exonerated by Science, supra note 145, at 15 (reporting that 29% of rape and rape-murder
cases in which the jury convicted a suspect later shown by DNA tests to be innocent
involved claims of perjured prosecutorial testimony, fabricated scientific evidence or
testimony, or state suppression of exculpatory evidence); Frontline, supra note 84
(providing examples of police and prosecutorial manicuring, embellishment, and selective
use of witness statements at trial); Matt Lait & Scott Glover, LAPD Chief Calls for Mass
Dismissal of Tainted Cases, L.A. Times, Jan. 27, 2000, at Al (discussing "Ramparts" scandal
in Los Angeles Police Department tainting scores of convictions based on evidence that
police officers frequently framed defendants); Bill Moushey, Government Misconduct in
the Name of Expedient Justice, Pitt. Post-Gazette, Nov. 22-Dec. 13, 1998 (ten-part series
documenting misconduct by prosecutors and law enforcement personnel resulting in
prosecution and conviction of innocent suspects); Katherine Shaver & Steven Gray,
Lawyers Seek Names of Officers Who Lied: Montgomery Verdicts May Be in Doubt, Wash.
Post, Oct. 20, 1999, at BI (discussing eight officers in Montgomery County, Maryland, who
repeatedly lied in court over a five-year period, affecting numerous cases).
161. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1999) (finding that state
suppressed exculpatory evidence that key witness against the capital petitioner had
"muddled memories," had not accurately identified him as the perpetrator before trial,
and was shown a picture of the victim just before testifying, to jog her memory); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441-45 (1995) (overturning conviction based on prosecutorial
suppression of evidence revealing, in part, that eyewitnesses who confidently identified
petitioner at trial as the attacker had originally described a different perpetrator); see also
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement 9, 17 (1999) (noting that routine procedures using mug books may be
suggestive to witnesses and that results of mug book viewings should be "evaluated with
caution"). See generally Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 136-37 nn.53-55 (discussing
role of misidentification in miscarriages of justice in criminal cases).
162. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 147 (giving examples). The showing
needed to establish that prejudicial pretrial publicity warrants reversal of a conviction or
capital sentence is notoriously difficult for a defendant to satisfy, thus permitting a
substantial amount of pretrial publicity about the case, including the state's theory and
evidence, to reach the jury without any chance that it will lead to the reversal of any
conviction or capital sentence that results. See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 417
(1991) (permitting trial court in capital case to refuse to question jurors about the content
of news reports to which they were exposed in heavily publicized trial); Tuggle v.
Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's grant of
habeas relief due to "pretrial influences of the jury resulting from media publicity, media
contact with members of the jury, the reading by some members of the jury of articles
concerning the case and a false story stating that Tuggle had committed another rape"
because "Tuggle did not show as required under the test established in Murphy v. Florida
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c. The Capital Charge. - Merely seeking the death penalty pays
prosecutorial dividends. 163 It enables the state to "death qualify" the jury,
thereby (via the trial judge's exclusion for cause of strongly death-scrupled jurors and the prosecutor's peremptory challenges of even mildly
scrupled jurors) jettisoning the segment of the jury pool that is most
likely to be skeptical of informer, police, and forensic testimony and to
take seriously the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and, by repeatedly forcing jurors during the pretrial voir dire to contemplate the imposition of death, making them substantially more likely to vote for death
when the time comes. 164 It provides the best plea-bargaining leverage
imaginable-leverage sufficient, indeed, to induce even innocent defendants to confess or plead guilty to murder to avoid the death penalty,
though innocent defendants almost never confess or plead guilty to other
serious offenses. 16 5 It doubles the defense burden with hardly any inthat 'the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury-selection process of
which he complains permits an inference of actual prejudice'") (citations omitted)
(quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975)).
163. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 42 (quoting various former and current
Pennsylvania prosecutors explaining the Philadelphia district attorney's practice of seeking
the death penalty in nearly all murder cases as self-consciously designed to give prosecutors
"a permanent thumb on the scale" enabling them to "use everything you can" to win,
including (1) that "[y]ou can hold the defendant without bail," an advantage only available
in capital cases; (2) "it gives you leverage in negotiating guilty pleas"; (3) a capital charge
'can . . . keep a good lawyer from taking a poorly paid job representing an indigent
defendant" "[g]iven the extra work it takes to defend a client in a death case"; (4)
"[p]rosecutors in [Pennsylvania] death cases get 20 peremptory challenges . . . instead of
the 7 in a noncapital case"; and (5) "[e]veryone who's ever prosecuted a murder case wants
a death-qualified jury," because of the "perception . . . that minorities tend to say much
more often that they are opposed to the death penalty," so that "[a] lot of Latinos and
blacks will be [stricken from capital juries as a result of] these [death qualification]
questions").
164. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1288-1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983), afftd,
758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986) (discussing studies of death-qualified juries showing that the process and outcome
of death qualification makes juries more likely to convict and condemn); Hovey v. Superior
Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-56 (Cal. 1980) (same); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of
Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of
Deliberation, 8 L. & Hum. Behav. 53, 55-75 (1984) (reviewing relevant studies, virtually all
of which conclude that death qualification producesjuries more likely to convict than nondeath-qualified juries); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 147 (discussing effects of death
qualification on jurors' propensity to convict capital defendants); Craig Haney, On the
Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 L. &
Hum. Behav. 121, 122-32 (1984) (presenting results of experimental study showing that
repeated discussion of death penalty during voir dire increases likelihood that jurors will
conclude after hearing the evidence that a death sentence is warranted).
165. See, e.g., Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 142-43 (citing statistical evidence
and giving example ofJohn Sosnovske who was implicated in capital murder by his former
girlfriend's false statements, pled no contest to avoid the death penalty, and served five
years before another man confessed and pled guilty to the murder); supra note 151
(describing false confessions given, inter alia, to avoid death penalty).
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crease in the state's burden.1 66 And it encourages defense lawyers to
adopt minimalist, risk-averse strategies at the guilt phase (a staple at conferences run by death-penalty lawyers) in order to maximize the lawyer's
1 67
and her client's credibility at the all-important sentencing phase.
These inducements to bring capital charges increase the incentives
already discussed to use questionable, even bad faith investigative techniques to justify and support the charges. Although charging the case
capitally increases the chance of winning, it also increases the embarrassment and publicity of losing,1 68 making it all the more important for police and prosecutors to search for additional ways to win.
d. The Trial. - Other corners may also be cut at trial, if need be, to
secure a capital conviction or sentence. The defendant may be denied an
166. Anti-death penalty lawyers have made a variety of unsuccessful challenges to the
double counting of elements of the offense as aggravating circumstances sufficient to
warrant a death sentence and to statutes that make the same facts sufficient to serve as an
element and one or more aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 119
S. Ct. 2090, 2117-18 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's decision
because it permits double counting of same personal characteristics of victim as basis for
two separate aggravating factors); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 367 (1993) (rejecting
ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to object in state court to double
counting of accompanying robbery as two separate aggravating factors: that the killing was
committed for pecuniary gain and that it occurred in the course of another felony);
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241-46 (1988) (upholding use of aggravating
circumstance that defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person both as basis for elevating first-degree murder to capital murder at
the guilt phase and then as statutorily necessary aggravating circumstance predicate to a
death sentence at the penalty phase); Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1392-93 (8th Cir.
1989) (overruling Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258, 264 (8th Cir. 1985), which had
rejected use of same robbery as basis for two separate aggravating circumstances-that
murder was committed for pecuniary gain and that it was committed in the course of a
felony). Although framed as double jeopardy, Eighth Amendment, and other
constitutional challenges, the real difficulty with these procedures is that they enable the
state to rest on its guilt-phase laurels at the capital sentencing phase while the defense is
required to put on an entirely new and separate case.
167. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 328-34 (1983) (giving what is considered to be
the classic description of the preferred, risk-averse strategy at the guilt phase of capital
cases); Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 148 ("Fear of a death sentence may drive the
defense to make tactical choices that compromise its position on guilt in order to improve
the odds on penalty."). Compare Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon:
Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 245, 250
(1990-1991) (urging defense counsel in capital cases to use a "'dramatic psychohistory' of
the client" to maximize the potential for mitigation at the penalty phase, and noting the
risk that a singleminded focus on the traditional task of convincing the jury that the
defendant is innocent can have the effect of demoralizing counsel upon the jury's
conviction of the defendant of capital murder, which in turn can lead counsel effectively to
"throw in the towel" at the penalty phase), with Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and
Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1539,
1565-66 (1998) (examining capital jurors' reactions to various defenses in capital cases
and revealing that jurors are not much moved by "abused childhood" or similar,
psychologically focused defenses).
168. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to retain experienced counsel of his choice (after his original
lawyer dies suddenly the night before trial), and he may instead be forced
to go to trial with an avowedly ill-prepared appointed lawyer only six
months at the bar. 169 Women with children at home may all be excused
from jury service for cause. Blacks also may all be excluded for cause, or
at least peremptorily, due, e.g., to their greater tendency to have scruples
against the death penalty. The trial judge may seat a prospective juror
who swears by the state's theory of the case on the central issue at trial
after that theory was reported as fact in press accounts fed to the press by
the police. The prosecution may keep the jury from hearing evidence
disproving its theory while presenting evidence supporting its theory that
(suppressed) police reports suggest was "planted." The courtroom may
be loaded with law enforcement officials while the defendant is shackled
in front of the jury (after a verbal outburst following the judge's denial of
his motion to retain new counsel). Police officers may be questioned
about the defendant's post-arrest silence, and prosecutors in closing argument may comment on his failure to testify and on the jurors' obligation
to convict and capitally sentence in order to save society from criminals.
An attribute of all murders (that they are "heinous, atrocious, or cruel")
may be treated as enough to "aggravate" the killing from first-degree murder to a capital offense. After threat of cross-examination that would reveal the defendant's prior record keeps him off the stand at the guilt
phase of the trial, the prosecutor at the sentencing phase may use a police officer's hearsay report of the defendant's cross-examination on his
prior record at a pretrial suppression hearing to tell the jury about the
defendant's record and also about some offenses that have never even
resulted in charges, much less convictions. Then, instructions may be
given to the jury to presume intent or malice;1 70 lengthy aggravating circumstance instructions may be juxtaposed to fleeting references to the
role of mitigation; and instructions and argument that state law would
keep the thirty-eight-year-old defendant in prison for a minimum of thirty
years even if he were not sentenced to die may be barred.
Equally important, the pressure-cooker atmosphere surrounding
capital cases very often assures both that they will go to trial, and that they
will be tried capitally. Thus, if the case seems to be aggravated (as it usually does, given the accompanying felony) and otherwise fits the profile
described above (male, outsider, low-status defendant with a prior record,
stranger (nondomestic) killing of a high-status victim), virtually no atten169. The examples listed in this section are of course only a small subset of the
methods available to achieve capital convictions and sentences in weak or inappropriate
cases. I chose these, rather than other illustrations, because they all appear to have
occurred in a single Tennessee capital case I am litigating in habeas corpus proceedings
there. See Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995); Memorandum in Support of
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Immediate Relief on Seven Claims, in id.
(filed Dec. 16, 1993).
170. Reversal on this ground mooted many of the other claims. See Houston, 50 F.3d
at 381.
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tion is paid at the, investigation and charging stage to defenses or extenuating circumstances or any nuances affecting the degree of the homicide
or the desert of the death penalty. The tendency instead is to resist settlement, go to trial-even if the evidence is weak-and demand the highest
17 1
penalty.
e. The Gamut. - For love of the death penalty-or for their constituents' love of it-some prosecutors notoriously use tactics running the
gamut described above. Early in 1999, Chicago Tribune investigative reporter Ken Armstrong (evidently, with his libel lawyers' blessing) gave the
following description of the capital tactics of Robert Macy, Oklahoma City
District Attorney, frequent death penalty user, t 72 and former head of the
National Association of District Attorneys:
[Macy] has lied. He has bullied. Even when a man's life is at
stake, Macy has spurned the rules of a fair trial, concealing evidence, misrepresenting evidence, or launching into abusive, improper arguments that had nothing to do with the evidence, according to appellate rulings condemning his tactics.
In the court of law, Macy meets with constant and sometimes severe criticism. But in the court of public opinion he consistently wins re-election-usually with more than 70 percent of
1 73
the vote.

171. Professor Gross states:
Prosecutors lose a much higher proportion of murder trials than other felony
trials, about thirty percent compared to about fifteen percent, which suggests that
in murder cases they are willing to go to trial with comparatively weak
evidence ....
In some cases,... the evidence is weak because the defendants are
not guilty, and some of those innocent defendants are not only tried but
convicted. In other words, (as with police investigations) as prosecutors work to
obtain convictions in hard homicide cases, they [are much more likely than in
less important situations to] draw in cases where it is difficult to separate the
innocent from the guilty.
Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 144; see Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 34, 42
(describing Philadelphia district attorney's practice of charging nearly all homicides as
capital murder, then accepting pleas only to sentences of life without parole, which in
practice means that plea offers are "seldom accepted"); see also Gross, Lost Lives, supra
note 84, at 144 ("[A]n actual decision to dismiss a serious charge that would probably have
resulted in a conviction is always difficult. It is bound to be much more difficult-and less
likely-if the crime has attracted a lot of attention, or if a victim, or several, were killed.").
Because many prosecutors simply refuse to plea bargain in capital cases, an important
source of information about defenses or the weakness of their cases is unavailable.
Moreover, defense lawyers' anticipated inclination to exaggerate to save a client's life
makes prosecutors especially likely to distrust information supplied by capital defense
lawyers, even highly respected ones. See id. at 145; see also Mary Stolberg, The Jury's Still
Out, Winston-Salem J.,June 20, 2000, at Al (discussing impetus to pursue death sentences,
in what even prosecutors believe are marginal cases, under a North Carolina law
forbidding prosecutors in potentially capital cases to accept a plea to first-degree murder
in exchange for a sentence of life without parole and requiring them either to pursue a
death sentence or accept a plea to second-degree murder, which carries only a 13-year
minimum sentence).
172. See supra note 140.
173. Armstrong, Cowboy Bob, supra note 114. At least four convicted murderers have
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3. Absolute Power: Five Missing Constraints. - The, fact that there are
strong political, professional, and emotional incentives to cut corners,
and that it is possible-even comparatively easy-to do so in capital cases,
is only half the story. The other half is the weakness of the incentives not
to do so. One might assume that every police officer's and prosecutor's
impulse to obtain numerous death sentences is countered by equal and
opposite impulses to take care to reach correct results, given that, after
all, a life is at stake. But that is exactly what does not happen. Consider
the five strongest external1 74 constraints on prosecutorial overreaching(1) being exposed or out-maneuvered and thus defeated at trial by competent, conscientious, and adequately compensated defense counsel; (2)
received new trials "based upon an appellate finding that Macy broke the rules." Macy and
his trial partners have been criticized by courts for similar misconduct in "at least 17 other"
cases, although the errors were found harmless or the convictions were reversed on other
grounds. See id. Macy's first capital sentence put Clifford Henry Bowen on death row in
1981. Five years later, federal habeas judges overturned Bowen's death sentence, finding
that the prosecution suppressed evidence indicating that Bowen was 300 miles away at the
time of the killing and that another man (a former police officer) had committed the
offense. Bowen was released as innocent. See id.; supra note 160 (describing Tenth
Circuit's decision in Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986)). Armstrong
described another aspect of Macy's record 18 years later, in 1999:
In March, a federal judge ordered a new sentencing hearing for Death Row
inmate Kenneth Paxton, saying Macy engaged in "blatant misrepresentation"
while convincing the jury to sentence Paxton to death.
In June, the Oklahoma appeals court upheld the conviction of Death Row
inmate Osbaldo Torres but upbraided Macy for a host of "improper tactics" he
employed while arguing to the jury. The court noted that it had condemned
Macy for the same tactics before.
In November, Macy was re-elected to his fifth full term. He ran unopposed.
Armstrong, Cowboy Bob, supra note 114. In late 1999, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's grant of habeas relief in the Paxton case, concluding that "Mr. Macy clearly
and deliberately made two critical misrepresentations to the jury" and that his comments
were "an integral part of the deprivation of Mr. Paxton's constitutional rights to present
mitigating evidence, to rebut evidence and argument used against him, and to confront
and cross-examine the state's witnesses." Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1213, 1218 (10th
Cir. 1999). Macy told a reporter he "didn't ... [do] anything wrong." Court Says D.A.
Acted Improperly, The Daily Oklahoman, Dec. 30, 1999, at IA.
Another frequent user of the death penalty is New Orleans District Attorney Harry
Connick, Sr., who has been continuously re-elected since 1974 even though his
subordinates "have been condemned repeatedly for withholding evidence." Armstrong &
Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra note 84. Connick has been described in print by a New
Orleans trial judge as believing that "bad guys are bad guys and whatever we need to do to
put them away is OK." A defense lawyer, who used to work for Connick and who refers to
his prosecutors as "lying, cheating bastards," "has won new trials for five clients-four
convicted of murder, one of rape-by showing that [Connick's] prosecutors suppressed
evidence." Id. Connick himself admits that his lawyers "find it difficult to keep track of
what evidence has been disclosed in .. .case[s] they handle," but excuses the problem as
the product of overwork. Id.
174. Internal, i.e., moral or ethical, constraints against making mistakes are probably
higher in capital than noncapital cases, but each increment in them is probably matched
by the greater emotional payback from solving a serious crime, protecting the community,
and subjecting a miscreant to a deserved punishment.
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revelation of facts impugning the state's witnesses, exhibits, or theories
and supporting those of the defendant; (3) trial court superintendence
of the requisites of reliable procedure; (4) jury skepticism and insistence
upon an airtight case of guilt and death-worthiness; and (5) anticipation
of the embarrassment or other costs of reversal on appeal or post-conviction review based upon a finding of nonfeasance or malfeasance.
a. Ineffective Defense Lawyers. - The ABA, Ken Armstrong and colleagues, Vivian Berger, Alan Berlow, Stephen Bright, and others have
documented the abysmally ineffectual lawyers-chronically under-remunerated; 175 often young and inexperienced, patently unqualified and in175. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1853-55 (1994) [hereinafter
Bright, Worst Lawyer] (comparing wages of state appointed attorneys in capital cases to
their vastly greater earning potential when working on other types of litigation); Randall
Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and
Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 Geo.J. on Fighting Poverty 1, 14, 16, 18 (1996)
(describing state techniques for appointing lawyers in capital cases, ranging from
patronage selections off a general list of all local attorneys, regardless of capital, or even
criminal, experience; contract systems under which all cases over a particular period go to
the lowest bidder (with the flat fee bid covering experts and other expenses), including
complex capital cases that unexpectedly appear on the county's docket; reimbursement
schemes that limit capital lawyers to, e.g., $2500 for the entire representation "plus $50 for
each motion ... filed up tofive motions-with the result that the number of motions filed in
almost every case is exactly five-or $1000, including expenses for expert and investigative
assistance; or what amounted to "$15 to $20 per hour" and "$11.84 per hour" to represent
two innocent men who were sentenced to die in Georgia and Texas but were eventually
released for lack of evidence of guilt); Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving
Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 4-5
(1992) (criticizing Alabama's built-in monetary disincentive-maximum compensation of
twenty dollars per hour for any work done out of court and forty dollars per hour for incourt activity, with a $1000 reimbursement cap-against thorough representation at the
trial level); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 433, 491-93 (1993) ("The paltry compensation provided to
lawyers who are appointed to defend capital cases ... discourages members of the private
bar from developing an expertise in death penalty litigation.... .");Joe Margulies, Resource
Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 673, 677-82 (1989)
(citing burdensome workloads-caused by under-funding and consequent understaffingas the "single greatest obstacle to effective representation"); Anthony Paduano & Clive A.
Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in
Capital Cases, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 281, 310-14 (1991) (citing, inter alia, a 1988 Mississippi
capital case in which the hourly fee of the defense attorneys worked out to be $2.98 as a
result of the state's statutory limit on reimbursable hours); Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note,
The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 626, 642 (1991) ("'[Pier case maximums
present an immediate threat' to the indigent accused's Six Amendment right to
counsel.... ."); Mary Flood, What Price Justice?, Hous. Chron., July 1, 2000, at 1 (noting
that, even after Houston, Texas, recently increased pay for appointed capital attorneys, the
"roughly $25,000 [available] for the 1st chair" is insufficient to attract skilled attorneys,
who receive at least five times that for the same work from clients who can pay);
Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 22, 50 (comparing (1) capital representation by appointed
lawyers who handle close to 80% of Philadelphia capital cases for a flat fee of $1700 plus
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sometimes drug-im-

$400 for each day in court and $300 for an investigator, with an average cost to the county
in 1995 of $3519 per capital case, to (2) representation by the local public defender office
in the one in five cases the office is permitted to handle, which assures two attorneys, a
mitigation specialist, an investigator, and access to a staff psychiatrist and fund of expert
witnesses, with the result that no defendants represented by defenders received the death
penalty in 1993-1995, compared to 33 defendants represented by appointed counsel who
did so, and to (3) the rare representation by a retained lawyer for whom the going rate in
Philadelphia is $50,000 per case); Swofford, supra note 85 (comparing North Carolina's
$85 per hour cap on compensation for defense attorneys appointed to represent indigent
capital defendants, to the going rate of $200 or more per hour for such representation by
experienced retained criminal defense lawyers in the state); infra note 185.
For case- and state-specific examples, see, e.g., Editorial, No Money for Justice: State
Will Help Prosecute Death-Penalty Cases but Falls Short in Ensuring a Fair Defense, Phila.
Inquirer, Mar. 8, 2000, at A22 (reporting on the Pennsylvania legislature's refusal to
provide money for defense of capital cases despite appropriating state funds to assist local
prosecutors in such cases); Editorial, Rush to Death, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 10, 2000, at
16A (discussing a Florida case in which a "young, inexperienced lawyer who knew little
about presenting a capital defense" and had his fee capped at $2500 for pretrial and trial
proceedings, "was paid the equivalent of $13 an hour" for what little he did, and failed to
present any witness describing his client's "long history of mental illness" because (as the
lawyer later testified in court) "he could not afford to call witnesses"); Dirk Johnson,
Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al
(citing statements by Chicago's former chief prosecutor and current mayor, Richard M.
Daley, that "lawyers in some [capital] cases were incompetent, and even when they were
competent did not have the money to conduct their own thorough investigations and
compete against the police and [better financed and highly experienced capital]
prosecutors"); Sara Rimer, Questions of Death Row Justice for Poor People in Alabama,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (explaining that low maximum hourly rates for work
performed by appointed capital trial counsel and trial courts' exercise of discretion to deny
compensation for hours admittedly worked result in (1) Alabama trial lawyers "often"
limiting themselves to 50 hours or less on capital cases, even though "adequate
preparation . . . should take 500 to 1,000 hours" and (2) the under-compensation of
lawyers who put in the necessary hours at a rate of about $5 an hour, prompting one lawyer
in the latter category to vow that "I will go to jail before I handle another capital case").
For evidence that poor compensation for capital attorneys translates into high capital
sentencing rates, and that generous compensation has the opposite effect, see infra note
191.
176. See, e.g., Rick Casey, Texas High Court 'Cynical,' Judge Says, San Antonio
Express-News, Mar. 8, 2000, at 3A (quoting an unpublished federal district court order
granting Texas death row inmate Ricky Kerr a stay of execution based on his
representation in state court by an appointed "attorney . . . so unqualified that . . . his

appointment... [amounted to] 'acynical and reprehensible attempt [by the appointing
court] to expedite petitioner's execution at the expense of all semblance of fairness and
integrity" and "'apparent bad faith demonstrated by the state of Texas in appointing a
plainly incompetent attorney'").
177. See, e.g., Alan Berlow, Lethal Injustice, The American Prospect, Mar. 27-Apr.
10, 2000, at 54 [hereinafter Berlow, Lethal Injustice] (discussing E. Ray Andrews's
representation of Betty Lou Beets (whom Texas executed in 2000); Andrews knew the
state's principal argument in favor of a death sentence-that Beets had killed her husband
to recover insurance proceeds-was false, because Andrews knew that Beets was unaware
of the policy until he told her of it a year after her husband's death, but chose not to so
inform the jury because doing so would have required him to stop representing Beets and
testify, and thus forfeit the literary and film rights to her story; Andrews later served three
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comatose,' 8 0 psychotic, or senile;18 1 very often grossly

years in prison for extorting a bribe in another murder case); infra notes 183, 190.
178. See, e.g., Armstrong & Mills, justice Derailed, supra note 84 ("At least 33 times
[i.e., in 12% of the cases], a defendant sentenced to die [in Illinois since 1977] was
represented at trial by an attorney who has been disbarred or suspended-sanctions
reserved for conduct so incompetent, unethical or even criminal the lawyer's license is
taken away."); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 82 (discussing Kentucky study
showing that 25% of state's death row inmates had been represented by attorneys who had
since been disbarred or had resigned to avoid disbarment; Louisiana study showing that
lawyers of inmates executed in state had bar discipline rate 68% higher than bar members
as a whole; and Texas Judicial Council study showing that capital defendants with
appointed lawyers were 28% more likely than those with retained counsel to be convicted
and, if convicted, were 44% more likely to be sentenced to die); Liz Chandler, Lawyers,
Inadequate Defense Cited in a Third of Death Case Reversals, Charlotte Observer, Sept.
11, 2000, at IA ("Since 1977, when the Carolinas restored capital punishment, at least 15
death verdicts have been overturned because of poor lawyering at trial. And at least 16
other death row inmates-including three who were executed-were represented by
lawyers who have been disbarred or disciplined for unethical or criminal conduct.");
Defense Called Lacking for Death Row Indigents, But System Supporters Say Most
Attorneys Effective, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 10, 2000, at 1A [hereinafter Defense
Called Lacking] (reporting, based on examination of 461 Texas capital cases, "that nearly
one in four condemned inmates has been represented at trial or on appeal by courtappointed attorneys who have been disciplined for professional misconduct at some point
in their careers," in "about half" of which cases, "the misconduct occurred before the
attorney was appointed to handle the capital case"); Dan Malone & Steve McGonigle,
Questions of Competence Arise in Death Row Appeal: Lawyer with History of Problems
Defends Handling of Case, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 11, 2000, at IA (describing capital
inmate Richard Lee Wardrup's representation by a lawyer who "has been repeatedly
disciplined by the bar during the last 15 years," has a history of alcoholism, and is alleged
by employees to have drunk heavily and used cocaine during the days when Wardrup's trial
took place); Mills et al., Flawed Trials, supra note 137 (reporting that 33% of the
individuals executed in Texas during George W. Bush's tenure as governor were
represented by lawyers who had been or thereafter were disciplined by the bar, including
following criminal convictions for extortion, forgery, stealing from clients, contempt, and
sexual assault and including at least five lawyers (some with multiple executions under
their belt) who were disciplined five times or more).
179. See, e.g., Liz Chandler, With Lives on Line, Attorney Turned to Drink; 3 Capital
Appeals Allege Shoddy Work, Charlotte Observer, Sept. 11, 2000, at 6A (describing
representation of three North Carolina men sentenced to die by alcoholic lawyer who
admittedly "drank at least a pint of rum a night while handling the three cases"); Marcia
Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, Nat'l LJ.,June 11,
1990, at 30 (discussing, among other examples, the 1982 Florida capital trial ofJerry White
at which the trial judge was so concerned about the sobriety of defense counsel, Emmett
Moran, that he required Moran to come into chambers each morning so the state's
attorney could smell his breath, and after which Moran's investigator swore he saw Moran
shoot up cocaine during trial recesses and use speed, alcohol, morphine, marijuana, and
quaaludes after court recessed each day; despite this evidence, a divided Florida Supreme
Court upheld White's death sentence); Malone & McGonigle, supra note 178 (describing
the Wardrup case, discussed supra note 178); infra notes 181, 185, 196 (citing other
examples).
180. See, e.g., Bright, Sacrifice of Fairness, supra note 84, at 184-85 (collecting
various examples of lawyers who slept through significant portions of capital trials); John
Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slay Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, Hous. Chron., Aug. 14, 1992, at
A35 (reporting that defense attorney John Benn "spent much" of George McFarland's
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capital-sentencing trial "in apparent deep sleep," "[h]is mouth falling open and his head
loll[ing] back on his shoulders"; Benn acknowledged he was sleeping, commenting that
"It's boring"; the trial judge dismissed the problem, commenting that "[t]he Constitution
doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake"); Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer and a Ticket
to Death Row, L.A. Times, July 15, 2000, at Al (detailed account of how attorney Benn's
slumbering defense led to McFarland's death sentence despite weak evidence against
him).
181. See, e.g., Bright, Worst Lawyer, supra note 175, at 1843 & n.49, 1857-66
(providing numerous examples of incompetent capital defense lawyers); Coyne &
Entzeroth, supra note 175, at 1, 14-19, 26-27, 31, 58 n.130 (citing numerous postconviction cases documenting the assignment of capital cases to (1) lawyers who had no
criminal, much less capital, trial experience and were only a few months at the bar or, in
one case, was a third-year law student, or who were so old that they could not follow the
proceedings; (2) lawyers who got to trial without having read the state's capital sentencing
statute, who thought the governing statute was one overturned years before, or whose list
of "criminal" cases read in preparation for trial consisted (in its entirety) of Miranda and
Dred Scott; (3) co-counsel who disagreed with each other over the appropriate defense and,
so, presented inconsistent defenses, or who each thought the other had agreed to conduct
the investigation of the defendant's guilt-innocence or sentencing issues so that neither
did so; (4) alcohol- and drug-dependent lawyers, including one who later ran into his
death-sentenced client in prison after the lawyer was convicted of drug distribution; (5)
lawyers who only recently had been suspended or otherwise disciplined; (6) lawyers who
admitted their client's guilt of the capital charges, consented to the removal from the jury
of the one juror who was holding out for a life sentence, failed to make objections to the
obvious legal errors that later led to the reversal of their codefendant's convictions or
sentences (the codefendants did object) but permitted the defendant himself to be
executed, and ones who informed the jury that they didn't think much of their clients,
including because of the client's race; and (7) most commonly, lawyers who simply failed
to interview any witnesses or the client, did not view the scene or the state's evidence
before trial, did not seek expert examinations of obviously mentally impaired clients, and
conducted no other investigation of either guilt or sentencing issues, in the process
forsaking substantial available exculpatory evidence); Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of
Fortune, supra note 137 (describing events leading to false conviction of Ford Heights
Four, two of whom spent 17 years on Illinois's death row before being released in 1995:
"The prosecutors capitalized on a weak front posted by defense attorneys who were often
ill-prepared or incompetent .... [T]hree attorneys who represented members of the Ford
Heights Four have had their licenses revoked or suspended for other matters ...
");
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 80-83 (citing various examples documenting the
conclusion that "[t]he single greatest threat to an innocent defendant .. may be his or
her own attorney"); Paul Duggan, Attorneys' Ineptitude Doesn't Halt Executions, Wash.
Post, May 12, 2000, at Al (describing "partisan patronage" selection of lawyers for
indigents in capital cases in Texas, including lawyers repeatedly appointed despite
"documented incompetence" and frequent bouts of sleeping in court and another who was
"'an active alcoholic' and cocaine user at the time of... trial" and could not file the appeal
because his law license was suspended due to substance abuse); Johnson, supra note 175
(identifying as a "common thread" in miscarriages of justice in capital cases that "poorly
financed, often incompetent defense lawyers [have] failed to uncover and present crucial
evidence"; and giving various examples "from around the nation of [death penalty] lawyers
who slept through trials, or came to court drunk" or who were assigned to handle capital
cases despite "specializing in tax law . . . [and] never [having] tried a criminal case");
Nightline: Crime and Punishment, Poor Counsel (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 3, 2000)
(transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing various examples of incompetent
lawyers appointed to handle capital cases, including one who worked out of a bar, another
who had never handled a felony case, others who routinely slept in court, another who
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negligent; 8 2 and nearly always out-gunned 1 83-who represent capital defendants in most death penalty states 18 4 around the country. 18 5 This
never mentioned to the sentencing jury that his client was severely mentally retarded, and
still another appointed after he responded to a sign in the courthouse seeking volunteers;
concluding that as a result of incompetent representation, "major chunks of the American
system of justice . . . have degraded to a scandalous point" leaving defendants "better
off.., to be rich and guilty, than to be poor and innocent").
182. See, e.g., Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 929-31 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
defense counsel ineffective for failing to respond to state's argument in aggravation-that
defendant killed his girlfriend to eliminate her as a witness against him in a criminal
proceeding-by presenting accessible evidence proving that petitioner knew for certain
prior to the murder that the victim could and would not testify against him); Rickman v.
Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning capital conviction on habeas
because counsel's "total failure to actively advocate his client's cause" and "repeated
expressions of contempt for his client for his alleged actions" had the effect of
"provid[ing] [petitioner] not with a defense counsel, but with a second prosecutor");
Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning capital conviction
on habeas because counsel failed to develop defense theory and "to conduct any
meaningful adversarial challenge, as shown by his failure to cross-examine more than half
of the prosecution's witnesses, to object to any evidence, to put on any defense witnesses,
to make a closing argument, and, at sentencing, to put on any meaningful mitigation
evidence"; instead, counsel abdicated client's case to counsel for codefendant who
presented a defense that was antagonistic to Groseclose); Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d
1508, 1512-21 (10th Cir. 1997) (overturning capital conviction on habeas because
appointed counsel, who received no funding for expert or investigative services and was
paid the statutory maximum of $3200, failed to investigate a videotaped statement by
another person confessing to the crime and extensive evidence of petitioner's mental
illness and likely incompetence to stand trial; DNA testing subsequently established that
the petitioner was innocent, and he was released from prison, see supra note 118); Harris
v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435-39 (9th Cir. 1995) (overturning capital conviction on habeas
because of counsel's incompetent failure to interview a majority of the witnesses, advice to
the defendant to confess to the prosecutor without receiving any promise of reduced
charges in return, and failure to file potentially meritorious suppression motions, to
propose or object to improper jury instructions, and to raise and preserve meritorious
issues for appeal); 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 11.2c,
13(d) (listing 36 postFurman federal habeas reversals of death sentences by courts of appeals due to egregiously
ineffective assistance of counsel that in nearly all cases consisted at least in part of counsel's
failure to conduct any investigation in mitigation of the death penalty); Liebman et al., A
Broken System, supra note 81, at app.C (listing more than 100 post-Furman reversals of
capital sentences by state post-conviction courts due to ineffective defense lawyering).
183. In the worst case, the defense lawyer is not only over-matched but has essentially
gone over to the other side. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases
Raises Doubts About System, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (detailing the career of Joe
Frank Cannon, a Houston lawyer who has made a living for years by being appointed to
represent capital defendants (10 of whom received death sentences), who "boasts of
hurrying through [capital] trials 'like greased lightning'" to save the county money, and
who has a history of making elementary legal mistakes and sleeping through capital trials);
see also Flood, supra note 175 (discussing system in Harris County, Texas, during 1980s
and early 1990s of, as one respected lawyer described it, "appointing [capital defense
lawyers] who will just roll over (without a fight)").
184. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
185. In 1990, the National Law Journal reached the following conclusions based on a
six-month study of the transcripts of nearly 100 trials in Alabama, Georgia, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that resulted in capital sentences, follow-up interviews,
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analyses of statutory defense resources and bar disciplinary records, and other information:
The trial lawyers who represented death row inmates in the six states have been
disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to 46 times the
discipline rates for [all lawyers in] those states.
More than half the defense counsel questioned in an NLJ survey said they
were handling their first capital trials when their clients, now on death row, were
convicted.
Wholly unrealistic statutory fee limits on defense representation-such as
Mississippi's flat, unwaivable $1,000 cap, equivalent to a fee of about $5 per hour
for many lawyers [a provision that remained in effect in March 2000, see Rimer,
supra note 175]-act as disincentives to thorough trial investigation and
preparation.
Inadequate or non-existent standards for appointment of counsel can result,
for example, in an oil and gas lawyer handling a capital trial as his or her first
criminal case.
Statutory standards that do exist for appointment of counsel are
routinelyignored ....
Capital trials often are completed in one to two days-in
contrast to the two-week to two-month trials in [other] regions [of the country]
where sophisticated indigent defense systems operate.
Penalty phases.., usually ... last only several hours and in at least one case
just 15 minutes.
Litde effort-and in at least one-fourth of the cases the NLJ examined, no
effort-was expended to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
Judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for expert/investigative fees.
State criminal justice systems are ill-equipped to deal with mentally ill or
retarded defendants unable to aid their defense attorneys.
[C]ompounding all of these problems, the U.S. Supreme Court decision that
lays out the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is itself ineffective . . .
ma[king] it all but impossible for death-sentenced inmates to challenge the
performance of their trial lawyers.
Coyle et al., supra note 179. For numerous examples and evidence that the National Law
Journal's findings remain accurate a decade later, including in northern venues, see, e.g.,
Scheck et al., supra note 84, at 183-92 (providing examples of attorney incompetence, and
arguing that recent changes in the willingness and ability of courts to fund and police
competent representation have aggravated the problem); Bright, Worst Lawyers, supra
note 175, at 1841-66 (arguing that inadequate legal representation is pervasive in those
jurisdictions that account for most death sentences); Armstrong & Mills, Inept Defenses,
supra note 137 (reporting that state and federal courts have overturned 26 of 285 Illinois
death sentences imposed between 1977 and 1999 due to prejudicial attorney
incompetence (many of the 285 remain under review on this basis); four of the 12 men
exonerated in the state between 1987 and November, 1999, were represented by lawyers
who have had their licenses suspended or withdrawn; lawyers "handpicked by the courts in
Illinois capital cases have included a tax lawyer who had never before tried a case, an
attorney just two years out of law school and an attorney just 10 days off a suspension for
incompetence and dishonesty"; the assigned lawyer two years out of law school handled the
case himself, though he had never before tried a murder case, was carrying 100 other
appointed criminal cases, had no investigator, and was denied funds for a sentencing
expert (by contrast, "the local prosecutor received help trying the case from a lawyer in the
Illinois attorney general's office, a common [practice]"); Illinois trial judges appointed
Robert McDonnell to represent four people now on death row in between McDonnell's
two disbarments (an Illinois record) and despite McDonnell's record of emotional
instability, drinking, and criminal problems); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 82-83
(documenting the failure of state and local jurisdictions to provide adequate legal
representation in capital cases); Flood, supra note 175 (describing indigent capital defense
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counsel situation is worse in capital than in noncapital cases in two important respects. First, capital trials are much harder to litigate well than
noncapital trials. Built into them are a hugely complicated body of specialized law, a second, sentencing trial that almost always is more far-ranging, expert-dependent, and factually complex than the guilt phase, and a
host of peculiar tactical and strategic decisions caused by the need to
"unify" one's defense strategy at two individually daunting and jointly
contradictory proceedings (the defendant didn't commit capital murder;
even though the defendant committed capital murder, it wasn't (or he
isn't) so bad that he deserves a death sentence).186 Second, although
most criminal defense lawyers are overworked and (even more so than in
noncapital cases) underpaid, what they do for a living in the main is settle
cases for lower sentences than would be imposed after a trial.18 7 To use
Vivian Berger's metaphor, what they do most of the time is hardly brain
surgery. But capital cases settle much less frequently, 18 8 and when they
do, the bargaining is far harder and more sophisticated than in other
kinds of cases 189-hence the many depredations (in Professor Berger's
full phrase) of "the chiropractor as brain surgeon." Indeed, because a
case in which a death sentence was imposed is virtually certain to have
gone to trial-not many lawyers are reckless enough to advise clients to
plead guilty to capital murder without an agreement or understanding
that doing so will avoid the death penaltyl 9 0-it is highly likely that any
capitally sentenced defendant who finds himself in that fix got there after
a settlement-specializing chiropractor attempted to open up that capital
defendant's cranium at trial.191
system in Harris County (Houston), Texas, from the 1970s until the mid-1990s as
characterized by "cronyism" and patronage appointments of unqualified, poorly
remunerated, and frequently bar-disciplined lawyers, some of whom handled dozens of
capital trials each and typically failed to keep their clients off death row); supra notes 175,
178, 181-183.
186. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 167, at 247-51; Coleman, supra note 52, at 16-19,
52-53; Luke DeGrande, Representing the Condemned: Professional Responsibility and
Death Row, 78 Ill.
B.J. 30, 33 (1990).
187. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 142-45.
188. See supra notes 90, 171.
189. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 144-45.
190. Such pleas do occasionally occur, however. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
1026, 1026-32 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing as
ineffective assistance of counsel capital attorney's encouraging and allowing client to plead
guilty to capital murder without securing a deal to avoid the death penalty, followed by
counsel's failure to present any evidence whatsoever to the sentencing judge in mitigation
of death penalty, and the trial judge's imposition of death). I represented the petitioner in
Mitchell during part of his federal habeas proceedings. One of the first depositions I ever
took was of his trial lawyer, by then a trial judge in the community where Billy Mitchell was
tried. At a break in the deposition-but not for the record-the judge informed me that
he had been a sociology major in college and, based on that, believed that the best
outcome for Mitchell was the death penalty. Mitchell was executed in 1987.
191. The Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, and New York experiences
suggest that properly funded and expert trial lawyers provide a meaningful constraint on
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prosecutors' capacity to secure, and thus their willingness to seek, marginal capital
sentences. Of these approaches, the best documented is Indiana's. See Lefstein, supra
note 114, at 496-504, 505-08, 505 tbl.1, 506 tbl.2, 508 tbl.3, 509-12, 521-26, 533
(discussing apparent effect of Indiana's adoption of legislation in the early 1990s making
state funds available to local jurisdictions that satisfy state commission's guidelines for
appointment of qualified counsel in capital cases, and Commission's incorporation within
its guidelines of a state supreme court rule (1) requiring the appointment of two lawyers in
capital cases with recent extensive training in capital defense and with, respectively, at least
five and three years criminal litigation experience that includes at least five and three
felony jury trials; (2) disqualifying lawyers with excessive workloads; (3) setting minimum
hourly rates that are relatively generous, though they remain well below the rates
prevailing among retained attorneys; and (4) assuring "adequate funds for investigative,
expert, and other services necessary to prepare and present an adequate defense at every
stage of the proceeding, including the sentencing phase"). According to Lefstein,
prosecutorial requests for death sentences dropped from an average of 23 per year in the
two years before, to 12 per year in the three years after, Indiana's adoption of its reforms,
jury-imposed death sentences dropped from five to zero in the same period, and judgeimposed death sentences experienced a smaller decline, from 1.5 per year to one per
year-even though the state's murder rate steadily increased during the period. See id.
Lefstein also reports agreement among state capital prosecutors and defense counsel
(whom he interviewed before his statistical data were available) that the reforms had (1)
improved the quality of capital defense lawyering in the state, especially by increasing the
use of expert witnesses at the mitigation phase; (2) attracted more and better defense
lawyers to the work; (3) probably generated better police and prosecutorial preparation
and decreased the likelihood that the resulting (smaller number of) capital judgments
would be reversed on appeal; and in the words of prosecutors (4) "definitely put a damper
on [their] asking for the death penalty," "'put some economic judgment' into the
'
decision-making about whether to seek the death penalty" and made prosecutors " think
two or three times' before filing a death penalty request," not only because of the greater
cost of trying cases but also because of the increased "risk [of] losing." Id. (citations
omitted). Based in part on a comparison of the Indiana experience to that of Ohio, which
adopted similar reforms but compensated defense lawyers at only two-thirds of the rate in
Indiana, provided funds for expert witnesses and mitigation specialists far less frequently
than in Indiana, and experienced smaller declines in the death-sentencing rate, Lefstein
concluded that there is "strong[ ]" reason to believe that the "ability of defense counsel,
the cost of the prosecution, and the burden on the prosecutor's staff" (both of the latter of
which in turn are affected by the quality and resources of defense counsel) affect
prosecutorial charging decisions in capital cases. Id. See also Richard Prez-Pefia, The
Death Penalty: When There's No Room for Error, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2000, at WK3
(contrasting high capital sentencing states like Alabama, Georgia, and Texas, where there
is 'a culture of habitually appointing courthouse hangers-on" who "don't know capital law,
[a]re cozy with the judges and [a]re underpaid," with three states that finance expert
statewide capital defense units-Colorado, which although "a Western state where the
death penalty is popular," has had only five death sentences imposed in only 52 capital
trials since 1975, and which in recent years has had only about three capital prosecutions a
year, "in part, experts say, because [prosecutors] believe that the Colorado Office of the
Public Defender will defeat all but the strongest cases"; Connecticut, which also has a
capital defense team of experienced state public defenders and has had few prosecutions
and no executions during the last 27 years; and New York, whose "gold standard" Capital
Defender Office has 21 highly trained trial lawyers and 17 investigators, with an annual $15
million budget, has appeared in 524 cases in which a capital charge was a possibility, and
has limited to 39 the number of capital charges actually brought and to five the number of
death sentences actually imposed); Rimer, supra note 175 (contrasting New York, New
Jersey, and Colorado, which have "multimillion-dollar capital defender offices that provide
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The absence of determined opposition is probably sufficient in itself
to encourage some prosecutors to succumb to incentives to secure capital
sentences where the facts do not, or only marginally, justify that outcome.
The other four constraints on prosecutorial corner-cutting also do little
to counteract- the political capital that capital politics tempt prosecutors to amass by overzealously pursuing death sentences.
b. Suppressed ContraryEvidence. - Consider, for example, why exculpatory evidence is so often suppressed before and at trial, yet is so often
crow-barred out of the state, under the same legal standard, during posttrial proceedings. 19 2 Part of the answer is the effect in capital cases of the
Court's self-defeating standard for the release of exculpatory evidence,
which demands its release before trial "only if there is a reasonable
probability that, [if] the evidence [is] disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would ...be[ ] different." 193 Obviously, this test gives
police officers and prosecutors with an eye on the large rewards from
securing a capital sentence (and the large penalties for failing to do so)
immense before-the-fact leeway to conclude that after the fact they will
not believe the evidence they suppressed would have mattered. Morever,
in exercising the foresight the Court's test demands, the prosecutor will
find it particularly easy to reach a "don't disclose" conclusion because she
teams of lawyers and investigators for people in death penalty trials" and low death
sentencing rates, with Alabama, which "has no state-wide public defender system" and
relies on "[c]ourt-appointed capital defense lawyers [who] are paid so little that many
lawyers refuse the work[,] . . .leaving many of those charged with capital offenses with
inadequate representation" by "lawyers who fail to do the most fundamental tasks, like
investigating the crime and their clients' backgrounds and presenting closing arguments,"
and which, in 1999, put "more people [on death row] per capita than any state in the
country"); Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Show Caution Seeking Capital Sentences, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 13, 1999, at 1 (attributing low number of New York capital prosecutions and
sentences-37 and 5, respectively, in four and one-half year period starting in 1994-in
part to generously funded and highly trained and qualified Capital Defender Office
lawyers). See also, e.g., Bowers, supra note 114, at 1075-77 & tbl.2 (concluding, based on
interviews with Florida prosecutors, that the quality of the defense lawyer is a factor in
deciding whether to accept a noncapital plea in cases charged capitally); Flood, supra note
175 (suggesting that the decision by Harris County (Houston), Texas, to require appointed
capital defense lawyers to meet minimum qualifications led more attorneys to present
mitigation testimony in the punishment phases of trial, possibly helping to account for a
drop in prosecutorial capital success rates); Dan Horn, Cincinatti Enquirer, Public
Defenders' Pay Near Lowest, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al (Hamilton County, Ohio, which includes
Cincinnati, sends more people to death row than any other county in Ohio and pays public
defenders less to represent them than all but one of Ohio's 88 counties; its hourly "rate of
$30 an hour-57 percent below the state average-is the same whether the case is a minor
felony such as theft or a death penalty case"); David Noonan, Death Row Cost Is a Killer,
N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 17, 1999, at 26 (reporting that the cost of prosecuting and defending
capital prisoners in the period during which only five capital sentences were imposed
(from 1994 to 1999) was $68 million, half of which was used to fund counsel for indigent
defendants).
192. See, e.g., Armstrong, Cowboy Bob, supra note 114; Berlow, Wrong Man, supra
note 84, at 66-67, 70, 74; examples discussed supra notes 148, 150, 152-155, 157-160.
193. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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naturally will ask whether the suppressed evidence would make a difference in the clumsy hands of the defendant's untutored and underpaid
lawyer. The rest of the answer appears once we juxtapose the prosecutor's motivationally blurred foresight with the post-conviction court's
twenty-twenty hindsight from corrective lenses fashioned by the welltutored and highly motivated anti-death penalty lawyer who materializes
on post-conviction review. Overproduction of death sentences occurs at
trial, that is, because prosecutors are not in fact pushed to disclose, and
cannot imagine what it would be like to be pushed to disclose, and thus
do not disclose, the exculpatory evidence that consequently only emerges
later, when newly intervening and better anti-death penalty lawyers do
more and better pushing.
c. Lax Judicial Supervision. - Nor are trialjudges disposed to apply
the brakes to proceedings that are speeding toward a death sentence with
highly motivated and weakly constrained prosecutors at the wheel. The
last thing an elected trial judge wants (trial judges in death sentencing
states are almost all elected;1 94 many of them began their political careers
as prosecutors1 95 ) is a district attorney's angry statement on the evening
news blaming "the people's" defeat in a capital case on a trial judge's
decision to suppress evidence, limit questioning, or withhold a desired
instruction.1 9 6 Trial judges are also unlikely to force prosecutors to dis194. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 115, at 776-80; Liebman et al., A Broken
System, supra note 81, at 127 n.54; infra notes 197, 198.
195. For examples, see supra note 190 and accompanying text; infra notes 196, 231,
232 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Armstrong & Mills, Conviction Overturned, supra note 138 (reporting
that the Illinois Supreme Court, in the process of unanimously overturning the conviction
of a police killer despite overwhelming evidence of guilt, "took Cook County Circuit Judge
Daniel Kelley to task for failing to halt the prosecutors' [egregious] misconduct and for
allowing them to place in the courtroom a headless mannequin wearing the victim's police
uniform, which had blood and brain matter on it"); Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed,
supra note 84 (discussing one Illinois trial judge (who has sentenced more people to die
than any other judge in the state but one) who appointed a previously disbarred lawyer to
represent the capital defendant, seated a juror whose husband, a judge, had previously
sentenced the capital defendant to prison, and who has had six of his nine capital
sentences overturned on appeal (some of the others are still under review), and another
judge who "mocked" defense lawyers for seeking DNA tests for their client that, when
ordered by the Illinois Supreme Court, demonstrated the defendant's innocence);
Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of Fortune, supra note 137 (documenting symbiosis
between "egregious" prosecutorial behavior in court and trial judges who permit trials, in
the words of one appellate court, to "t[ake] place in an atmosphere of near anarchy");
Rimer, supra note 175 (describing Alabama trial judge who permitted a capital defendant
to be sentenced to die at a trial the judge had to interrupt for a day so the court-appointed
defense lawyer, whom the judge found in contempt for coming to court drunk, could dry
out in jail; the result was several years of post-conviction litigation, ending in a retrial and a
life sentence).
The symbiotic relationship between prosecutors and trial judges in capital cases is
nicely illustrated in a New York Times Magazine profile of Philadelphia district attorney,
Lynne Abraham, entitled "Deadliest D.A.," because of her insistence on seeking death in
every case in which it might possibly be permitted. Because Philadelphia is one of a
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close evidence the latter prefer to withhold, to appoint better defense
lawyers, or to replace demonstrably incompetent ones, not only because
doing so may trigger prosecutorial or voter complaints about interference, cost, and delay, but also because judges themselves tend to benefit
from more, not fewer, death sentences. This is so because judges, and
the governors who appoint them, run for office based on the high number of death sentences juries impose in trials over which the judges preside, and may be defeated for reelection because trials over which the
judges preside result in acquittals or life sentences. 197 These same conhandful of cities in which all homicide cases are assigned to the same group of specialized
judges, "[p] rosecutors have been able to knock lenient judges out of the program and
steer the most serious cases to a handful of those most sympathetic to their charges,"
including one now-retired judge, Albert F. Sabo, who "presided over 31 death sentences,
more than any other judge in the country [as of 1995]" and who made it a practice to
"suggest[ I to prosecutors.., how to strengthen their cases and routinely denied money to
defense attorneys to pay for experts." Abraham herself first came to prominence in
Philadelphia as ajudge in the specialized homicide unit, leading directly to her election as
district attorney Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 23-24, 34.
197. Alan Berlow reports:
In Tennessee .... Governor Don Sundquist proclaimed before a 1996 judicial
election that he would appoint only death-penalty supporters to be criminal-court
judges. Some judges and judicial candidates who must run for office have clearly
imbibed a similar message, campaigning for office with promises to impose the
death sentence at every opportunity. In thirty-two of the thirty-eight deathpenalty states judges may be subjected to voter approval. In most it is highly
implausible that a candidate who refused to take a strong position in favor of the
death penalty could be elected. Judges are also elected in eight out of the nine
states where it is ajudicial prerogative to impose a death sentence or to override a
jury's sentence of life. Can such judges fairly examine the facts in a gruesome
murder case when the public is demanding execution?
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 80; see, e.g., Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 175, at
13 ("The death penalty and politics ... are inseparable," particularly because "the vast
majority of judges who preside over capital cases must answer to the electorate" and
because "judges are far less likely to punish misconduct and take other tough action if
they must run for reelection or retention every few years"' (quoting ABA, Rep. of the
Comm'n on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986)); Dateline, Mock Justice?: The
Competency of a Texas Public Defender Questioned (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 30,
2000) (transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting view of respected former
Houston, Texas, criminal trial judge Jay Burnett, who presided over "many death penalty
trials," that, because Texas "judges are elected," some of them "to win votes . . .want to
move [capital] cases quickly and keep convictions high to show voters they're tough on
crime" and for that reason "select attorneys who they know won't put on an aggressive
defense"); Maura Dolan, Execution Issue Clouds Davis' Judge Selections, L.A. Times, Nov.
13, 1999, at Al (reporting complaints that California Governor Gray Davis, "haunted by
the memory of former Chief Justice Rose Bird . . . whom voters ousted because she never
voted to uphold a death sentence," is demanding, in the opinion of Peter Keane, Dean of
Golden Gate University Law School, that his appointees to the state's trial and appellate
courts profess support for the death penalty as "the greatest thing since sliced bread");
David R. Dow, The Real Scandal on Death Row Is Inept Lawyers, Hous. Chron., Feb. 24,
2000, at A29 (stating that because 'judges in [most] states, including Texas, are elected"
and "will be voted out of office if the capital murder defendants over whose trials they
preside do not get sentenced to death," they have "a powerful interest in seeing to it that
defendants are convicted quickly and packed off to death row"); Bart Jansen, Davis:
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Judicial Picks Should Follow My Lead, Orange County Register, Mar. 1, 2000, at A4
(reporting Governor Davis's statements to reporters "that voters elected him based on
public positions in favor of capital punishment and abortion rights . . . [and] expect his
[judicial] appointments to follow his political views": "'My appointees... are not there to
be independent agents. They are there to reflect the sentiments that I expressed during
the campaign."'); see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 & n.5 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (expressing concern about "a political climate in which judges who covet
higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly profess their fealty
to the death penalty" and about the consequent "danger that (judges] will bend to political
pressures when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases"); Blume &
Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 470-75 (describing a variety of campaigns to unseat state
judges based on their alleged failure to impose or affirm death sentences); Stephen B.
Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate
and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308, 308-12
(1997) (describing trend whereby judges have increasingly come under political fire,
explaining the detrimental effects of irresponsible criticism, and calling for leadership and
systems that protect judicial independence); Bright, Sacrifice of Fairness, supra note 84, at
184 (giving example ofjustice voted off the Tennessee Supreme Court due principally to a
silent concurrence in a single death penalty reversal in an election "that became a
referendum on the death penalty"; quoting Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist asking:
"Should a judge look over his shoulder [in making decisions in capital cases] about
whether they're going to be thrown out of office? I hope so."); Stephen B. Bright et al.,
Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence
Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases, 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 123 passim (1999)
(providing additional examples ofjudges under attack due to the outcomes of capital cases
over which they presided).
Bright & Keenan note that:
Judges have come under attack and have been removed from the bench for their
decisions in capital cases-with perhaps the most notable examples in states with
some of the largest death rows and where the death penalty has been a dominant
political issue. Recent challenges to state court judges in both direct and
retention elections have made it clear that unpopular decisions in capital cases,
even when clearly compelled by law, may cost a judge her seat on the bench, or
promotion to a higher court.
Bright & Keenan, supra note 115, at 760-61, 765 (citing numerous examples of judges
removed from office as a result of their record in capital cases, and of their successor
judges' pronounced proclivity to impose and affirm death sentences); see also Jo Becker,
Justices Leery of Appeal Changes, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 15, 2000, at B5 (describing
Florida legislators' attacks on the Florida Supreme Court for staying a law designed to
increase the number and speed of executions while the court considers the law's
constitutionality, and their proposal to expand the size of the court to enable pro-death
penalty Governor Jeb Bush to pack the court with death penalty supporters); Martin
Dyckman, Courts at Mercy of Legislative Purse, St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 23, 2000, at Al 7
(quoting letter written to all state supreme courtjustices by the chair of the state legislative
committee that controls the courts' budget, on stationery indicating his position as
appropriations chairman, calling the justices' death penalty "decisions ... a mockery to the
victims and their families"); William Glaberson, Chief Justices to Meet on Abuses in
Judicial Races, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2000, at A14 (describing "an unusual 'summit
meeting'" at which state chiefjustices will meet to discuss ways "to limit what some of them
describe as increasing abuses in bitter election contests for judgeships," including
candidates' statements "indicat[ing] how they would decide on issues like the death
penalty or abortion"); see also Symposium, supra note 139, at 270-73 (presenting
statements by judges participating in symposium describing criticism they faced during
elections based on their decisions in capital cases); supra notes 139-140 and
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siderations explain why trial judges in states that authorize them to do so
(1) impose death sentences so frequently (more often than juries1 98 ) and
impose with death sentences so much
(2) replace life sentences juries
199
reverse.
the
than
often
more
d. CredulousJurors.- This is not to say that juries impose much of a
check on overly motivated and insufficiently constrained law enforcement officials. To begin with, the heinous nature of the offense in most
capital cases is likely to weaken the "beyond a reasonable doubt" conviction that jurors are supposed to have before finding the defendant guilty
and the crime capitally aggravated. In the usual Holmesian formulation,
the beyond a reasonable doubt test is supposed to make jurors feel ten
times more regret if they convict an innocent defendant than if they acquit a guilty one. 20 0 Holding jurors to that skewed regret matrix is difficult under any circumstances and is particularly problematic when jurors
a mistaken acquittal to be the release of a brutal and
consider the price20 of
1
dangerous killer.
Once jurors find the defendant guilty of aggravated murder, moreover, they then are strongly disposed to condemn the defendant by three
accompanying text (describing political pressures on district attorneys in potentially capital
cases). See generally William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital
Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 77, 135 (1994)
(detailing results of survey of legislators showing substantial support for proposition that "a
vote against the death penalty would 'definitely hurt your re-election chances'").
198. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 521 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Not surprisingly, given the
political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death
penalty."); see also, e.g., Editorial, Flawed System, Las Vegas Rev.-J., July 10, 2000, at B6
(criticizing Nevada system using three-judge panels to decide between life and death
sentences in cases in which juries cannot reach agreement, while permitting judges to opt
out of service on such panels: "In a state where voters directly elect them, judges
disinclined to support the death penalty have every incentive to beg off rather than risk
creating a campaign issue for a future opponent."); Bill Hethcock, The Colorado Gazette,
Mar. 27, 2000, at M1 ("There's a strong chance that the judges in the Colorado Springs
case will vote for death [as they ultimately did] . . . because of the public outrage that
erupted last year when [the codefendant] was allowed to live .... 'A non-death verdict is a
ticket to public outrage in this county,' [a defense lawyer] said. 'Any judge who votes for
life is going to be unemployed when they come up for retention.'"); Julia C. Martinez,
Vote Retains 3-Judge Panels in Death-Penalty Cases, Deny. Post, Mar. 25, 2000, at A15
(discussing apparent threat by Colorado Senate President to delay action on a bill affecting
state judicial authority in capital cases in order "to influence the [capital] sentencing
outcome in [a] murder trial in his hometown" as to which it is "no secret that [the Senate
President] believes [the defendant] . . . should be sentenced to die").
199. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 521 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "Alabama
judges have vetoed only five jury recommendations of death, but they have condemned 47
defendants whom juries would have spared" and citing statistics showing similar patterns in
two other 'judge[ ] overr[i]de" states, Florida and Indiana).
200. See Richard 0. Lempert et al., A Modern Approach to Evidence 234-39 & n.50,
1241-45 (3d ed. 2000).
201. See Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 148. Death-qualification also weakens
capital juries' commitment to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See supra notes
163-164 and accompanying text.
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common beliefs, which prosecutorial arguments somtimes encourage
and judicial instructions either tolerate oi underline:
1. If the jury does not sentence the defendant to die, he will be eligible for parole. This belief was accurate during most of the post-Furman
period, due to the deliberate under-use of life without parole ("LWOP")
options in death-sentencing states by legislators who accurately feared
that such options would dampen citizens' ardor for death penalty legislation. 20 2 The "parole belief" has persisted even as LWOP options have
become more common. 20 3 It strongly inclines jurors to impose death
202. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An
Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L.
Rev. 605, 611 n.21, 646 n.198, 708-09 & nn.288, 292 (1999) (noting that a number of
death sentencing states (and many more until very recently) lack LWOP alternatives to the
death penalty and concluding, based on statements by state legislators, that "[t]he failure
of states to make LWOP available for capital murder appears to be due, in part, to
legislators' . .. apprehension that having LWOP would mean a reduction in the use of the
death penalty"); Bowers et al., supra note 197, at 137-42 (finding that legislators often vote
against LWOP alternatives to the death penalty, erroneously believing that if they vote the
other way their constituents will punish them at the polls); see also Mark S. Hamm,
Legislator Ideology and Capital Punishment: The Special Case for Indiana Juveniles, 6
Just. Q. 219, 229 (1989) (explaining that legislators' fear of appearing "soft on crime" can
lead them to "take public stances on getting tough" on capitally charged juveniles as well as
adults); Lefstein, supra note 114, at 512 (noting that, after the state legislature and
supreme court adopted rules requiring multiple, better trained and funded defense
lawyers in capital cases, Indiana prosecutors "lobbied for the life without parole option ...
in order to get around" the capital case reforms; attributing lower rate of capital
prosecutions to combined effect of better-financed defense counsel and existence of
LWOP option).
Regarding the large drop in public support for the death penalty when life without
parole is offered as an option, see, e.g., ABCNEWS.com, Split Decision on Death Penalty
(visited Oct. 13, 2000) <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/
pollOO01 19.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that in an ABC News
poll, 64% of Americans say they support the death penalty for people convicted of murder,
but that the percentage drops to 48% when LWOP is an option); Greg Lucas, Poll Takes
Snapshot of Californians' Views, S.F. Chron., Jan. 14, 2000, at A20 (reporting that, in
California poll asking respondents to choose between death or LWOP as the appropriate
punishment for murder, 49% chose death and 47% chose LWOP); Eric Zorn, Prosecutors
Deaf to Outcry Against Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., Mar. 7, 2000, at NI (reporting results of
Chicago Tribune poll of Illinois voters, showing a 15-point drop in support for the death
penalty (from 58% to 43%) when LWOP is given as an option). See generally Bowers et
al., supra note 197, at 79, 102-07 ("When people are presented with an alternative to the
death penalty that incorporates both lengthy imprisonment and restitution to murder
victims' families . .. they consistently choose the non-death-penalty alternative.").
203. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 202, at 645-52, 704, 708 & n.289 (1999)
(documenting 11-state study of capital-sentencing jurors finding that "very few jurors
believe that LWOP is the punishment usually served by those not given death," even in
states where LWOP is the mandatory alternative to a death penalty); Theodore Eisenberg
& Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1993) (statistical study finding that South Carolina jurors vote for death
"because of false impressions about parole eligibility"); Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk
Knowledge as Legal Action: Death PenaltyJudgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a
Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 L. & Soc'y Rev. 461, 474-77 & tbl.2 (1999)
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20 4
rather than life.
2. If a convicted murderer is eligible for parole, he is likely to get out
of prison within seven to twenty years. 20 5 This belief is inaccurate because most or all states now make the alternative to a death sentence a
mandatory minimum sentence of well over twenty years. 20 6 Citizen estimates of how long prisoners convicted of murder must serve before becoming eligible for parole consistently fall well below the actual number
of years, 20 7 and with few exceptions, trial courts refuse, and defense law-

(reporting finding of a survey of capital jurors in several states that the median juror
estimates of years usually served by convicted murderers in the four states in the survey, in
which the alternative to a death sentence in fact was life without parole, all fell within the
15-20-year range); see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 159, 170 n.9 (1994)
(citing studies). In Simmons, the Court for the first time ruled that prosecutors could not
simultaneously seek the death penalty based on the defendant's danger to society in the
future and yet withhold from the jury the fact that the alternative to a death sentence is life
without parole. Id. at 171. The Court has interpreted that ruling narrowly, however. See
Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2126 (2000) (concluding that state judges may
decline to give instruction on LWOP as an alternative to the death penalty if they find that,
despite a statute mandating the LWOP alternative, a defendant given that sentence might
still become eligible for parole at some point). The Court also has refused to extend the
Simmons ruling to impose a requirement that capital jurors be informed (which few of
them are, see infra note 208) of even lengthy minimum sentences that apply in states that
do not provide for life without parole. See Brown v. Texas, 522 U.S. 940, 940-43 (1998)
(Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
204. See Brown, 522 U.S. at 941 n.2 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(describing "[p]oll data from various States support[ing] the conclusion that full
information [about sentencing alternatives to the death penalty] would have an impact on
jurors' decisionmaking"); Bowers & Steiner, supra note 202, at 660, 652-71, 705 (reporting
results of statistical study in 11 states showing that "mistaken estimates of early release [of
capital defendants] appear to be decisive in the decision-making of jurors who have not
made up their minds before deliberations begin or by the time of the jury's first vote on
punishment," and concluding that "[t]he empirical evidence, especially the accounts
jurors give of their own punishment decision-making, reveals that the absence (real or
imagined) of [a life without parole] option figured prominently in the decisions of many
jurors to impose death"); Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 203, at 15 ("Juries that might
otherwise sentence to life do not do so because of false impressions about parole
eligibility."); Steiner et al., supra note 203, at 493-94 & tbl.4 (reporting results of 10-state
survey of capital jurors: "The shorter time jurors think prison confinement would be if
they did not impose the death penalty, the more likely they are to vote for death .. . ."); cf.
Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 26,
64-67 (2000) (concluding based on extensive survey of capital jurors that, among
emotions that capital jurors report having during capital trials, two-fear of and sympathy
for the defendant-appear to influence how a juror votes; fear has the greatest influence
on undecided jurors, nudging them towards death).
205. See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 202, at 634-35, 637, 645-52, 660-61 (citing
various studies and reporting their own data demonstrating that "[j]urors grossly
underestimate how long capital murderers not sentenced to death usually stay in prison"
and that "people generally believe murderers not given a death sentence will be back on
the streets in relatively few years; most said ten or less").
206. See Julian H. Wright, Jr., Note, Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or
Not Much of a Life at All?, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 529, 540 (1990) (as of 1990, at least 30 states
had adopted life without parole as an option for the most serious murders).
207. See Michael L. Radelet & MarianJ. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty
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yers are forbidden, to clue jurors in on the minimum number of years
that must be served. 208 These beliefs, again, lead jurors to vote for
2 09
death.
3. If the jury does sentence the defendant to death, the sentence will
be reviewed by a myriad of state and federal judges (which is well-publicized, well-known, and accurate, though prosecutors and trial judges cannot directly say so at trial2 1 0 ), and by the governor on clemency (which is
formally accurate, although clemency rarely is granted, 2 11 and is something jurors may be and sometimes are told by prosecutors and trial
Debate, 26 Ann. Rev. Soc. 43, 47 (2000) (concluding that "most citizens and jurors do not
realize" the wide availability of LWOP as the mandatory punishment when the death
penalty is not imposed and that they "vastly underestimate the amount of time that those
convicted of capital murders will spend in prison"); Steiner et al., supra note 203, at 472,
475-77 & n.38 (reporting that capital jurors in an 11-state juror survey "consistently
believe[d] that murderers not sentenced to death will usually be back on the streets sooner
than state law permits"); see also supra note 205.
208. See, e.g., Bowers & Steiner, supra note 202, at 630-43 (tracing the history of the
presumption against informing capital jurors about parole and discussing studies that
indicate the importance of such information to capital sentencing jurors). Among states
that do not have life without parole, "[o]nly New Mexico, Ohio, and Indiana permit
argument by counsel to the jury on the issue of [mandatory minimum terms before
eligibility for] parole," and only New Jersey permits jurors who ask to be given accurate
answers; California law requires jurors to be told that the state's "life without parole"
option may result in parole. Steiner et al., supra note 203, at 482 n.46.
209. See supra note 204.
210. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985). But cf. Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1994) (juror may be told that defendant already is under
sentence of death in another case, notwithstanding the danger that the jury will treat the
imposition of an apparently supernumerary death sentence as less serious than imposing a
first such sentence); Kevin Michael Miller, Note, Romano v. Oklahoma: The Requirement of
Jury's Sense of Responsibility and Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev.
1307, 1352 (1995) (arguing that Romano unwisely neutralized Caldwell's effort to assure
that juries feel a sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty).
211. See Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 311, 347-53
(1996) (noting a decline in death penalty commutations since 1972 and suggesting that it
is due to actual or anticipated political penalties for granting clemency); Michael L.
Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 289, 290-92 (1993) (claiming that, in light of its decline in frequency,
clemency "is a filter available more in theory than in actual practice"); Berlow, Wrong Man,
supra note 84, at 80 ("Since 1973 there have been more than 6,000 death sentences and
only forty cases of clemency nationwide."); Randolph Pendelton, Clemency Rarely Given in
Florida, Fla. Times Union, June 24, 2000, at Al (noting that no death row inmate has
received clemency in Florida since 1983); Frontline, supra note 84 (describing pressure on
governors with aspirations to higher office to forgo granting clemency to capital prisoners,
even ones whom DNA evidence seems to show are innocent). Clemency may be staging a
minor comeback; five governors in five states granted clemency petitions in 1999, the most
governors acting in a single year since Furman. See Jim Yardley, A Role Model for
Executions, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2000, at WK5 (noting that the five death sentences
commuted in 1999, including one each in the strongly pro-death penalty states of Texas
and Virginia, was a record for the preceding two decades, during which an average of only
one commutation had occurred each year).
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judges2 12 ). Jurors consequently believe that it is not at all certain that
anyone they sentence to die will actually be executed, though the blame
for a lesser sentence will lie elsewhere.2 1 3 This "layers of review/likelihood of reversal" belief is largely accurate, although the nation's odd
penchant for highly public reversals of death sentences, but-contrary to
all good deterrent theory-poorly publicized and nonpublic executions
2 14
could lead jurors to underestimate the likelihood of execution.
In other words, when jurors decide whether or not to sentence a
defendant to death, they believe (as they report to researchers) that a life
verdict makes them responsible for putting the miscreant back out on the
street within a decade, 2 15 while a death sentence displaces the ultimate
decision onto someone e/se2 16 who in all likelihood (jurors accurately be212. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001-03 (1983)
(upholding
constitutionality of California law requiring that capital sentencing jurors be told of the
governor's power to commute death sentences); Blain LeCesne, Tipping the Scales
Toward Death: Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of Executive Clemency, 65 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1051, 1056-62 (1997) (discussing mandatory instructions in California and
Louisiana capital cases regarding governor's power to commute death sentences).
213. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An
Empirical Study, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 339, 352-54, 362-64 (1996) (discussing post-sentencing
interviews with 153 actual capital jurors, revealing that they felt little responsibility for
death sentences and less for executions and that, "[o]n the whole, jurors simply do not
believe that defendants sentenced to death will in fact ever be executed," with "[a] clear
majority say[ing] that 'very few' death-sentenced defendants will ever be executed, and
about 70 percent. . . believ[ing] that 'less than half or 'very few' will be executed"); see
also supra note 92 (collecting local press reports informing the public about high reversal
rates and low execution rates in many capital sentencing states).
214. See supra note 104; infra text accompanying note 236.
215. See, for example, New York's capital sentencing statute, which requires capital
sentencing jurors to be told of the state's sentencing scheme, which permits parole after 25
years if some jurors vote for death and others for life, but imposes life without parole if the
jury is unanimous for life. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 400.27(1), 400.27(10)-(11) (McKinney
2000). The only possible reason for having this cockeyed sentencing scheme-and for
insisting that capital jurors be informed of it-is to put pressure on minorityjurors holding
out for life to switch to death so that the defendant is not made eligible for parole as a
result of a nonunanimous verdict.
216. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 355, 435 (1995) ("The diffusion of moral responsibility that occurs when a
decision is perceived (correctly or not) to be divided among a number of participants ...
[undermines the sense of responsibility of] all participants in the decisionmaking process,
which in the capital context may include everyone from law enforcement agents to the
actual executioner."). The hypothetical nature of the act of serving up a death sentence at
trial may explain jurors' proclivity to testify under oath or tell reporters on the eve of the
same defendant's actual execution that they would not have imposed a death sentence had
they known one or another thing about the defendant or the offense that was kept from
them at trial and that they have only recently learned. See, e.g., the Williams, Silagy,
Stockton, Brogdon, Adamson, Jones, and Coleman cases cited in I Liebman & Hertz,
supra note 42, § 21.2, at 840-41 n.14 & 1999 Supp. (discussing admissibility of post-trial,
out of court statements by jurors in capital and other cases that newly discovered evidence
would have led them to reach a different result at trial); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note
84, at 68-69 (discussing "[d ] oubts about the guilt of capital offenders.., raised by jurors
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lieve) will stop the defendant from being executed. Once again, the imbalance between the (particularly defense) resources available at the
front-end and those applied at the back-end has perverse, capitally overproductive effects. Prodded by prosecutors and trial judges who stand to
reap substantial rewards if their prodding succeeds, undeterred by defense lawyers at trial who have too little gumption and too few resources
to put up a fight, and let off the hook by the accomplishments of highly
motivated and competent defense lawyers after trial, jurors are caught in a
self-fulfilling regress: Realizing that intense post-trial scrutiny makes execution an unlikely outcome of a death sentence, they are encouraged to
impose death verdicts that fully responsible jurors would realize are not
deserved, thus necessitating intense post-trial scrutiny to catch their mistakes. 21 7 And so on.
e. Weak Feedback from Reversals. - None of this would matter so
much, of course, if there were an effective feedback loop from the posttrial (two-thirds reversal) stage to the trial (overproduction) stage. But
there isn't. To begin with, the slap on the hand does not come contemporaneously with the violation (as deterrence theory requires for good
effect 21 8 ) but on average five to eleven years later.2 1 9 By then, the indiwho learned after an execution of evidence they hadn't heard during the trial"); Yates,
supra note 144 (reporting that, upon hearing of principal witness's recantation and of
ballistics evidence withheld by the state at trial, five of six jurors who voted to condemn
Philip Workman at his 1982 trial and whom a newspaper reporter was able to find and
interview 18 years later "said they now have doubts that Workman killed [the victim] and
would like to see a new trial"); see also Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 77 (reporting
statement of a juror in the Rolando Cruz case who voted to convict Cruz despite "grave
reservations about the defendants' guilt... because 'I was more than willing to say, "All
right, we'll put you in the slammer for a while, and sooner or later the truth is going to
come out."' ").

217. The reverse also may be true: Jurors who believe that death sentences will
actually be carried out may impose them less frequently. See Samuel R. Gross, The
Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 Stud. L., Pol., & Soc'y 71, 97-98
(1993) (documenting a drop or tapering off of death sentences in Georgia, Florida, and
Louisiana immediately after 12- to 24-month periods in which executions surged); Jason
DeParle, Abstract Death Penalty Meets Real Execution, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1991, § 4, at 2
(noting that not long after Louisiana-a state that was "so enthusiastic about capital
punishment that a legal newspaper dubbed it 'Death Mill, U.S.A.' "-executed eight men
s]
in 11 weeks,juries there "[ uddenly... stopped handing out death sentences," prompting
some informed observers to speculate that jurors are less likely to impose death sentences
they believe will actually be carried out); see also Laurie Asseo, Death Row Develops into a
Growth Industry, The Grand Rapids Press, Sept. 30, 1999, at A10 (suggesting that drop in
death sentences imposed nationally in 1997 was result of spike in executions in preceding
years).
218. See James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 117-21 (rev. ed. 1983).
219. See Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 29-30, 40-41, 63 fig.9, 76
(presenting data showing that between 1973 and 1995, direct appeal reversals of capital
verdicts-accounting for 80% of the total number of capital-verdict reversals during the
period-occurred on average about five years after trial, and that federal habeas
reversals-accounting for about 10% of all reversals-occurred on average about nine
years after trial, with the latter average rising to 11 years in the second half of the study
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vidual responsible for the violation very often is long gone from the
agency that, in theory, is held responsible: Local prosecutors, for example, frequently go on to become state judges; trial judges move to higher
courts or other offices. 220 Even if the official is still there and is (atypically 221 ) identified publicly, the transgression is likely to appear to the
public-to whom patterns of abuse are largely invisible 2 22-as an isolated
and youthful indiscretion in service of a good cause. The value to local
officials of delay in appellate courts' reactions helps explain why prosecutors and trial judges, who work so assiduously at trial to ensure death
sentences, are so accommodating thereafter, when the defendant's trial
lawyer, the court reporter, or defendant's appellate counsel (whose newtrial motion, transcription, and notice of appeal and briefs are prerequi223
sites for appeal) ask to delay the appeal for months or even years.
When the slap eventually does come, it is not the prosecutor's, but a
state bureaucrat's, hand that initially sustains it. In all but one or two
states, 22 4 appeals and post-conviction proceedings are handled by lawyers
in the state attorney general's office-attorneys who, in my experience,
believe themselves to have less clout and status within the state's law enforcement apparatus than district attorneys, or even assistant district attorneys. 22 5 As a result, any "loss" sustained on direct appeal or post-conperiod); supra note 96 and accompanying text (reporting similar Justice Department
estimates of time required for capital appeals); infra note 245 (giving examples of lenghty
appeals).
220. See examples discussed in supra note 190 (discussing capital trial lawyer who by
the time he was charged with misconduct in a federal habeas proceeding had been elected
as a state judge), note 196 (discussing a state trial judge assigned to county's specialty court
for capital cases who thereafter was elected district attorney); infra note 228 (noting that by
the time prior state prosecutors' misconduct was exposed, one was an elected state judge
and another was a federal prosecutor), note 229 (discussing former Cook County State's
Attorney Richard M. Daley, who had gone on to be elected mayor of Chicago by the time
the courts began identifying serious defects in capital convictions he had obtained as the
county's chief prosecutor), note 231 (discussing prosecutor elected to Congress after
putting innocent man on death row), note 232 (discussing several prosecutors responsible
for abuses in capital cases who later were appointed to prestigious positions in the
executive branch or were elected judges).
221. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 226-236 and accompanying text.
223. Pre-appeal transcription typically takes much longer in capital than in noncapital
cases because capital cases involve more complex pretrial motions practice, more often go
to trial, and take longer to try (due, for example, to extra, death-qualifying voir dire and a
full-fledged sentencing trial). See supra note 110 (reporting that pre-appeal transcription
takes on average 12 to 24 months in California capital cases). Capital appeals lawyers are
rarely anxious to rush given how poorly paid they are, and capital clients may acquiesce in
the delay (to the limited extent the)' have any say in the matter) because speed can hasten
execution as well as release.
224. One exception to this rule, Louisiana, has a much lower reversal rate in the Fifth
Circuit than does Mississippi. See Liebman et al., A Broken System, supra note 81, at 59,
60 tbl.8, 61 fig.8.
225. Judging from my experiences as a capital defense lawyer, the trajectory for
ambitious (particularly politically ambitious) young lawyers in the state attorney general's
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viction review is not the "loss" of the local prosecuting office that
generated the death sentence in the first place. Instead, it is the "loss" of
a lower status official in the state attorney general's office who, even if she
isn't given the blame for the loss, is unlikely to make it an object lesson
back in the district attorney's office.
Most importantly, the slap on the wrist is only that. It is neither
money damages (from which the police officer, prosecutor, and, usually,
the municipality are almost always immune 226 ), nor even an enforceable
injunction to change the local policies and practices that led to the mistake: The slap is merely an order to "try the defendant again" or to give
22 7
him a new sentencing hearing. Bar discipline is almost nonexistent;
office seems to be to move to ajob as an assistant district attorney and then as a supervisor
in that office, rather than moving up through the ranks of the state attorney general's
office.
226. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) ("We
have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat
superior."); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987) ("Our cases have . . .
generally provid[ed] government officials performing discretionary functions with a
qualified immunity shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions
could reasonably have been thought consistent with the fights they are alleged to have
violated."); Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 14:13 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing impediments to damages awards against prosecutors for misconduct);
Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137 (concluding, based on intensive analysis
of Illinois's treatment of prosecutors found to have committed prosecutorial misconduct in
homicide cases, that "[t]here is little threat of financial penalties from a civil lawsuit
because courts have granted prosecutors immunity" subject to only "narrow exceptions").
A partial exception to the absence of remuneration for miscarriages of justice in capital
cases (and criminal cases generally) are occasional, usually legislated, awards to individuals
released from death row upon conclusive proof (typically supplied by DNA evidence) that
they are innocent. See infra note 246 (giving examples). Because these rewards are
episodic and usually flow directly from the legislature to the individual without any
assignment of blame or liability to particular law enforcement officials or offices, they have
little deterrent effect.
227. See, e.g., Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (documen,ing state
bar committee's failure to impose discipline on a prosecutor referred to it by the Seventh
Circuit based on the state's attorney's "shocking" and "reprehensible" suppression of
exculpatory evidence); Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137 (concluding,
based on Chicago Tribune's intensive analysis of Illinois's treatment of prosecutors found to
have committed egregious prosecutorial misconduct in homicide cases, that the threat of
bar discipline "is hollow. Courts have referred numerous prosecutors to the Illinois agency
that polices lawyers only to see investigative files get opened and closed with no
punishment levied . . . ."); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 83 (contending that

professional standards are "widely ignored and largely unenforceable," and that Bar
Association guidelines are "purely hortatory" and "rarely put into practice" in capital
cases).
For defense lawyers found to have performed incompetently in capital trials, the
negative consequences are even less frequent and severe. See Ill. St. B. Ass'n, Advisory
Opinions on Professional Conduct, Op. No. 89-7 (1989) (absolving public defenders of
duty to report allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to bar disciplinary
committee); In the Matter of Steven Dean Applegate, Comm'n No. 96 SH 90 (Ill. Atty. Reg.
Disp. Comm. June 30, 1997) (withholding bar sanction, despite a state appellate court's
conclusion that the attorney in question had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel,
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prosecution for malfeasance is all-but-unheard-of and always unsuccessful
in the rare instances in which it occurs;2 28 and even more rare are investigations by police or prosecuting agencies themselves to find out why the
mistakes that led to reversals and even to the release of innocent condemned prisoners were made. 229 For this reason, the press is often horribecause the conduct in question did not rise by clear and convincing evidence to the level
of a violation of the disciplinary rules); Armstrong & Mills, Inept Defenses, supra note 137
(reporting that no lawyer in any of the 26 Illinois capital cases overturned by state and
federal courts due to incompetent representation has been disciplined for that
incompetence, although one was disciplined for conflict of interest in simultaneously
representing the capital defendant and a critical witness against him); see also Susan P.
Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong With Rights We Find There,
9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 6-7 (1995) (finding that "state courts are all but unanimous in
holding that a criminal defendant, who challenges his conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel and whose claim is denied, is collaterally estopped from suing for
malpractice," thus "provid[ing] counsel with a powerful incentive to oppose actively the
ineffectiveness challenge to the conviction" in state post-conviction and federal habeas
proceedings in order to establish a defense to later malpractice suits as well as bar
sanctions). The dearth of bar discipline for the bad lawyering that helps send people to
death row is ironic, given that as a class, the lawyers appointed to represent capital
defendants in most states have much-higher-than-average rates of bar discipline for
infractions other than incompetent capital representation. See supra notes 177, 178, 181,
185 and accompanying text.
228. Alan Berlow documented one such instance:
[E]ven if former death-row inmates truly believe they were framed by police
officers and prosecutors, such claims are nearly impossible to prove. In the
Rolando Cruz case [in which an innocent man was tried and spent 10 years on
Illinois's death row after another man confessed to the crime], a special
prosecutor . . . indicted four policemen and three former prosecutors [one of
whom by then was an elected judge and another was a federal prosecutor, see
Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of Fortune, supra note 137] for falsely accusing
Cruz, charging them with perjury and obstruction of justice. But this is believed
to be the only death-penalty case in U.S. history that has led to such high-level
indictments, and earlier this year all the defendants were acquitted.
Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 70, 74. In an extensive study, the Chicago Tribune
identified only two other instances:
A Tribune examination of homicide cases over the past 36 years shows 381
homicide convictions have been reversed because prosecutors knowingly used
false evidence or withheld evidence suggesting the defendant's innocence, [but]
not a single prosecutor in those cases was ever brought to trial for the
misconduct.... Only two of those cases even resulted in charges being filed and,
in both instances, the indictments were dismissed.
Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 137.
229. Armstrong & Mills report, for example, that although the current Cook County
State's Attorney has abandoned a number of cases against men released from death row
"where evidence of their guilt unraveled during appeals," he has exhibited an "apparent
lack of enthusiasm for finding out why such faulty prosecutions were mounted in the first
place, or whether police and prosecutors acted criminally in securing those convictions."
Armstrong & Mills, Flawed Cases, supra note 114. Thus, after paying $36 million to settle
lawsuits by four men who were wrongly convicted of murder and who alleged that they
were framed by the county sheriffs office, see Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra
note 84, the State's Attorney "successfully opposed the appointment of a special prosecutor
to review the conduct of the sheriffs police officers and prosecutors who sent the [four
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fled to find (if it ever gets wind of the problem, as occurs only in large
men] to prison, including two to Death Row," and the sheriff has declined to conduct his
own investigation because the "state's attorney's office told [him] there was no need to
because [his officers] had done nothing wrong." Armstrong & Mills, Flawed Cases, supra
note 114; see also, e.g., Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 78 ("[N]o government
agency, federal or state, has conducted a comprehensive analysis of why [innocent
defendants are convicted and condemned]-not even in Florida, where at least eighteen
innocent men have been discovered on death row since 1977."); id. at 74 ("[I]n practice
prosecutors rarely find any reason to investigate, let alone indict, their colleagues" for
concealing evidence of innocence or presenting evidence they know to be false, and
offending officials are never "barred from practicing law."). See generally Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393, 393 (1992) (although prosecutors
"wield vastly more power than ever before," they "are more insulated from judicial control
over their conduct" and "are increasingly immune to ethical restraints"); Armstrong &
Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra note 84 ("Vested with the power to decide life or death,
prosecutors are among the most powerful public officials. They .are also the least
accountable."). In this regard, consider the views of Chicago Tribune columnist Eric Zorn:
What do former Death Row inmates Perry Cobb, Darby Tillis, Verneal Jimerson,
Dennis Williams, Anthony Porter and Steven Smith have in common?
At one time, each was being hustled toward the execution chamber at the
vigorous urging of deputies of Richard M. Daley's.
Daley, now mayor of Chicago, was the elected state's attorney of Cook
County either during the trials or retrials of half of the dozen men in Illinois who
have been exonerated and freed from Death Row since capital punishment was
reinstated.
. . . 61 percent of capital convictions won by Daley's prosecutors were
reversed on appeal.
Ten of Daley's capital convictions were reversed based in whole or in part on
findings of prosecutorial misconduct and sent back for new trials or resentencing
hearings. Two others were sent back because county prosecutors had been
overzealous in seeking the death penalty, and three simply fell apart due to
powerful evidence of innocence.
Those 15 do not include other instances of dubious conduct in capital cases
under Daley, such as his assistants' handling of the 1986 murder trial of William
Franklin. Prosecutors told jurors at that trial that the star witness to the murder
was a bystander when in fact he was an accomplice-a misrepresentation that got
Franklin's co-defendant, who had been sentenced to 40 years, a new trial. But the
Illinois Supreme Court barred Franklin from raising the same issue on
procedural grounds, and he remains on Death Row.
...When [Daley] decided in November 1986 to do something about the
troubling number of reversals from his office, he asked four top supervisors to
address the felony division about proper trial conduct and procedure.
But surprisingly (or maybe not so), three of the speakers were representative
of the problem, not the solution: Scott Arthur, the assistant state's attorney who
put on the bogus, flimsy case that wrongfully convicted the Ford Heights Four
and put two of them on Death Row; Tom Gainer, who just prior to addressing the
felony prosecutors on propriety had had a conviction overturned in federal court
when an appellate judge found he had repeatedly failed to heed the trial judge's
order to stop reminding jurors that the defendant had failed to testify; and Jay
Magnuson, whose conduct in the Linscott case included "rank" and "calculated"
misrepresentations of evidence in the harsh opinion of the appellate court that
reversed the case.
Zorn, Daley's Oversight, supra note 114.
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cities with an aggressive newspaper that has investigative reporters to
spare) that (1) repetitive abuses by particular police officers or prosecutors have been generating complaints from defendants, lawyers, and
23 0
eventually appellate courts, as well as actions for damages, for years;
23 1
(2) supervising officials and voters have taken no ameliorative action;
230. Consider, for example, the police torture ring that was allowed to operate in a
precinct house in Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding that the unit generated
"[d]ozens" of "remarkably consistent" prisoner and lawyer complaints in criminal motions
and civil rights complaints alleging the use of torture to induce confessions and
convictions (10 of them capital). Abramsky, supra note 145. Jailers early on reported to
the police chief that officers in Unit 2 had turned over one suspect, whose injuries were
similar to those of others who had been interrogated by Unit 2, "with severe facial bruising
and cuts suggestive of a prolonged pistol-whipping, strange alligator-clip marks on his ears,
nose, penis, and testicles, marks indicative of wires . . .attached to his extremities"; the
police chief wrote then-head prosecutor Richard Daley ("Daley's office never replied")
"outlin[ing] the specific charges against [unit chief Jon] Burge and his team, detailling]
[the police chief's] belief that top officers in the precinct must have known what was going
on in their holding cells and call[ing] for a broad outside investigation." Id. Appellate
courts reversed numerous convictions in cases investigated by the unit based on faulty
confession findings; subsequent civil rights suits cost the city more than a million dollars in
damages; and the unit was the subject of "a scathing Amnesty International report." The
only ameliorative action the city ever took-13 years after it first heard complaints-was to
fire unit chief Burge. The state has never confessed error in any conviction that it
premised on a confession the unit obtained. Rather, 20 years later, it continues to defend
the convictions (several of them capital) in state and federal post-conviction proceedings.
See id. at 8-9; Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra note 137; 60 Minutes II, supra note
151; see also supra note 151 (discussing the Maxwell case).
231. As Armstrong and Possley report:
[P]rosecutors rarely get punished [for concealing the truth in order to secure
undeserved convictions], even if their conduct is outrageous.
A dramatic example is provided by the 381 homicide defendants who
received new trials [in the United States between 1963 and 1999] because
prosecutors hid evidence or allowed witnesses to lie. The appellate courts
denounced the prosecutors' actions with words like "unforgivable," "intolerable,"
"beyond reprehension," and "illegal, improper, and dishonest." At least a dozen
of the prosecutors were investigated by state agencies charged with policing
lawyers for misconduct.
But ... here is what has happened to the prosecutors in those hundreds of
cases: One was fired, but appealed and was reinstated with back pay. Another
received an in-house suspension of 30 days. A third prosecutor's law license was
suspended for 59 days, but because of other misconduct in the case.
Not one received any kind of public sanction from a state lawyer disciplinary
agency or was convicted of any crime for hiding evidence or presenting false
evidence .... Two were indicted, but the charges were dismissed before trial.
Instead, the prosecutor's career advances. In Georgia, George "Buddy"
Darden became a congressman after a court concluded that he withheld evidence
in a case where seven men, later exonerated, were convicted of murder and one
was sentenced to death. In New Mexico, Virginia Ferrara failed to disclose
evidence of another suspect in a murder case. By the time the conviction was
reversed she had become chief disciplinary counsel for the New Mexico agency
that polices lawyers for misconduct.
Armstrong & Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra note 84; see also Armstrong & Mills,
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and instead (3) the offending officials have been repeatedly promoted. 23 2
Conviction Overturned, supra note 138 (noting that Cook County prosecutor David
O'Connor, whose "infantile" behavior, "bickering, name calling," use of profanity, and
other misconduct during a trial led the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously to reverse a
police killer's capital conviction, had been criticized by a Supreme Court opinion five
months before that trial for "degrading name calling and screaming" and for a "campaign
of invective against a [capital] defendant, defense counsel, and witnesses who testif[ied] on
behalf of the defendant"; in between the two decisions, O'Connor was promoted to chief
of Chicago narcotics prosecutions); Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137
(reporting that despite repeated criticism by appellate courts and even a rare reprimand
from a bar disciplinary commission based on a pattern of egregious misconduct in murder
and other cases, Cook County prosecutor Carol Pearce McCarthy "received no internal
discipline within the state's attorney's office" and instead was promoted and eventually
elected judge; also reporting that supervisors in the Cook County state's attorney's office
"can not recall a single case [from 1980 to 1999] where a prosecutor has been dismissed
for trial misconduct," and that none of the 13 cases of misconduct that state and federal
judges referred to bar disciplinary officials led to discipline); Armstrong & Possley, Verdict
Dishonor, supra note 84 (concluding that because "appeals courts rarely name
prosecutors" in opinions reversing convictions, and because many state appellate and postconviction decisions are not published, "[w]rongdoing by prosecutors remains largely
undetectable [by voters], with puzzle pieces scattered in warehoused trial transcripts and in
court rulings that are hard to find or connect"); supra note 173 and accompanying text
(discussing repeated re-election of Oklahoma District Attorney Robert Macy and New
Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick despite numerous state and federal appellate
court reversals based on egregious misconduct in capital and other cases handled by thier
staffs); supra note 229 (documenting the infrequency of investigations of prosecutorial
misconduct).
232. The title of a Chicago Tribune article about the problem tells the story: "Break
Rules, Be Promoted." The article reports that:
As Cook County prosecutors, Carol Pearce McCarthy, Kenneth Wadas and Patrick
Quinn drew scathing rebukes from the Illinois Appellate Court for failing to
abide by the rules designed to keep prosecutors honest and trials fair ....
Collectively, the three prosecutors broke enough rules that nine defendantsfour convicted of murder-were granted new trials ....
But instead of having
their career prospects suffer, all three prosecutors prospered. They were
promoted to supervisor in the Cook County state's attorney's office. Then, on the
same fall day in 1996, all three were elected judges.
Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137; see also supra notes 139-140, 194-197
and accompanying text (discussing political rewards for high death-sentencing prosecutors
and judges, notwithstanding later findings of error). In another report, Armstrong and
Possley discuss the record of former Cook County prosecutor Scott Arthur:
The story of Scott Arthur reflects, in many respects, a troubling side of the Cook
County state's attorney's office. Winning is rewarded. Cheating goes
unpunished.
A courtroom imposes rules of engagement. Arthur broke those rules [e.g.,
in capital and other homicide cases by "allowing a key witness to lie, making
improper arguments ....
engaging in abusive behavior towards defense attorneys
and witnesses[,] ...

misle[ading] jurors, brush[ing] aside the judge ....

[and]

smear[ing] the defendant with innuendo that was unsupported by the facts"], but
he continued to move up the office's ranks ....
In the past two decades, appeals
courts have hammered one Cook County prosecutor after another only to see
that attorney promoted rather than reprimanded.
Armstrong & Possley, Reversal of Fortune, supra note 137. Based on its study of the
aftermath of hundreds ofjudicial reversals of homicide convictions based on prosecutorial
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Nor are post-conviction lawyers likely to seek sanctions or even publicize
their victory over the prosecutor. Having just secured a reversal of their
clients' convictions, their goal is to convince the district attorney to either
drop the charges against their clients or accept a noncapital plea. The
one thing they do not want to do is embarrass the district attorney with
calls for punishment or an investigation.
Moreover, even in the face of egregious behavior, orders announcing these reversals rarely single out anyone by name to bear the blame,
and the public is likewise shielded from knowledge of the infrequent bar
disciplinary action. 233 There is also a systematic bias against identifying all
the violations in a single case, because reviewing courts that find a single
violation at a particular phase of a capital trial often forbear adjudicating
other claimed violations at the same stage because the issues are moot.234
No less crucially, the "violation" found is almost never the substantive admonition that "you convicted an innocent man" or "sentenced someone
misconduct, the Tribune concluded that, "[w]inning a [homicide] conviction can
accelerate a prosecutor's career, but getting rebuked on appeal will rarely stall it,
contributing to a culture that fosters misconduct. And the deterrents that confront
prosecutors are fearsome only in theory." Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note
137.
233. See Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137 ("When a court does
overturn the conviction, it shields the prosecutor from embarrassment, omitting his or her
name from the opinion or releasing its ruling in a way that few eyes ever see it."); see also
id. ("Disciplinary and court records concerning... [prosecutorial misiconduct are layered
in secrecy or buried in obscure files."); Hunt, Clouded Cases, supra note 160 (reporting,
based on study of court records, that Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly criticized
prosecutors for "a wide variety of errors in Hamilton County [Cincinnati] death
sentences," but "almost never identif[ies] prosecutors by name"). Even the "simple" task of
discovering the names of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers found by appellate
courts to have committed egregious misconduct in death penalty and other homicide cases
is daunting and well beyond the capacity of most members of the public. To accomplish
this feat, investigative reporters have had to undertake painstaking comparisons of the
appellate decisions to docket sheets and trial transcripts. See Armstrong & Mills, Justice
Derailed, supra note 84 (describing Chicago Tribune's November 1999 "comprehensive
examination of all 285 death-penalty cases since capital punishment was restored in
Illinois" in 1978, "which included an exhaustive analysis of appellate opinions and briefs,
trial transcripts and lawyer disciplinary records, as well as scores of interviews with
witnesses, attorneys and defendants"); Armstrong & Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra note
84 (describing similar investigation in conducting national study of prosecutorial
misconduct in homicide cases); Hunt, supra note 160.
234. See, e.g., Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1414 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
the district court is not obliged to decide petitioner's challenges to sentence after granting
relief on challenge to conviction and ordering retrial or release because "an affirmance on
appeal will obviate altogether the need for either the district court or this court to address
Blazak's penalty phase claims"); Clark v. Duckworth, 906 F.2d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1990)
(reversing district court's grant of writ on one claim and remanding for consideration of
other claim that district court failed to address); see also 2 Liebman & Hertz, supra note
42, § 35.1, at 1405-09 (noting that a majority of circuits that have addressed this issue
follow the rule that if a district court has granted all the relief that a habeas petitioner
seeks, it need not review additional claims seeking the same or lesser relief).
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to die who didn't deserve that penalty,"23 5 but only that "you made a

mistake of procedure" (ostensibly, the sole concern of most post-trial review), which officials back home can-and do-characterize in the press
and in their own minds as a "technicality." 23 6 And, whatever else is true,
the penalty for error by trial-level prosecutors and judges never requires
them to bear the huge financial costs of the lengthy post-conviction process that the error imposed on state-level states' attorneys and judges. Instead, the costs of reprosecution and retrial (1) are muted by the capacity
to piggy-back on the original investigation and trial evidence, and either
(2) are neutralized by the political and reputational benefits of being
able to seek and secure yet another death (re)sentence (when the public
is paying attention and the case remains winnable) or (3) may be avoided
entirely by taking the plea bargain or dismissal that was rejected the first
time around (if the public isn't looking or the case isn't winnable and the
now-ancient error can be blamed on a prior administration). So, even in
the rare event that there is someone back home who can be, and who is,
singled out for a reversal penalty five or ten years after the fact, the penalty comes nowhere near canceling out the amortized rewards from generating the mistaken death sentence in the first place.
Finally, in some-probably large-number of "overproduced" cases,
the deserved slap never comes, because the error eludes the reviewing
courts. 23 7 Even apart from the ever-mounting hurdles the Court and
235. Compare Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1517-22 (10th Cir. 1997) (granting
capitally sentenced petitioner Williamson a new trial based on ineffective assistance of
counsel) with Bill Dedman, DNA Evidence Frees Two in Murder Case, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, Apr. 25, 1999, at 20 (discussing Williamson's later release due to innocence).
236. Consider, for example, the local prosecutor's reaction to a federal habeas judges'
reversal of the death sentence in Houston v. Dutton, 50 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 1995), discussed
supra note 170 and accompanying text:
Where's the fairness for the law-abiding citizens? How many appeals are you
entitled to? The constitution demands finality of punishment.
Us good folks here in Tennessee are able to take care of our business in the
criminal justice system. We're bright enough to understand the system. Once
the Criminal Court has spoken, and the Tennessee Supreme Court has spoken,
that's enough.
We don't need this guy telling us we're wrong. If he had to stand for election
every eight years or so and let the people speak, we wouldn't be seeing opinions
like this. We don't need a federal judge involved in our justice system. He needs
to be held accountable for what he's doing.
Tom Chester, Prosecutor Lashes Judge for Reversal of Death Sentence, Knoxville NewsSentinel, May 21, 1994, at Al; see also Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 67 (proffering
an explanation for successive reprosecutions of an innocent defendant, Rolando Cruz, see
supra note 143, for capital murder after the Illinois Supreme Court twice overturned his
conviction on appeal-notwithstanding the confession to the crime by another man who
was later linked to the offense by DNA tests that exonerated Cruz: "When that verdict was
set aside, prosecutors probably satisfied themselves that the court's decision turned on
nothing more than a technicality").
237. See supra notes 84, 91. Once someone is executed, there rarely is anyone left
with the incentive and wherewithal to prove his innocence; organizations that pursue these
kinds of cases will instead devote their resources to probably innocent prisoners who are
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Congress have thrown in the way of meaningful review, 2 38 and the myriad
cases in which serious, even malicious, errors are spotted but elude reversal due to procedural defaults, harmless error analysis, and the like, 239
still alive. Cf. Frank Green, Diocese's Request for Evidence Denied: DNA Data in O'Dell
Case Were Sought, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 16, 1998, at BI (reporting
unsuccessful effort by family members, lawyers, and religious leaders to get court to order
the release of DNA evidence they believe would establish the innocence of executed
Virginia prisoner Joseph O'Dell); Weinstein, Many Resist DNA Testing, supra note 118
(discussing prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction release of information probative of
innocence). It consequently is necessary to extrapolate from the huge number of mistakes
that are caught, from the resistance of officials to, and the foibles of the system for,
catching them, and from the arbitrary means by which so many are caught, see supra note
84, to the likelihood that some mistakes are not caught. It also is very likely that some
significant number of innocent individuals who were tried capitally but given life
sentences, or whose death sentences were overturned, remain in prison on lesser
convictions or sentences. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 84 (discussing Earl Washington
whose death sentence was commuted to life based on DNA and other evidence that
seemed to demonstrate his innocence, but who remained in prison six years later).
Because the services of anti-death penalty lawyers are rationed only to people serving death
sentences, the incentive and resources available to prove the innocence of individuals
removed from death row is very low. Even more important, innocence is a very
underinclusive proxy for mistakes. See supra note 144. It is reasonable to suspect that
many more mistakes take the form of first-degree murderers given undeserved death
sentences, and homicide perpetrators convicted of a higher degree of crime than they
committed. See generally James S. Liebman et al., Death Matters: A Reply to Latzer and
Cauthen, 84 Judicature 72, 74-75 (2000) (documenting these and other reasons why
innocence-focused measures of miscarriages of justice in capital cases are inaccurate and
underinclusive).
238. See Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 68 ("Ironically, it is the safeguards
[death penalty supporters] refer[ ) to-the often time-consuming constitutional and legal
challenges to convictions and death sentences-that death-penalty supporters have
successfully undermined during the past decade, thereby increasing the likelihood of
executing an innocent person."); supra notes 41, 50-74 and accompanying text.
239. See Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137 ("Between 1993 and 1997,
there were 167 published opinions in which the Illinois Appellate Court or Illinois
Supreme Court found that prosecutors committed some form of misconduct that could be
considered harmless. In 122 of those cases-or nearly three out of four times-the
reviewing court affirmed the conviction, holding that the misconduct was 'harmless'....";
also quoting conclusion of retired Illinois appellate judge Dom Rizzi, a longtime critic of
courts' and chief prosecutors' tendency to ignore "troublesome pattern[s]" of
prosecutorial misconduct, that "'[i]f you do not reverse the conviction where there is
prosecutorial misconduct ...there is virtually no way you can be assured that the conduct
will not repeat itself in other cases'"); Hunt, Clouded Cases, supra note 160 (reporting,
based on study of court records, that, although the Ohio Supreme Court "repeatedly has
criticized [Cincinnati] prosecutors for making improper courtroom statements to win 14
death penalty cases over the past 12 years," and "has written at least four lengthy opinions
since 1988 telling prosecutors to stop the misconduct, the record shows justices are more
than willing to forgive these mistakes and uphold death sentences" on grounds of a lack of
prejudice-as the court has done in 13 of the 14 cited cases, with the 14th still under
submission; also quoting Ohio high court's chief justice stating: "We better stop
complaining about it if we're not going to do something about it."); Prosecutorial
Restraint: Death Penalty Allows No Margin for Error, Columbus Dispatch, July 15, 2000, at
6A (citing a number of recent capital cases in which the Ohio Supreme Court had
express[ed] frustration" and "'mounting alarm' over the increasing incidence of
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the fact is that post-trial reviewing courts do not purport to be, would be
excoriated if they claimed to be, do not want to be, and are not designed
to be-even if, willy hilly, they end up acting as if they were-guilt-determiners and capital sentencers.
Often, therefore, no message about the substantive inaccuracy of
death verdicts (no matter how egregiously inaccurate they are) is ever
transmitted back to the responsible trial-level actors. And when the message is transmitted back, its power is dissipated by the light-years it must
travel, the chain of transformers it has to go through, and the weakness
and garbled nature of the original signal. So, if you were a prosecutor
considering whether or not to seek a death sentence and whether to cut
corners if necessary to get it, your mental calculus might go something
like this: "Don't seek a death sentence-very bad. Seek it and don't get
it-even worse. Seek it and cut corners to make sure I do get it-very
good (emotionally, politically, professionally) in the short-run, with only
a small chance of something mildly bad (happening many years later." A
similar calculus faces police officers, trial judges, and jurors-all of
whom, like the prosecutor, are left virtually unconstrained by defense
counsel at trial, and, as noted, may actually be let off the hook( by the
predicted success of movement lawyers years later. As police officer, prosecutor, judge, or juror, what would you do?
4. Maximized Benefits and Displaced Costs: The Role of the CapitalDefense
Bar. - I have heaped a lot of blame for the overproduction of death on
trial-level officials who fail to pay their way (i.e., to internalize the costs of
their errors) in capital cases. 240 But this allocation of blame is incomplete and potentially misleading. Although the death penalty debate is
typically framed in terms of the monolithic capital sentencing state as a
whole versus capital defendants and their movement lawyers, the above
analysis reveals a far more complicated set of actors, alliances, and oppositions. For one thing, the anti-death penalty bar is effectively in league
with overproducing trial-level officials, given the bar's diversion of resources to the later stages of capital cases, leaving ill-prepared and poorly
compensated lawyers to hold down the fort (or, more accurately, to be
overrun) at trial. 24 1 Moreover, the supposedly monolithic state is in fact
composed of two sets of actors-trial-level officials, who have relatively
easy access to the benefits that accumulating death sentences provide,
and appellate-level officials, along with victims and taxpayers, who bear
misconduct by prosecutors" and trial judges; in nearly all the cases, however, the error was
found harmless and the death verdict was upheld); supra notes 46-47, 63, 66-67, 69, 91
and accompanying text. Waiver and procedural default rules typically are attacked because
they leave violations of rights unremedied. See, e.g., Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 175,
at 28-30. Harmless error rules seem less controversial because they only apply where no or
little harm was done to the bearer of the right. The analysis here makes clear that both
types of rules are equally, and seriously, problematic, because both so often and seriously
undermine the reversal penalty for trial-level mistakes.
240. See supra Parts lI.C.2, II.C.3.
241. See supra notes 175-185 and accompanying text.
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the heavy costs of defending, fixing, and culling those sentences and otherwise suffering their untoward consequences. 242 As abolitionists and the
newspapers are fond of pointing out when the question is whether a noncapital state should adopt the death penalty, capital sentencing states in
fact spend excessively on capital sentences-$3.2 million per execution in
Florida between 1973 and 1988, compared to $855,240 for a 60-year sentence (in 1985 dollars); $3 million per execution in Pennsylvania (three
times the cost of incarceration for life without parole); $2.16 million per
execution in North Carolina, $2.3 million in Texas, and $5 million in
California. 243 In fact, when not only trial, incarceration, and execution
costs are counted, but also the expense of post-conviction capital litigation, especially in the two-thirds or more of cases in which the result is to
of
overturn capital sentences, the figure is much higher, perhaps upwards 244
$20 million in extra expenditures for every person actually executed.
242. At worst, crime victims pay with their lives for police and prosecutorial
misconduct in capital cases. For example, 13 years after the Ford Heights Four were falsely
convicted (two capitally) of two rape-murders, and four years before they were exonerated,
one of the actual perpetrators, who was still at large, suffocated a third woman to death in a
vacant apartment near the scene of the earlier crimes. See Armstrong & Possley, Reversal
of Fortune, supra note 137. During the trial of the Ford Heights Four, prosecutors (1)
presented false and misleading scientific evidence; (2) used a variety of undisclosed
benefits to induce three witnesses to finger the defendants, then permitted the witnesses to
lie about the inducements on the stand at trial; and (3) "capitalized on a weak front posted
by defense attorneys who were often ill-prepared or incompetent." Id.; see also Masters,
supra note 151 (discussing tactics Arlington, Virginia, police used to induce David Vasquez
to give a false confession to a capital rape-murder, leaving the actual killer free to commit
four more rape-murders before being apprehended); supra note 151 (discussing the
Ochoa case).
243. See Kozinski & Gallagher, Run-On Sentence, supra note 85, at 11-15 & nn.45, 64
(citing studies and estimates for various states); Margot Garey, Comment, The Cost of
Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1221, 1245-66
(1985); Aaron Chambers, Resources a Concern in Death Penalty Reform, Chi. Daily L.
Bull., Apr. 24, 1999, at 19; Paul W. Keve, The Costliest Punishment-A Corrections
Administrator Contemplates the Death Penalty, Federal Probation, Mar. 1992, at 11, 13;
Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 22; A. Wallace Tashima, A Costly Ultimate Sanction, The L.
A. Daily J., June 20, 1991, at 6.
244. Consider the findings of a recent study by the Palm Beach Post:
What price for vengeance on society's worst killers? In Florida, try $51 million a
year. That, according to a [1999] Palm Beach Post estimate, is how much Florida
spends each year to enforce the death penalty-above and beyond what it would
cost to punish all first-degree murderers with life in prison without parole. And at
the [slow] rate at which Florida is executing its killers (there have been only 44
since executions resumed in 1979), it's costing about $24 million per
electrocuted murderer. ...
According to The Post's estimate, [life imprisonment] is about $23 million
cheaper, even for an inmate who is imprisoned in his 20s and dies in his 70s. The
Post's figure was derived using estimates of how much time prosecutors and
public defenders at the trial courts and the Florida Supreme Court, which devotes
approximately half its time to death penalty cases, spend on extra work needed in
capital cases. It accounts also for the time and effort expended on defendants
who are tried but convicted of a lesser murder charge and whose death sentences
are overturned on appeal as well as those handful of condemned inmates who are
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These points-that trial-level officials fail to pay their own way when
they seek death sentences, that anti-death penalty lawyers are complicit in
the dodge, and that other state officials and taxpayers pay the price-can
be unified into a single story that puts the anti-death penalty bar in the
role of the chief villain: The reason states spend so much on capital cases,
while spending so little on (at least the defense side of) capital trials, is
the choice anti-death penalty lawyers have made about where to deploy
their resources. On the one hand, they have deployed few of their own
resources, and as a result have attracted few of the state's resources (especially on the defense side), into capital trials. On the other hand, they
have deployed extensive defense resources into post-trial proceedingsin the process sucking into the same proceedings huge amounts of the
states' responsive resources, many of which redound to the prisoners' and
their lawyers' benefit in the way of expert assistance, disclosed files and
245
other discovery, counsel fees, and the like.
actually executed.
Date, supra note 85; see also Jonathan Alter, The Death Penalty on Trial, Newsweek, June
12, 2000, at 24, 34 ("California spends an extra $90 million on its capital cases beyond the
normal costs of the system."); infra note 246 (discussing cost of post-conviction litigation).
245. See, e.g., Alan F. Blakley, The Cost of Killing Criminals, 18 N. Ky. L. Rev. 61,
71-73 (1990) (estimating cost of state supreme court appeals in capital cases as of the late
1980s, and exclusive of travel, photocopying, investigation, and "court costs-the salaries
of the justices and their aides-" as between $120,000 and $160,000 per case; certiorari
thereafter costs the state about $170,000); Garey, supra note 243, at 1262-66 (analyzing
defense attorney expenditures in litigating capital appeals); Elias & Fried, supra note 85
(reporting that in California, which has several hundred state and federal post-conviction
petitions pending at any given time, state courts as of 1999 were paying $25,000 for
prefiling investigation and a flat fee of $72,000 to $107,000 in counsel fees (plus an hourly
fee for reading the transcript) for every capital state post-conviction petition litigated in
the state; federal courts as of 1997 paid an average of $370,000 in inmate litigation fees and
expenses per capital habeas corpus case and upwards of $1 million in some); Mintz,
California Gridlock, supra note 91 (reporting that just the federal court portion of the
average death penalty appeal in California costs $700,000 per case to cover prisoners'
litigation expenses and attorneys fees); Mintz, Capital Punishment Gridlock, supra note
124 (reporting that the state court portion of the average capital appeal in California costs
"as much as $315,000" per case in defense lawyer fees, "but officials still can't find enough
attorneys for 564 condemned inmates" and have had to create a "15-lawyer resource center
to represent death row inmates, coupled with the expansion of [the appellate capacity of]
the state public defender's office"); Bill Sloat, Public Defender's Office Says it Can't Afford
Appeal, Clev. Plain Dealer, Jan. 6, 2000, at 5B (reporting that after the Ohio statewide
public defender office, with a 1999 budget of $1.15 million for post-trial representation in
capital cases, spent $200,000 in an unsuccessful effort to stop the state's first post-Furman
execution, it filed papers claiming that "a rash of death penalty cases left it unable to pay
about $12,000 for 3 expert witnesses" at an evidentiary hearing ordered by a federal habeas
judge to explore "alleged racism in jury selection" and ineffective assistance of trial
counsel); Dave Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, Miami
Herald, July 10, 1988, at 12A (stating that post-trial costs of Florida capital appeals are from
$344,000 to more than $1,160,000 higher than in noncapital cases); Vivian Wakefield,
Lawyer Wants Court to Weigh the Costs of Justice, Fla. Times-Union, Apr. 3, 2000, at Al
(reporting on well-known Jacksonville lawyer's refusal to take death penalty appeal at
going rate of $50/hour-less than his overhead-given burden placed on his office by a
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prior successful appeal in which he logged 545 hours, along with 105 hours of support staff
time);Jonathan E. Gradess, N.Y. Public Defense Backup Center, Report to the N.Y. Senate
Fin. Comm., Mar. 3, 1989 (estimating that New York direct appeals in capital cases would
cost the state about $246,000 per case); PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Cost of Private Panel
Representation in Federal Capital Cases from 1992 to 1998, at 111-23, V-79, VIII-119 (Feb. 9,
1999) (experienced federal habeas counsel "described the preparation required for an
evidentiary hearing [in capital habeas cases] as similar to that required for an entire capital
trial; such hearings are granted in from 40% to 89% of capital habeas cases in California);
see also Woolner, supra note 131 (reporting that from 1993 to 1998, lawyers from the New
York law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell spent "thousands" of uncompensated hours and
"dozens and dozens" of unreimbursed trips to Georgia in the process of securing state postconviction relief for Georgia death row inmate Scott Christenson). See generally
Armstrong & Possley, Verdict Dishonor, supra note 84 (reporting results of study of 381
homicide convictions overturned based on prosecutorial suppression of evidence or
presentation of false evidence and concluding that the "failure of prosecutors to obey the
demands of justice-and the legal system's failure to hold them accountable for it-leads
to wrongful convictions, and retrials and appeals that cost taxpayers millions of dollars
[and] .. .fosters a corrosive distrust in [the judiciary]").
As for expenditures in time, as opposed to money, see, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 120 S.
Ct. 459, 461-62, 465 (1999) (Breyer,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that as
of the end of 1997, there were 24 prisoners who had been on death row for more than 20
years; citing as examples the proceedings in the two cases before the Court-that of
Florida death row inmate Thomas Knight (24-plus years on death row, including one year
on direct appeal, eight years in state post-conviction proceedings, five and one-half years in
federal habeas proceedings resulting in a grant of habeas relief, seven-plus years awaiting a
retrial that resulted in a new death sentence, two more years on direct appeal, and one
year on certiorari review in the Supreme Court), and that of Nebraska inmate Carey Dean
Moore (19-plus years on death row, including two years on direct appeal, two years in state
post-conviction proceedings, four years at the federal district court level on habeas during
which relief was granted, four years on the state's appeals of that ruling, three years
awaiting retrial resulting in a new death sentence, two more years on direct appeal, and
two-plus years in state post-conviction proceedings and ensuing certiorari review)); supra
notes 85, 96 (discussing court time devoted to capital appeals and length of those appeals).
Sometimes, a good bit of the blame for excessive state spending on capital postconviction litigation falls on state's attorneys. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Caver v.
Gramley, 1999 WL 261838, at *4 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 15, 1999) (decrying practice of Illinois
state's attorney of filing motions to dismiss capital habeas petition on procedural grounds
rather than responding on the merits, which "has unduly and unreasonably delayed
resolution of the petitioner's discreet claims"); Weinstein, Faster Appeals, supra note 64
(discussing federal audit of expenses in capital cases, conducted by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which found that unlike the state's attorneys in other states, who
acquiesced after unsuccessfully raising a particular claim under a 1996 federal habeas
statute, "'the California attorney general's office has [unsuccessfully] litigated the
[claim]' . . . 'in every case,'" i.e., in 40 death penalty cases, which, according to the
accounting firm's rough estimation, "might have generated an additional $100,000 in costs
to taxpayers in each of the cases where [California] pursued the issue"). The Supreme
Court and Congress may also bear some of the blame. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Boerckel,
119 S. Ct. 1728, 1741 (1999) (Breyer, J.,dissenting) (criticizing Court's ruling requiring
federal habeas petitioners to exhaust state discretionary review procedure (akin to
certiorari) that state law discourages prisoners from seeking, and predicting that ruling will
"add to the burdens of already over-burdened state courts and delay further a criminal
process that is often criticized for too much delay"); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,
147-52 (1998) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding majority for "needlessly
prolong[ing] this [capital habeas] proceeding" by summarily reversing and remanding to
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The problem thus is not that the state fights too hard for death
sentences or that it never faces determined opposition to executions.
Rather, the problem is that the determined opposition arrives so long
after a death sentence occurs that it is inordinately easy for trial-level actors-especially given their unusually great motivation and capacity to cut
corners when the case is capital-to secure what society should (and in
the end does) treat as its most serious and difficult-to-justify sanction. The
problem is not that state and federal governments do not pay dearly for2 4 a6
system that overproduces death sentences-they do, in financial terms,
the court of appeals for additional harmless error analysis even though "our decision today
is unlikely to change the result below" and "there is a strong interest in bringing all
litigation, and especially capital cases, to a prompt conclusion"); In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024,
1027 (7th Cir. 1999) (Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (decrying
myriad complications and conflicts among the circuits engendered by recent federal
legislation that was designed to narrow federal habeas litigation, particularly in capital
cases); supra note 124 (citing other examples). Compare Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 459
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (attributing 19- and 24-year delays in
capital cases before Court to its "Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence") with id. at 464
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (attributing delays to "the States' failure to
apply constitutionally sufficient procedures at the time of initial sentencing and to
"extensive delays" in providing for "appeal and consideration of reprieve").
246. See, e.g., Bright, Worst Lawyer, supra note 175, at 1838-39 (describing two cases
in which defense lawyers were paid what amounted to $15 to $20 per hour and $11.84 per
hour to represent men who were sentenced to die but eventually were released as innocent
after the expenditure of large sums of money by volunteer counsel in post-conviction
proceedings); Armstrong & Mills, Inept Defenses, supra note 137 ("in Illinois, the
resources rallied on appeal often dwarf those summoned to keep a defendant off Death
Row in the first place"; for example, a trial judge trying a capital defendant-who was "a
two-term Kankakee County Board member with colleagues eager to describe his
accomplishments"-was, by his own admission, "'totally amazed' at how little evidence
[trial counsel, retained for a flat fee of $8000,] offered [in mitigation]" but, instead of
stepping in to relieve the incompetent attorney, sentenced the defendant to die; the
Illinois Supreme Court later overturned the death sentence after "Jenner & Block, one of
Chicago's largest and most prestigious law firms," devoted "five lawyers, two investigators
and an untold number of paralegals and support staff members" to seven years worth of
appeals); Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84 (discussing the "staggering"
costs of capital case reversals and exonerations in Illinois: "Taxpayers have . . . had to
finance multimillion-dollar settlements to wrongly convicted Death Row inmates[Dennis] Williams alone received $13 million [-and] . . . to pay for new trials, sentencing
hearings and appeals in more than 100 cases where a condemned inmate's original trial
was undermined by some fundamental error."); Balestier, supra note 84 (reporting that, in
the process of seeking state post-conviction relief for a possibly innocent death row inmate
in Texas based in part on ineffective assistance of counsel by trial lawyers who spent 'Just
three hours with [the client] in preparation for trial," the New York law firm of Latham &
Watkins has "devoted thousands of attorney hours to the project," assigned a partner and
associate to "work full-time on the ... case for weeks at a time," and "include[d those] pro
bono hours in its calculations for bonuses"); see also Armstrong & Mills, Flawed Cases,
supra note 114 ("Cook County agreed to pay a record $36 million to... the Ford Heights
Four, four men who had been wrongly convicted [two capitally] of the 1978 murders of a
south suburban couple"; the men "alleged that sheriffs officers framed them by
manufacturing evidence of guilt while burying evidence pointing to the real killers");
Laurie Goering, Florida Lets Speed Govern Executions, Chi. Trib., Feb. 28, 2000, at NI
(noting that the Florida legislature granted Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee $1 million in
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diluted deterrence and retribution, victims' unrequited hopes for clo248
sure-by-execution, 24 7 and lost judicial opportunity and public support.
damages for falsely incarcerating them on death row for 12 years (including 10 years after
the actual killer confessed to the crime in a statement that police suppressed, see supra
note 151)); Paul W. Valentine & Richard Tapscott, Md. to Give Cleared Man $300,000,
Wash. Post, June 23, 1994, at BI (discussing legislative appropriation to Kirk Bloodsworth
after DNA cleared him of a rape and murder for which he spent two years on Maryland's
death row, then seven years in prison following an initial retrial).
Typifying the huge and needless expenditure of money and time on post-conviction
efforts to save tainted capital judgments is Illinois's insistence upon defending the verdicts
of all 14 men put on death row as a result of confessions taken by detectives at a notorious
Chicago precinct house, notwithstanding that (1) the Police Department fired the
supervisor of the unit for torturing a man whose capital conviction and sentence the state
previously had spent $1 million and five years defending-ultimately unsuccessfully, with
the result that the police killer involved avoided the death penalty on retrial; (2) the
Department has paid out more than an additional $1 million dollars to settle civil suits
growing out of torture claims against the unit in noncapital cases; (3) the Department's
own Office of Professional Standards concluded in a series of reports that police officers in
the unit had tortured at least two of the 14 men it put on death row and were guilty of
.systematic" and "methodical" abuse in taking confessions; and (4) a state intermediate
court and a federal district court have found that "[i]t is now common knowledge that...
[the unit] regularly engaged in the physical abuse and torture of prisoners to extract
confessions." Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra note 137; 60 Minutes II, supra note
151; supra note 151. Also typical are the post-trial litigation costs that had to be expended
to force the Police Department, as late as 1999, to disclose its own internal investigative
findings that officers in the unit tortured capital defendants into confessing. See Mills &
Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra note 137.
247. A Seattle journalist reports:
Two years ago, the family of Tracy Parker was upset when a federal judge
overturned the death sentence of the man convicted of her 1986 rape and
murder. That disappointment turned to devastation yesterday when the . . .
Court of Appeals took Brian Keith Lord's appeal a step further, ruling his trial
attorneys did a shoddyjob and ordering that he receive a new [guilt] trial. "I can't
stand it; I can't stand it," Parker's mother.., said, weeping. "We're left to deal
with this .... "
Carter, supra note 91. See also Kozinski & Gallagher, Honest Death Penalty, supra note 1
("One worries about the effect on the families of the victims, who have to endure the
possibility-often the reality-of retrials, evidentiary hearings and last-minute stays of
execution for years after the crime."); Mintz, California Gridlock, supra note 91
(describing emotional toll of protracted appeals process on relatives of crime victims);
Possley & Armstrong, Flip Side, supra note 137 (concluding, based on study of effects of
prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois homicide and capital cases, that "the reversals exact a
toll on victims and their families who are forced to come back to court, reopening
sometimes barely healed emotional wounds"); Swofford, supra note 85 (documenting the
"emotional toll ... [on] a victim's family as they wait year after year for the execution of
the killer of their [loved one]"); see also infra note 273 (quoting statements by members of
murder victims' families about the impact on them of lengthy capital appeals).
248. A constant theme of the many investigative media reports cited here that expose
mistakes and injustices in capital cases is the impugned integrity of capital courts and their
processes. In November 1999, for example, the Chicago Tribune published a five-part
series on Illinois's death penalty, which Republican Governor George Ryan credited with
influencing him to declare an indefinite moratorium on executions in the state. See
William Claiborne, Ill. Governor, Citing Errors, Will Block Executions, Wash. Post, Jan. 31,
2000, at Al. The Tribune's report began as follows:
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It is just that (with the unwitting complicity of the anti-death penalty bar),
the actors who incurred those costs (at great political, professional, and
psychic advantage to themselves) are the only ones who are permitted for
the most part to avoid paying for them.
Nor can death penalty lawyers solve the problem by simply redirecting their resources to the trial stage. Recall the problem of the pyramid. 2 49 To concentrate their fire as successfully as they now do, death
Capital punishment in Illinois is a system so riddled with faulty evidence,
unscrupulous trial tactics and legal incompetence that justice has been forsaken,
a Tribune investigation has found ....
The findings reveal a system so plagued by unprofessionalism, imprecision
and bias that they have rendered the state's ultimate form of punishment its least
credible.
Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 84; see also Alexander & Chandler, supra
note 91 ("Capital punishment in the Carolinas is so tainted with mistakes, inequities and
incompetence that the system risks executing innocent people, while sparing some of the
states' most vicious killers, an Observer investigation has found."); Armstrong & Possley,
Verdict Dishonor, supra note 84 ("An [earlier, national] investigation by the Chicago
Tribune found nearly 400 cases where prosecutors obtained homicide convictions by
committing the most unforgivable kinds of deception. They hid evidence that could have
set defendants free. They allowed witnesses to lie. All in defiance of law.... The premium
is on winning, not justice ...

."); Berlow, Wrong Man, supra note 84, at 91 (deploring

asserted unreliability of Texas's death penalty regime); Evidence Clears Two: The Law
Doesn't, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1995, at A28 (decrying ordeal of Oregon couple jailed
despite evidently compelling exculpatory evidence because of limits on appeals based on
newly discovered evidence); Mills & Armstrong, Tortured Path, supra note 137 ("When
[police] investigations are tainted by credible charges that confessions were coerced, the
integrity of a conviction suffers, and questions of guilt or innocence linger after the trial
ends. In death-penalty cases, police misconduct undermines society's expectations that its
harshest punishment will be meted out only with certainty."); Frontline, supra note 84
(alleging in public television documentary about conviction and failure to release innocent
capital prisoners around the country, that "[t]he system is broken [because it] . . .can't
correct its own mistakes and admit that it makes mistakes and give people an opportunity
to protect them"-or, as one of the victims of a miscarriage ofjustice puts the point in the
shot that ends the program, "I want to know why. I want to know why they did this to me
for so long. And it's always going to be there. I don't think they could even start to
explain to me why.").
A California journalist summarized as follows the "toll" taken on "[a]ll sides" by that
state's post-trial review process in capital cases: "Victims' family members.., are haunted
for . . .years by cases that hang in limbo without a resolution"; the inmate's "wait for
answers can be excruciating"; federal habeas proceedings on average cost $700,000 per
case in defense lawyer fees; the state faces "the prospect of retrying cases so old that
witnesses and evidence [have] vanish [ed]"; and the state high court is so "overwhelmed by
death penalty work" that it can write only one-line orders in death appeals (thus increasing
the burden on subsequent federal court review), prompting the state's chiefjustice to call
the review process "a blight on the system" over which he presides. Mintz, California
Gridlock, supra note 91; see also Kozinski & Gallagher, Honest Death Penalty, supra note 1
(decrying costs current death penalty regime imposes on courts, victims, and taxpayers);
Possley & Armstrong, Flip Side, supra note 137 (listing retrial costs imposed by reversals
due to prosecutorial misconduct in homicide cases, including "cost in time and effort for
investigators, defense lawyers, judges and jurors" and "[flor the guilty, ...
another
opportunity to go free").
249. See supra notes 125-135 and accompanying text.
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penalty lawyers would have to accomplish an impossibly difficult predictive feat. They would have to identify beforehand-with considerable
strategic hindrance from the state in the form of overcharging, undersettlement, over-death-qualifying, and the like-what their top-of-the-pyramid strategy now tells them with 100% accuracy: which murders will be
charged as capital crimes, convicted as such, taken to capital sentencing
hearings, and actually result in death sentences that are eventually affirmed on direct appeal. Even worse, they would have to abandon their
thousands of current clients who were convicted and sentenced under
the preexisting error-plagued regime.
III. SOLUTION: THE DIFFERENCE A CONSCIENTIOUs TRIAL-FocUs
WOULD MAKE

As noted in Part II, the incentives driving the nation's process of
imposing and reviewing death sentences are skewed from stem to stem.
The devil's bargain between death-sentence-prone prosecutors and trialshy anti-death penalty lawyers has so thoroughly hollowed out the procedural constraints against unwarranted capital sentences that a prosecutor's decision to seek and a jury's decision to impose death says rather
little about whether it is substantively deserved. Moreover, the cost of
empowering a procedurally-focused review process to take an (awkward)
stab at remaking those substantive judgments is more than a decade of
time and millions of dollars in each case.
A. Inadequate Solutions
Most proposals for curing this problem are doomed to make it
worse. Typically, those proposals aim merely to treat one or another procedural symptom at either the stern or the stem, without attacking the
disease itself (the skewed incentive system) or its principal, substantive
symptom (the overproduction of death). It is true that the post-trial
phases of the death penalty process are far too lengthy and costly. 250 But
simply to decree that those phases henceforth take less time and
money-as the governor and legislature of Florida recently attempted to
do, adopting time limits and litigation restrictions (later ruled unconstitutional by the state's high court 251 ) designed to make happen in five years
what has long taken fourteen 2 52-is to order severe production deficien250. See supra notes 95-97, 244-246 and accompanying text.
251. See Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000).
252. The Florida law had repealed state supreme court rules governing post-trial
review in capital cases and replaced the state's existing chain of review procedures on
direct appeal, in (often successive) state post-conviction proceedings, and in Public
Records Act litigation, with a unitary process. The law was intended to cause executions to
occur within five years of death sentences and to prompt state courts "to impose sanctions"
on prisoners and their lawyers who "[albused" the litigation process, "[r]aised a claim that
a court has found to be frivolous or procedurally barred," or "[a]dversely affected the
orderly administration of Justice." Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000, sec. 17,
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cies to go away by firing the quality control staff. It won't work. 253 The
production process will remain severely deficient.
§§ 924.395(l)(a)-(d), 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 00-3 (West). The law gave capital prisoners
180 days after the filing of their direct appeal brief to file a state post-conviction petition;
barred all claims that were or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal; forbade
extensions of time, even if, for example, delays were the result of the state's illegal
withholding of exculpatory evidence or a court's failure to compel legally required
disclosure of public records; barred successive petitions unless based on previously
undiscoverable evidence establishing a constitutional violation and the prisoner's factual
innocence; and imposed strict time limits on the adjudication of state post-conviction and
public records act petitions. See id. sec. 6, §§ 924.056(3) (a), (d), (5); id. sec. 9, § 924.059.
See generally Sara Rimer, Florida Passes Bill to Quicken Execution Pace, N.Y. Times, Jan.
6, 2000, at Al (describing the passage of the Florida legislation and the accompanying
public debate). Other states are considering post-conviction review reforms similar to
those abortively adopted in Florida. See, e.g., Yoji Cole, Napolitano Wants to Find Ways to
Speed Executions, Ariz. Republic, Feb. 16, 2000, at B7 (discussing state attorney general's
proposal "to streamline the [Arizona capital] appeals process"); Amy Green, State Attorney
General Wants Speedier Appeals for Condemned, Associated Press State & Local Wire,
Apr. 10, 2000 (reporting that "Tennessee's attorney general wants to reduce the number of
appeals available to death row inmates"); Siegelman Seeks to Shorten Death Penalty
Appeals, Bulletin's Frontrunner, Mar. 21, 2000, available in Lexis News Library, Wire Serv.
Stories File (discussing proposals by Alabama governor and legislators "to speed up
executions" by eliminating capital defendants' automatic right to appeal to the state
supreme court); ABA Section of Individ. Rts. & Responsibilities, State Legislative Activity
Summary Selected Bills: 1999-2000, at 3-4 (draft Oct. 1, 2000) [hereinafter ABA
Legislative Summary] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing proposed
legislation to reduce appellate review of capital judgments in Alabama, Florida, and New
Mexico).
253. A number of observers have commented on Congress's largely unsuccessful
effort to truncate the federal post-conviction process via the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996. See Fred Cheesman, II et al., A Tale of Two Laws: The U.S.
Congress Confronts Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits, 22 Law & Pol'y
89, 90, 95, 99, 105 (2000) (concluding based on statistical study that AEDPA has had
"virtually no impact" on the number of habeas petitions filed and "almost complete lack of
success" in moderating the burden such petitions place on state lawyers and the federal
courts); Claire Cooper, Death Penalty Rules Blasted, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 15, 2000, at Al
("[A] growing number of lawyers and judges say [AEDPA's] measures designed to improve
efficiency are stalling appeals more than ever before."); Mintz, Capital Punishment
Gridlock, supra note 124 (concluding that, four years after its enactment, AEDPA "has had
little effect in states notoriously slow in processing death penalty appeals," and that "[i]f
anything, its clunky language has further slowed capital cases .. .as lawyers and judges
figure out how to interpret it[ ]"); supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text (discussing
AEDPA generally and noting the extensive number of Supreme Court cases that the Act's
poor drafting has generated). With regard to the failings of similar legislation passed in
Texas a few years ago and in Florida last year, see Defense Called Lacking, supra note 178
(concluding, based on study of 461 Texas capital cases, "that measures put in place in 1995
to ensure that people facing the death penalty got at least an adequate defense," at the
same time as the capital appeals process was being reformed and truncated, have "often"
failed to have much effect); Lloyd Dunkelberger, Florida New Death Penalty Law Rejected;
State Supreme Court Justices Say the Reform Is an Unconstitutional Attempt, Ledger
(Lakeland, Fla.), Apr. 15, 2000, at Al (discussing Florida Supreme Court's unanimous
conclusion that Florida legislation truncating capital appeals interfered with judiciary's
prerogatives in violation of the state constitution); Jim McBride, Speedy Death Row
Appeals Draw Fire, Amarillo Globe-News, Jan. 29, 2000, at IA (reporting on resolution
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What it might do is make matters worse. If defense lawyers have a
third of the time to discover and expose, and if courts have as little time
to catch and cure, the same high number of errors, it is likely that fewer
deficient capital judgments will be discovered, more innocent and undeserving prisoners will be executed,2 5 4 and more actual killers will remain
free. 255 Worse, deficient capital sentences will occur more often, because
overzealous police and prosecutors will operate under even less discipline
than before. 2 56 Nor will anti-death penalty lawyers be able effectively to
redeploy their resources to earlier stages of the process, because having
to litigate each of their already piled-up cases and each new case three
times faster will effectively triple their post-conviction dockets, and because their resources (already depleted by recent federal budget Cuts2 5 7 )
may be spread even more thinly by pr6secutors emboldened to file even
more capital charges.
It also is true of course that the defense lawyers appointed to handle
most capital trials are far too poorly qualified, prepared, and paid to assure reliable capital judgments. But to expect states simply to order that
the trial of every capital case shall henceforth be more costly-the result
of proposals to improve the quality of defense lawyering at capital trials 258 -is vainly to expect fiscally and socially conservative voters and legislators to act on faith in the frugality of anti-death penalty lawyers. It is
unlikely that any such order will issue based only on the hope that increasing the cost of every capital trial 259 will keep the anti-death penalty
unanimously adopted by northern Texas bar association calling on criminal defense
attorneys to decline to accept court appointments to represent inmates facing the death
penalty in post-trial litigation because of the absence of "meaningful review" in the state's
appellate courts). The analysis here suggests that fixing AEDPA's "clunky language," see
also supra note 71 and accompanying text, will not solve the problem. Because so much
error is structured into American capital judgments, simply decreeing that the errorcorrection system must move faster will not work. It is no surprise, therefore, that AEDPA
has fallen short of expectations.
254. See supra note 84.
255. See supra note 242.
256. To be sure, this effect may be lessened somewhat because the admonitory
message ofjudicial reversals will reach the offending officers and offices more quickly than
before. Cf. supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text (discussing poor feedback from
reversals under existing system due to delays during review process). But because the
kinds of errors deserving the most admonition-most especially, prosecutorial suppression
of evidence and other forms of evidentiary manipulation, see supra notes 148-160 and
accompanying text-take the longest time to discover, the overall effect of the reform is
likely to be the quicker discovery and cure of fewer, less serious, and more record-bound
miscues. Any increased disincentive to commit error visible on the record (and those
disincentives will remain weak for the reasons discussed supra notes 194-199, 218-239 and
accompanying text, and because reviewing courts will be strapped for time to cure even
these errors) will be more than offset by the increased incentives to cut corners using
investigative and other tactics that are largely off the record.
257. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., infra notes 279, 289 (describing various measures and proposals for
improving the quality of defense attorneys during capital trials).
259. See supra note 246.
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bar from directing as many resources as before into the process of reviewing capital sentences. As silly as it now is to pay a few thousand dollars
per capital trial, then millions of dollars per post-trial review, most legislators will conclude it is sillier still to risk paying millions at both phases.
Concerns about the amount of resources currently expended on,
and the power currently given to judges in, capital post-trial litigation will
also probably block proposals to expand judges' ability to winnow cases
effectively in the post-trial phases. This is true whether the goal is more
scrupulous procedural review (as Senator Leahy and a bipartisan group
of Representatives are currently proposing in Congress 260 ) or more
scrupulous substantive review (as, for example, Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker and Joseph Hoffmann have proposed2 6 1). And in this instance, suspicious voters and taxpayers are probably right. By themselves,
enhanced post-trial review processes (state or federal) will not rationalize
the system, even if they catch more of its mistakes, because of the abysmally ineffective mechanisms for feeding back what is learned at the posttrial phases to the trial phase.2 6 2 As with other piecemeal reforms, these
would likely aggravate the incentives problem by more effectively drawing
resources away from trials and into post-trial review-meaning more overproduction of death and more need for costly appeals.
To say that voters, taxpayers, and legislators are suspicious of proposals to pour still more public resources into the post-trial review process is
not, however, to say that they are immune to increasing evidence that
capital trials are generating inordinate numbers of flawed outcomes and
miscarriages ofjustice that risk, among other serious harms, the ultimate
horror of executing the innocent. 26 3 On the contrary, as recent events in
Illinois and elsewhere reveal, the public suddenly seems less willing than

260. See infra notes 279, 285.
261. See Joseph Hoffmann, Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal
Habeas Courts Should Review the Merits of Every Death Sentence, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1771,
1796-1802 (2000) (promoting reinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to
capital cases to require not only reliable procedures, but also a judicial finding "at every
stage of the post-trial proceedings" of a "moral certainty ... that the defendant is, in fact,
guilty" and that he "deserves to die"); Hoffmann & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 93-99, 108
(proposing that a defendant's showing of probable innocence be recognized as a separate
and preferred "track" for federal habeas review); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 216, at
414-21 (proposing stricter state court comparative proportionality review of death
sentences on direct appeal). The fate of AEDPA's "special" provisions for capital cases
suggests that taxpayers and state policymakers are not anxious to put more resources into
capital cases. Those provisions invited states to spend more money on their own post-trial
review procedures in return for receiving more truncated federal post-conviction review of
capital judgments. See supra notes 54-56, 64 and accompanying text. Four years have
passed, but no state has yet been willing to spend the money. See supra note 64. But cf.
infra notes 268, 298 and accompanying text (suggesting that better inducements to more
rational reforms might be of greater interest to taxpayers and policymakers).
262. See supra Part II.C.3.c.
263. See supra notes 84, 89-94 and accompanying text.
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before to tolerate the results of the overproduction of death, even while
264
continuing to support the death penalty.
264. This point is most dramatically illustrated by the moratorium on executions
ordered by Illinois Governor George Ryan on January 30, 2000, because of the high rate of
errors in Illinois capital judgments. See Claiborne, supra note 248:
Gov. George H. Ryan (R) has decided to effectively impose a moratorium on the
death penalty in Illinois [by indefinitely staying all scheduled executions] until an
inquiry has been conducted into why more death row inmates have been
exonerated than executed since capital punishment was reinstated in 1977 ....
"There are innumerable opportunities along the way for serious errors, and the
governor wants to take a pause here," Ryan's press secretary, Dennis Culloton,
said today.
See also Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
2000, at Al ("Governor Ryan's announcement... met with little public criticism here, a
measure of how public outrage over the wrongful convictions has changed the political
landscape on the issue in this state."); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Gov. George Ryan
Plans to Block the Execution of Any Death Row Inmate, Chi. Trib., Jan. 30, 2000, at 1
(citing March 1999 poll showing that Illinois death row exonerations have prompted 54%
of the state's voters to favor and only 37% to oppose a moratorium, notwithstanding that a
majority support the penalty in the abstract; also noting that even before Governor Ryan
acted, both the General Assembly and state supreme court had initiated studies of the
death penalty); Henry Weinstein, Support for Executions Declines, L.A. Times, Sept. 15,
2000, at A26 (reporting results of August 2000 national poll conducted by a bipartisan
group of pollsters finding that "53% of those surveyed said they favored a nationwide
suspension of executions until a study is completed on the fairness of how the death
penalty is used" and that only 29% were opposed). Spurred by events in Illinois, and by
the Nebraska Legislature's even earlier adoption of a moratorium on executions (vetoed
by the Governor) and commissioning of a comprehensive study of the state's death penalty
(not vetoed), (1) the Governors of Florida, Indiana, and Maryland, the legislatures of
Illinois and North Carolina, and the attorney general of Arizona have ordered studies of
the fairness of some or all aspects of their states' capital sentencing procedures; (2)
abolition and moratorium legislation is pending in Congress in regard to federal
executions, see S.2463, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Senators Russell Feingold and
Carl Levin); H.R. 3623, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Rep. Jessie Jackson, Jr., of
Illinois); (3) legislation seeking a moratorium on state executions or a study of the state's
death penalty system has recently been under consideration in Alabama, Arizona,
Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington; (4) serious abolition campaigns are
taking place in Kentucky, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Oregon. See, e.g., Paul Barton,
Efforts to Put Death Penalty on Hold Continue to Grow, USA Today, July 6, 2000, at 5A
(reporting on numerous grass-roots initiatives to abolish or impose a moratorium on the
death penalty); John M.R. Bull, Catholic Leader Urging Moratorium on Executions, Pitt.
Post-Gazette, Feb. 28, 2000, at D1 (discussing Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua's testimony in
favor of a moratorium before a Pennsylvania legislative committee); Richard Carelli,
Optimism on Death Penalty Moratorium, Associated Press, Feb. 12, 2000 (detailing the
growing support for state and federal death penalty moratoriums); Warren Cohen, Putting
a Hold on Executions: Nebraska May Study Wrong Convictions, U.S. News & World Rep.,
May 31, 1999, at 29 (describing Nebraska Legislature's approval of a moratorium on
executions); Spencer Hunt, Plea to Suspend Death Penalty, Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 20,
2000, at B2 (describing hearing on bill in Ohio legislature to suspend executions pending
a study); Claudia Kolker, Death Penalty Moratorium Idea Attracts Even Conservatives, L.A.
Times, Aug. 29, 2000, at A5 (reporting that numerous death penalty moratorium groups
"have sprouted up nationwide" since January 2000 and that "[t]wenty-seven local
governments have urged moratoriums, five states are sponsoring death penalty studies and
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religious leaders are paying new attention to the debate"); Paul Schwartzman, Glendening
Proposes Study of Executions, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 2000, at B2 (discussing Maryland
governor's decision to set aside $250,000 in his budget to study whether the death penalty
"is being imposed fairly and without racial bias"); Peter Smolowitz, Death Penalty
Moratorium to Be Pushed. Legislator: Study Panel Has Votes, Charlotte Observer, Sept.
16, 2000, at 1A ("An influential [North Carolina] state senator said Friday he expects his
legislative panel, which is studying capital punishment, to recommend a moratorium on
executions until it can be determined that the death penalty is fair."); Stolberg, supra note
171 (discussing the expanding agenda of a North Carolina legislative commission studying
the death penalty); Robert Tanner, Ill. Give [sic] Death Penalty Critics Hope, Associated
Press, Feb. 1, 2000 (discussing the status of state moratorium proposals); ABA Legislative
Summary, supra note 252, at 1-3 (listing legislative proposals in 1999 and 2000 to declare
moratorium on, study, or abolish death penalty). Numerous commentators have noted
and contributed to important shifts in the death penalty debate. See, e.g., ABC This Week,
Roundtable Discussion of the Death Penalty Moratorium (ABC television broadcast, Apr.
9, 2000) (transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing events of week of
April 3, 2000, with regard to the death penalty, including (1) op-ed by conservative
columnist and long-time death penalty supporter expressing certainty that innocent
prisoners have been executed and calling for curbs on government power to impose the
death penalty, see George F. Will, Innocent On Death Row, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 2000, at
A23; (2) expression of support by another long-time death penalty supporter, Rev. Pat
Robertson, for temporary moratorium on executions because of its unfairness to the poor
and minorities; and (3) discovering that all four round table participants, representing a
wide range of the political spectrum, have sympathy for the moratorium idea, revealing a
"tectonic shift in the politics" of the death penalty); E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Right Gets Edgy
About Capital Punishment, Newsday, June 28, 2000, at A38 (describing "the willingness of
more and more conservatives to express their doubts about a policy that, after all, gives the
government the right to take a life" as "[t]he most important shift in the death penalty
debate": "Many who have made 'limited government' the cause of a lifetime are starting to
wonder how the death penalty advances that goal.");John Harwood, Bush May Be Hurt by
Handling of Death-Penalty Issue, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at A28 (noting "remarkable ..
absence of public protest" when Governor Ryan declared the Illinois moratorium on
executions and discerning "a national shift in the politics of capital punishment"); Steven
A. Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, § 4, at 3
(discussing various prominent conservatives' recent expressions of skepticism about the
death penalty); Elizabeth A. Palmer, The Death Penalty: Shifting Perspectives, 58 Cong. Q.
Wly. 1324, 1324 (June 3, 2000) ("Rep. HenryJ. Hyde is no bleeding heart liberal. So his
support for a fresh look at the fairness of the death penalty shows just how much the
debate has shifted in recent years."); Robert Reno, Support for Death Penalty Goes
Wobbly, The Des Moines Reg., June 12, 2000, at 7 (quoting statement by conservative
commentator and former political candidate Oliver North that "I think capital
punishment's day is done in this country. I don't think it's fairly applied."); Bruce Shapiro,
Capital Offense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2000 (Magazine), at 19 ("[D]eath row innocence
cases" have pushed "capital punishment ... [toward] a political tipping point.").
Public support for the death penalty has declined rather dramatically from 80% in
1994 to 66% in 2000 (a 19-year low), with public opposition having reached a 20-year high.
See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Think Death Penalty Applied Fairly
in this Country (visited Aug. 11, 2000) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
prOO0630.asp> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that a Gallup poll
conducted June 23-25, 2000, shows that 41% of Americans believe the death penalty is
applied unfairly; only 51% believe it is applied fairly; "28% of Americans support the death
penalty unconditionally, 37% support it with reservations, and 26% oppose it outright");
Frank Newport, Support for Death Penalty Drops to Lowest Level in 19 Years, Although
Still High at 66% (visited Aug. 11, 2000) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/
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Nonetheless, the proposals to tighten standards and penalties for illegal police and prosecutorial tactics in capital cases 265 that these concerns are generating are also unlikely by themselves to solve the overproduction problem. Law enforcement officials don't commit these
infractions for fun; they do so because of an incentive structure that
handsomely rewards each additional death sentence, however obtained.
And just as officials will be tempted to pursue additional death sentences
by crook if they can't get there by hook, they will be tempted to resort to
new means (crooked or otherwise) if existing ones are made more costly.
To work, reforms must instead force trial-level officials to bear the costs of
the undeserved capital sentences that result from all such tactics-legal as
well as illegal-and they must do so without imposing duplicative costs on
the post-trial phases.
B. Overhauled Incentives
To succeed, reform efforts must realign the incentives of all the key
players at the pre- and post-trial phases of the capital process. The goal is
threefold: (1) to make it possible for the capital defense bar from the
start to identify the "real" capital prosecutions in which their services are
needed and on which their resources should be concentrated; (2) in this
way to make it possible for states, and rational for defense lawyers, to
divert to the trial phase some of the resources they now lavish on the posttrial phases; and (3) in this way to make it costly for police and prosecutors to pursue marginal, and to obtain undeserved, capital judgments.
Although there is a role for nearly all the reforms discussed in the preceding section, the trick is to implement them all (and others) simultaneously,
with a commitment on all sides to a process that accurately identifies
from the start the few cases (many fewer than before) with demonstrated
facts that indubitably warrant the death penalty according to the particular jurisdiction's substantive lights.
The pitfalls along this road are immense, and I take it with great
trepidation. As is shown above, there are numerous temptations and opportunities for both sides to cheat-if only defensively, believing that the
other side will do so. Pro-death penalty ideologues will resist agreeing to
fewer death sentences and executions; front-line government actors will
resist giving up a political-capital machine that is the stuff of fairy tales;
anti-death penalty ideologues will resist a system with the avowed goal of
permitting some (even a small number of) executions; and anti-death
penalty lawyers will resist forsaking a post-conviction system that adds
eleven years on average to each of their clients' lives and overturns twothirds of their clients' death sentences. 266 Moreover, a sure-fire means of
pr000224.asp> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing survey results showing
drop in public support for the death penalty).
265. See supra notes 148-160 and accompanying text; infra note 289.
266. These lawyers will resist on behalf of each of their post-conviction clients, even if
they believe (which they likely will not) that the aggregate number of clients reaching the
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sabotaging the reforms will always be at hand, namely, a "compromise"
on virtually any variant of the partial measures discussed in the preceeding section. As is discussed there, under existing circumstances, the usual
political outcome of half a loaf is almost surely worse than no change at
all.
That trepidation prompts me to bind together all of the various parts
of my proposed solution into a single, presumptively unseverable package. That proposal is as follows.
Federal legislation would invite states to opt into a capital punishment system subject to ten requirements that are set out below. States

would sign a formal declaration to signify their opting-in.2 67 In return,
the law would permit states to suspend all state post-conviction remedies,

and would suspend all federal post-conviction remedies except time-limited federal circuit court review (or, if the circuit court decides an evidentiary hearing is required, time-limited federal district court review) of
claims alleging that the state violated one of the ten requirements. 2 68
post-conviction stage (albeit with less vulnerable capital sentences) will decline
substantially.
267. This declaration would make clear from the outset the contractual nature of the
state's undertaking, through which it agrees to fulfill its potentially quite costily obligations
(e.g., adequately compensating qualified lawyers; forsaking death sentences in cases in
which it fails to abide by one of the ten requirements, which may seem, at the time, like
mere "technicalities") in return for benefits that it concludes are worth those costs. Each
state may design its own declaration.
268. Time limits would consist of a six-month statute of limitations on filing, following
the end of direct review and certiorari proceedings, and a presumptive 10 month (oneyear, if a hearing is held) adjudication limit. See 2 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42,
§ 28.3d, at 1192 n.Ill (discussing federal court practice of treating such time limitations
on adjudication as nonmandatory); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional
Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 761, 798-810 (1997)
(discussing the constitutional reasons to make time limits on adjudication presumptive
only).
Certiorari review of all court of appeals (or district court) decisions would be
preserved. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996) (noting constitutional problems
that might arise if Supreme Court review of post-conviction proceedings in the lower
federal courts were barred).
Despite the suspension language, this proposal would not violate the Suspension
Clause because of the capacity that remains for meaningful post-trial review via the beefedup direct appeal certiorari process and via federal review of states' compliance with the 10
requirements. See 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra note 42, § 2.4e, at 83 n.326. The suspension
language is intentional, however. It indicates how much states would gain in the way of
reduced post-conviction litigation, adjudication, and "delay" if they opt into the proposed
regime. This proposed "carrot" contrasts sharply with AEDPA's puny and unsuccessful
inducement to states to opt into its regime of narrowed federal habeas review of capital
judgments in return for spending additional money on state post-conviction counsel. See
supra notes 54-74, 261 and accompanying text. For one thing, AEDPA made its most
inviting review-truncating reforms available "for free" to all states in all cases (capital and
noncapital), thus giving capital punishment states little reason to spend a lot more money
to secure relatively little additional truncation. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying
text. In addition, AEDPA encourages states to spend more money, not on trials, but on
state post-conviction proceedings, thus irrationally continuing to draw resources away from
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The remedies for more than de minimus violations of any of the ten re269
would be (1)
quirements in the process of securing a death sentence
automatic forfeiture of the death penalty and imposition of the highest
alternative sentence available under state law, and (2) imposition of the
costs of litigating and adjudicating the violation on the government entity
that committed it. The ten requirements, satisfaction of which would be
the state's responsibility to document, 2 70 are:
1. 120-day DeliberationPeriod. - The prosecutor must wait 120 days
after indictment before announcing a decision to prosecute the case capitally, at which time the lead prosecutor on any case charged capitally
must file a report with the district attorney, the state attorney general,
and the defense, justifying the capital charge. 27 1 The report must identrials. That taxpayers have been loath to move still further in the wrong direction is not
necessarily indicative of their willingness to spend additional resources on reforms that are
more likely to be productive.
The system of truncated review proposed here obviously cannot be applied to capital
judgements imposed under the preexisting regime. Because close to 4000 death row
inmates have judgements in that category as of now, see Figure 1, supra, their cases will
continue-potentially for many years to come, see supra notes 96, 219, 245 and
accompanying text-to draw large amounts of resources into the preexisting post-trial
review process and away from a new, trial-centered system. To shrink this backlog and
facilitate the transition to a new system, states could either (1) offer all capital inmates
awaiting review the chance to accept a lesser penalty in return for dropping their appeals
or, if that is thought to be too indiscriminate a windfall, (2) establish administrative
procedures for quickly indentifying the weaker casses for execution among those awaiting
review-perhaps in proportions roughly equal to the state's historical (e.g., post-Furman)
combined direct appeal, state post-conviction, and federal habeas reversal rate for capital
cases-and offer just those inmates the chance to avoid execution in return for droppinig
their appeals.
269. This component does not contemplate harmless error review. The question
would not be whether the violation affected the outcome, but simply whether any
requirement was more than minutely neglected.
270. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
271. This type of provision, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 250.40, 400.27, 470.30
(McKinney Supp. 2000), together with adequate funding for expert trial counsel, limited
the number of capital prosecutions in New York during the five-year period following
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1994 to 37, and limited the number of death
sentences during the period to five. See supra note 191; see also Raymond Bonner & Marc
Lacey, U.S. Plans Delay in First Execution in Four Decades, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2000, at Al
(explaining that before seeking the death penalty, U.S. Attorneys must secure approval
from the Attorney General via a formal procedure requiring prosecutors in every
potentially capital case "to send a memorandum to the Justice Department, with a
recommendation on whether or not [a death sentence] should be sought," which is
reviewed by a committee that reports to the Attorney General; the procedure gives defense
counsel a chance "to make a presentation to the federal prosecutor ... and then to the
Justice Department review committee, two levels of protection that do not exist for a
defendant in state capital cases"); Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 42 (noting practice among
Pittsburgh prosecutors of carefully weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances
before deciding whether to seek the death penalty); Willing, Prosecutor Determines, supra
note 138 (noting practice of Jacksonville, Florida, district attorney Harry Shorstein and
Austin, Texas, district attorney Ronnie Earl to forgo charging cases capitally except on the
advice of well-informed committees of assistant district attorneys); cf. Rosenberg, supra
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tify the facts making the offense death-eligible under state and federal
constitutional law, the aggravating circumstances to which the state will
be limited at trial, the reasons why the level of aggravation net of mitigation warrants a death sentence, and the evidence warranting near-certainty on each of those points. During the 120-day period, the district
attorney (a) must inform defense counsel of these same factors and give
counsel a meaningful opportunity to convince the district attorney to sette the case or at least not to proceed capitally, 2 72 and (b) must give any
members of the victim's family that the district attorney consults on the
charging decision written notice of (i) how frequently death sentences in
the United States, the state, the county, and the relevant trial court, and
ones handled by the relevant prosecuting office, have actually resulted in
execution; (ii) the average time from death sentence to execution in
those jurisdictions; and (iii) the error and risk rates defined in item 10
273
below.
2. Open Files. - The police and prosecution must make full disclosure to the defense before trial (and thereafter, if new information is obtained, through the trial, direct appeal, and post-conviction phases of the
case) of all relevant information known to them, inculpatory or exculpatory. 274 The disclosed information must include the criminal records of,
note 114, at 24 (describing Pennsylvania's Rule 352 requiring prosecutors to fill out a
special form in all cases they decide to pursue capitally, which explains their decision;
currently, the form is used only to inform defense counsel of the prosecutor's intentions,
but there is no reason why a similar document could not also be used for purposes of
statewide comparisons of prosecutorial practices).
272. On the important contribution that plea bargaining can make to the process of
avoiding miscarriages ofjustice, see Gross, Lost Lives, supra note 84, at 142-45; supra notes
90, 171 and accompanying text.
273. See Alex Fryer, Victim's Family Wrestles Death-Penalty Issue, Seattle Times, May
14, 2000, at BI (reporting conclusion of adult children of elderly Seattle murder victimwhom prosecutors said they would consult before deciding whether to seek a death
sentence and who said they favor the death penalty in the abstract and consider it the
appropriate punishment for their mother's killer-that they oppose a capital charge
"because it takes too long and costs too much," because "'[i]f [the defendant] does get the
death penalty, and it's 10 to 12 years of waiting, I don't know what good that does,'" and
because "'I used to wonder why it took 10 or 12 years, but it's obvious when you see all the
mistakes in [capital cases in] Illinois, you have to be careful'"); cf. Mintz, California
Gridlock, supra note 91 (quoting the brother of a murder victim of California death row
inmate Darrell Rich, 22 years after the killing: "We figured it would take a couple of years
for appeals .... Boy, were we wrong.").
274. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong, Ex-Justice Favors Identifying Wayward Prosecutors,
Chi. Trib., Jan. 11, 2000, at NI [hereinafter Armstrong, Wayward Prosecutors] (discussing
legislative testimony of a former Illinois Supreme Court Justice supporting "open-files
policies adopted by some [Illinois] state's attorney's offices.., under which prosecutors let
defense attorneys see all the investigative reports and other records in the prosecution's
files"). In describing to the United States Supreme Court, in Michael Williams v. Taylor,
120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000), his successful efforts to keep a capital prisoner from obtaining
potentially exculpatory information in state files, Donald R. Curry, Senior Assistant
Attorney General in charge of capital litigation in Virginia, exemplified the contribution
closed files and close-to-the-vest policies make to poorly informed decisionmaking at trial
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and must notify the defense about all criminal matters pending against,
the recent sentencing history of, all plea discussions with and benefits
2 75
afforded to, and the informing history of, all state witnesses.

and to extended litigation thereafter. Williams was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to die based almost exclusively on the testimony of Jeffrey Cruse. Cruse
admitted that he and Williams robbed and raped the victims, that he fired at least one shot
into the victims, and that he tried to pin the rape on Williams until serological analysis had
showed that he (Cruse) also raped the victim. Cruse nevertheless claimed that Williams
was the prime mover who fired all of the potentially fatal shots and that he, Cruse, had no
understanding with the state that he would avoid the death penalty (as he did) if he
testified against Williams. See Williams v. Taylor, 189 F.3d 421, 424, 428-29 (4th Cir.),
rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000). In his Supreme Court brief, Curry admits that at the time of
Cruse's sentencing following a guilty plea-which occurred between the dates when the
jury pronounced Williams' verdict of death and when Williams was formally sentencedWilliams' lead prosecutor received a state psychiatrist's report stating that Cruse had told
the psychiatrist before both trials that he was so drugged and drunk at the time of the
offense that he did not remember what he and Williams had done. See Brief of
Respondent, 2000 WL 126196, at *34-*38 nn.26-28, *46 n.38, Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct.
1479 (2000) (No. 99-6615). Despite obtaining this evidence that Cruse had told drastically
different stories about his memory of the killings to different government agents before
trial, the prosecutor recommended that the trial judge sentence Cruse to life
imprisonment, which the judge did. See id. at *43. And the prosecutor never informed
Williams or his attorney of the psychiatric report. See id. at *29. Instead, when Williams'
new lawyer asked Mr. Curry during state post-conviction proceedings to turn over all
psychiatric reports and other exculpatory evidence relating to Cruse and to make Cruse
available for counsel to interview, Mr. Curry responded (1) that because the proceeding no
longer was, technically speaking, a criminal case but instead was a "civil, habeas
proceeding," he had no obligation to-and would not-search for or turn over
exculpatory evidence in the state's possession; (2) that because the file in the case was the
product of a criminal investigation, he would follow the usual practice in criminal cases of
refusing to provide "informal discovery" of the sort that typically occurs in civil cases, and
would (as he successfully did) oppose all motions for discovery; and (3) "that Cruse is
incarcerated in an out-of-state location and that his location would not be disclosed to
Williams" or his counsel in order to protect Cruse from Williams. Id. at *34 n.26, *46 n.38.
275. See, e.g., Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (on
rehearing) (responding to reversal of double-murder conviction and death sentence due
to misuse of dubious jailhouse informant by adopting a rule requiring all prosecutors in
the state who intend to use the testimony of a jailhouse informant to disclose (1) the
informant's criminal background, (2) any deal made with the informant, (3) the alleged
confession by the defendant to the informant, and (4) all other cases in which the
informant supplied any information, and by requiring trial courts to give a strongly worded
cautionary jury instruction; court, however, recinds prior decision's additional
requirement of a reliability hearing before jailhouse informants would be permitted to
testify for the prosecution); Mills & Armstrong, Inside Informant, supra note 137
(reporting that, in the wake of a series of informant scandals in California, the Los Angeles
district attorney has "set up a clearinghouse to monitor and centralize information about
jailhouse informants and [has] required prosecutors to corroborate informant
statements"; the California courts also now require a "special instruction warning jurors to
view a jailhouse informant's testimony with skepticism"). Despite the presumptive
requirement that all evidence in the prosecution's hands be disclosed, there might be
some need for narrow exceptions for privileged or inculpatory evidence, where the public
interest in nondisclosure is compelling and the defendant's interest in disclosure is slight.
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At trial, the prosecution may not intro-

duce inculpatory statements made by the defendant while in custody unless the statements, and all interrogations leading up to them, were276videotaped and the videotapes have been turned over to the defense.
4. Adequate Defense Counsel and Support Services. -

States must (a) ad-

2 77

defense lawyers for indigent defendants for work
equately compensate
performed from the initial charging through trial, direct appeal, and the
filing of any timely post-trial motions based on innocence, 278 (b) select
lawyers from a roster of state or nationally "board-certified, experienced,
and continuously peer-reviewed" capital-punishment lawyers, 279 and (c)
adequately fund all reasonably necessary defense support services by independent professionals, including investigation, expert advice and testimony, and forensic (including DNA) analysis.
276. See Ryan Keith, Task Force on Capital Cases Calls for Videotaping of Suspects,
Chi. Trib., Mar. 16, 2000, at M6 (reporting on an Illinois Senate task force
recommendation that all police interrogations of suspects accused of serious felonies and
potentially capital offenses be videotaped); cf. supra note 151 and accompanying text
(giving examples of use of forced or manufactured confessions to secure capital
convictions).
277. A fee schedule would be set by the U.S. Department of Justice or the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
278. The existing federal provision mandating appointment and adequate funding
(at federal expense) of federal post-conviction lawyers in capital cases would be retained.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 848q-848r (1994).
279. See Carol Marbin Miller, Florida High Court Raises Standard for Death Row
Case Lawyers, Miami Daily Bus. Rev., Nov. 5, 1999, available at <www.floridabiz.com/
expcfm/display.cfm?id=2266> (discussing adoption by Florida Supreme Court of rules
setting minimum standards for defense attorneys in capital cases; lead capital defense
attorneys must have at least five years trial experience in criminal cases, including at least
nine jury trials in serious or complex matters and at least two capital cases; trial judges are
encouraged but not required to appoint two defense lawyers in each case); Maurice Possley
& Ken Armstrong, Revamp Urged in Handling of Capital Cases, Chi. Trib., Nov. 4, 1999, at
NI [hereinafter Possley & Armstrong, Revamp Urged] (reporting that at least a dozen
states "have established minimum standards for defense attorneys in capital cases," which
typically "require that at least two attorneys be appointed in capital cases and that they have
a certain number of years of experience in trying criminal matters"); supra note 191
(discussing provisions to assure competent capital representation in Colorado,
Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio); see also Mike Doming, Death
Penalty Reforms Gain Backers in D.C., Chi. Trib., Mar. 31, 2000, at NI [hereinafter
Doming, Reforms] (describing bipartisan support in the U.S. House of Representatives for
a bill, parallel to one proposed in the Senate by Patrick Leahy, to improve capital
defendants' access to evidence of innocence, adequate representation, and other
protective procedures); Mike Doming, Senator to Propose Death Row Safeguards, Chi.
Trib., Feb. 10, 2000, at NI [hereinafter Doming, Safeguards] (describing federal
legislation proposed by Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy that would, inter alia, give states
incentives to "require that indigent death penalty defendants be allowed a team of at least
two court-appointed attorneys" who "meet competency standards set by the U.S.
Administrative Office of the Courts"); Jack Elliot, Death Row Defense Bills Move Through
Legislature, Biloxi Sun Herald, Mar. 2, 2000, at A5 (discussing proposals in the Mississippi
legislature to provide state money to assist smaller Mississippi counties to bear the expense
of competent trial and state post-conviction representation in capital cases).
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5. Death-Neutral Guilt-PhaseJuries. - States may not use death-qualified juries at the guilt phase of capital trials.2 80 Although prosecutors
could continue to remove jurors who could or would not sentence anyone to die from the penalty phase jury, this reform would take away their
existing incentive to charge marginal cases capitally in order to secure a
death-qualified jury and in that way improve their chances of convicting
28 1
the defendant of a capital murder.
6. Truth in Sentencing. - Trial courts must (a) give jury instructions
(if timely requested by the defense) that fully and accurately inform the
jurors of the minimum length of time murderers must serve before being
eligible for parole; 28 2 (b) notifyjurors ahead of time that, if the verdict is
death, each will be required to state in court that it is his or her judgment
beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment;
and (c) forbear making statements or giving instructions suggesting that
the jurors' verdict will or may be reviewed or reconsidered by anyone else
or that any sentence they impose will or may be overturned or commuted. 283 Prosecutors also, of course, must forbear making arguments
that are inconsistent with any of these requirements.
7. Substantive State Court Review of CapitalJudgments. - On direct appeal, (a) state high courts must conduct meaningful, substantive, comparative proportionality review of all capital judgments in the state; 284 (b)
their review must be informed, inter alia, by periodic reports of the state
280. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text (describing the existing
practice of "death qualifying" juries in capital cases).
281. See id. (discussing the incentive to charge cases capitally in order to use death
qualification to improve the chances that the jury will convict). States might satisfy this
requirement by, for example, forgoing death qualification altogether, empaneling two
juries, one (non-death-qualified) to adjudicate guilt or innocence and another (deathqualified) to determine sentence, or empaneling juries with more than 12 non-deathqualified members with the intention of drawing lots to determine who deliberates on
guilt, then using the excess jurors to replace any death-scrupled jurors who are removed
prior to the sentencing trial. The cost of dual juries would be compensated by reductions
in expensive death qualification and other capitally focused jury selection procedures,
which would flow from the procedures suggested here.
282. This provision would extend the rule of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
154, 169-71 (1994), which currently applies only to life-without-parole states, to states that
make parole an option for defendants who are convicted of capital murder but are spared
a death sentence. See supra notes 203-209.
283. This provision would preserve the rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,
328-29 (1985), see supra note 210 and accompanying text, but would suspend the rule of
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983), which permits instructions on the
availability of executive clemency, see supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing
potentially misleading nature of clemency instructions).
284. Comparative proportionality review requires the reviewing court to evaluate
death sentences substantively by (a) discerning and listing the specific, objective criteria
that persistently-as well as those that only rarely-lead to capital sentences in the state,
(b) carefully scrutinizing whether each death sentence under review is consistent with
those criteria and is proportionate to sentences imposed in like cases, and (c) reversing
"outlier" sentences. See supra note 261 (discussing similar proposal by Steiker and
Steiker).
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attorney general using information in the deliberation-period reports described in item (1) above; (c) the trial prosecutor (or someone from her
office if she is no longer employed there) must serve as counsel of record
and must appear at oral argument; and (d) review must culminate in an
opinion documenting the result of the proportionality rule and reporting
the names of any defense attorney, prosecutor, or state judge held to be
responsible for any error found on appeal, including error deemed
285
harmless or nonprejudicial.
8. Meaningful FederalBackup Review on DirectAppeal. - In any case in
which the United States Supreme Court on direct review of a capital judgment discerns a substantial probability of a violation of federal law, it either must exercise its own power to grant certiorari or refer the case to
the relevant federal circuit court (which has the power, in turn, to refer
fact-based claims to the relevant district court) 286
9. Motions Based on Innocence. - States must permit the filing of motions for relief from a capital judgment based on newly discovered evidence of (a) innocence or (b) ineligibility for a death sentence at any
time while proceedings to review the judgment are permitted and
28 7
pending.
10. Disclosure of Error and Risk Rates. - For state and national comparative purposes, trial judges and district attorneys must publish and file
with the state attorney general and U.S. Department of Justice:
285. For discussion ofjudges and courts advocating and engaging in such reporting,
see Armstrong, Wayward Prosecutors, supra note 274 (reporting that "[r]etired Illinois
Supreme Court Justice John Nickels, a Republican who served on the state's highest court
as a representative of one of the state's most conservative judicial districts ..... testified [in
the Illinois House of Representatives] that he favors identifying wayward prosecutors by
name in appellate opinions" and "more routinely refer[ring]" prosecutorial and defense
counsel misconduct to Illinois's attorney discipline commission); Armstrong & Mills,
Conviction Overturned, supra note 138 (noting that after a unanimous Illinois Supreme
Court decision overturning the capital conviction of a police killer due to egregious
prosecutorial misconduct, the court "took the unusual step of naming the prosecutors and
defense attorneys, whom the court ... criticized for... unprofessional behavior," causing
'[
the First Assistant State's Attorney to acknowledge to the press that " t]he whole tone of
the opinion sends a message about the way trials should proceed'"); Armstrong & Possley,
Break Rules, supra note 137 (noting that "Ruth I. Abrams, a justice on Massachusetts'
highest court, has urged her colleagues to name prosecutors who commit serious
misconduct, citing the substantial costs shouldered by taxpayers, victims and others when a
case has to be retried").
286. Cf. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference Special Session, March
16-17, 1959, 1959 Ann. Rep. Jud. Conf. U.S. 287, 313 (1960) (discussing possibility of
improving federal scrutiny of state criminal convictions on direct appeal by empowering
the Supreme Court on certiorari to refer petitions "to [federal] district judges sitting as
special masters" where factual questions arise). Given uncertainties created by the
insufficiency of the record at this stage, a denial of certiorari would not count as a decision
on the merits, even of the claims on which certiorari was sought, notwithstanding the
Court's judgment that there was no substantial probability of a violation of federal law.
287. To prevent "sandbagging," states may require that such motions be filed within
some reasonable period after the discovery of the new evidence.
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a. the "error rates" (i.e., the rates at which capital judgments secured
or presided over by the reporting office or official are overturned on state
or federal judicial review of death sentences) of each prosecuting office,
lead trial prosecutor, trial judge, and appointed defense lawyer who took
part in the proceedings generating those judgments, and the type of error responsible for the reversal;
b. those same actors' "risk rates" (i.e., the rates at which state or federal reviewing courts deem each of the actors' practices unlawful or unethical, or prospectively ban the practice, without reversing the underlying judgment, as where an error is deemed waived, "harmless," or not
prejudicial);288 and
c. citations of the judicial opinions and the location of transcripts
and other public materials documenting errors, and risky behavior by
289
those same actors.
288. It is the responsibility of appellate courts, like any other supervisor of a complex
system, to detect and take steps to remedy patterns of error and misconduct. Crucial to
this effort is the collection of data revealing the error rates associated with each important
actor in the system. Because of the disciplining value of published error rates, see infra
note 292 and accompanying text, the courts should be obliged to report, and can achieve
much of the desired remedial effect simply by reporting, these rates publicly. Armstrong &
Possley describe the quixotic lengths to which individual appellate judges have had to go in
the past to compensate for the lack of institutional commitment to curbing, and
institutional memory about, repeated instances ofprosecutorial misconduct:
In his 18 years on the Illinois Appellate Court [from 1978 to 1996], Dom Rizzi
struggled to rein in those prosecutors who trampled upon defendants' rights.
And he struggled to get other justices to help.
Some lawyers considered Rizzi the court's conscience... who was willing, on
occasion, to rule by what he thought the law should be, not what it was. Some
prosecutors, though, derided him as a lawyer with little experience in the
trenches of criminal court.
Over the years, Rizzi tried repeatedly to get prosecutors to try cases fairly.
In some opinions he scolded the prosecution with acid language. In some
he mentioned prosecutors by name. During oral argument, he sometimes asked
prosecutors to relay the message to their supervisors that the appellate court was
getting fed up with certain tactics.
When Rizzi detected a troublesome pattern, he documented it. In one trial,
prosecutors said they couldn't provide the defense with tape-recorded police
interviews of a witness because they had lost the tape. By a 2-1 vote the court
upheld the conviction, but Rizzi dissented and listed 30 other Illinois casesincluding 23 in Cook County-where evidence had been lost or improperly
destroyed by prosecutors and police.
Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, supra note 137.
289. Cf. Dorning, Safeguards, supra note 279 (describing federal legislation proposed
by Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy that would, inter alia, give states incentives "to award
,reasonable damages' to prisoners sentenced to death but later found innocent").
Over the last year, both houses of the Illinois Legislature, the Illinois Supreme Court,
and, more recently, the Illinois Governor have empaneled committees to consider the
frequency with which innocent people have been sentenced to die there and to hold
hearings on possible solutions. Among the solutions proposed (with the proponent
indicated in parentheses) are many of those suggested in the above text, including that:
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These mechanisms have four principal functions. The first is public
signaling. The waiting period and decision that follows, as well as the
prosecutor's willingness to incur the special procedural costs of proceeding capitally (e.g., more skilled and determined opposition, enhanced
discovery, limitations on confessions and testimony by jailhouse informants, and dual jury panels if death-qualification is used), would signal to
defense lawyers (and, indeed, to police and prosecutors themselves) that
the case is a "real" capital prosecution. The jury instructions and postverdict polling would signal to jurors that a death verdict is their own
"real" responsibility and, where it is the case, that a nondeath verdict results in "real" jail time. 2 90 Prosecutors' capital-charging reports to the
(1) prosecutors be required to notify defense lawyers of their intent to seek the death
penalty within 120 days after arraignment of the defendant (supreme court committee;
Illinois Senate task force); (2) prosecutors and defense attorneys handling capital cases be
limited to members of a special capital litigation trial bar with special experience, training,
and ethical standards (supreme court committee; Illinois House Death Penalty task force)
or other minimum standards for defense counsel (Senate committee); (3) funding for
capital defense be increased (Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan; Cook County State's
Attorney Richard Devine); (4) police be required to videotape confessions and the
interrogation leading to them (Illinois Senate task force); (5) prosecutors follow an "openfiles policy" in capital cases (Illinois House committee); (6) upon a showing of good cause,
defense counsel be permitted to depose certain prosecution witnesses, including jalhouse
informants, prior to capital trials (supreme court committee; Illinois House committee);
(7) trial judges give instructions cautioning juries about reliance on jailhouse informant
testimony (members of and a witness before supreme court committee); (8) trial judges
receive enhanced training in the handling of scientific evidence (supreme court
committee); (9) appellate courts identify by name prosecutors who engage in misconduct
and more frequently refer them to bar disciplinary officials (a former Illinois Supreme
Court Justice testifying before House committee); (10) appellate courts automatically
reverse convictions upon proof that the prosecutor intentionally withheld exculpatory
evidence (a witness before Illinois House committee); and (11) a standing public
commission, modeled on one used in Canada, be created to investigate the causes of
capital convictions of individuals who turn out to be innocent (a witness before supreme
court committee). See Armstrong, Wayward Prosecutors, supra note 274; Ken Armstrong
& Steve Mills, String of Exonerations Spurs Legislative, Judicial Panels to Study Reforms,
Chi. Trib., Nov. 16, 1999, at N8; Keith, supra note 276 (discussed supra note 276); Steve
Mills & Ken Armstrong, Prosecutors Under Glare at Reform Hearing, Chi. Trib., Jan. 28,
2000, at NI; Evan Osnos & David Heinzmann, Death Penalty Remains an Option, Ryan's
Execution Halt Won't Deter Prosecutors, Chi. Trib., Jan. 31, 2000, at NI; Possley &
Armstrong, Revamp Urged, supra note 279; see also Dwight Arons, Getting Out of this
Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 2, 64-79 (1998) (proposing variety of reforms similar to some of
those advocated here in order "to ensure that only defendants most deserving of death are
prosecuted for capital crimes"); Mona Charen, DNA Tests Can Avert Awful Errors, Omaha
World-Herald, Feb. 16, 2000, at 26 ("The answer must be more care-not more
appeals ....
[for example, by] videotaping all interrogations, permitting access to postconviction DNA evidence and limiting executions to those cases where doubt is pretty
much non-existent should calm fears of committing irreversible mistakes.").
290. By increasing the costs, and lowering the number, of capital prosecutions, and by
making the imposition of the next-lowest sentence the automatic post-conviction penalty
for non-de-minimus violations of the 10 requirements, the proposal would encourage
lawmakers to adopt life without parole and other "real time" alternatives to a death
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state attorney general, that official's periodic reports to the state supreme
court, and that court's comparative proportionality decisions would continuously signal-in the process of continuously revising and updatingthe facts that do and do not typically warrant a death sentence in the
state, thus helping to unify standards and deter the current geographic
disparities in capital sentencing rates that plague many states. 29 1 And the
continuously peer-reviewed defense lawyer roster, the "error rate" and
"risk rate" reports, and appellate judges' "naming" of offending attorneys
and trial judges would inform victims, the public, the media, opposing
candidates for public office, and the singled-out individuals and their supervisors about the lawyers, judges, and prosecuting offices in the state
292
that are and are not competently performing their tasks.
The reforms' second principal function is efficient cost allocationmaking the relevant actors bear a greater share of the costs of their mistakes in charging and trying cases capitally, so that they more often refrain from making mistakes and thrusting a burden on others to catch
and cure them. Here, too, the flow of information is crucial. Under current conditions, prosecutors have strong incentives to hide information at
the trial stage, and post-conviction defense lawyers have strong incentives
to expend huge amounts of their own, the courts', and the public's resources and time searching for that information. 293 Under this proposal,
the various pretrial reporting and open-files policies-and, crucially, the
provision of defense lawyers skilled in marshaling the disclosed information before and at trial-would help caution prosecutors that their case
for death will appear no stronger than it actually is. Consequently, they
more often will face the stiff political, reputational, and professional costs
of losing at trial 294 when that is the deserved outcome. The post-trial
reporting, naming, and other feedback mechanisms (e.g., imposition of
court costs for adjudicated violations of the ten requirements; the defense counsel registry; and public, media, and supervisory access to statistics and evidence documenting mis- and malfeasance) will add other new
costs, which the truncated review process will more quickly and directly
impose on the offending actors. As importantly, the absence of most
forms of post-conviction review will force capital defense lawyers, via their
clients, to bear stiff penalties for back-loading their litigation effort, thus
295
truly forcing them to treat the trial as the "main event."
sentence, rather than using early-release sentences as the next-lowest option on the
assumption that most or all aggravated killings will receive death. See supra note 202 and
accompanying text (documenting relationship between enhanced quality of defense
lawyers and enhanced use of life without parole options in capital cases).
291. See supra notes 114, 140.
292. On the value of error-rate reporting, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 287, 299-301 (1998).
293. See, e.g., supra notes 136-162, 192-193, 240-249, 274 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
295. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
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The reforms' third function is to avoid increasing overall costs in the
process of rationalizing and reallocating them. Here the crucial reforms
are the elimination of all state post-direct-appeal review, the narrowing of
federal post-direct-appeal review to one court and to ten claims based on
relatively mechanical and objective requirements, and the strict limitation
of the time available for that review. The proposal would replace the
current four-to-six-court, five-to-fifteen-year state and federal post-conviction review process, which focuses on literally scores of vexing, fact-intensive mixed questions-e.g., whether confessions were voluntary 29 6 and
whether there is a reasonable probability that but for prosecutorial misconduct, attorney error, or jury misinstruction, the outcome of trial
would have been different 297-with a single federal court's eight-totwelve-month inquiry, which would focus on whether and when particular
reports were filed, and whether the ten well-specified procedures listed
above were followed.2 9 8 Although certain questions would require judg296. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990) (premising finding of
instructional error on question whether there is a reasonable probability that the
challenged instruction misled the jury); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985)
(basing suppression of evidence violations in part on whether there is a reasonable
probability that but for the government's suppression of evidence, the outcome of the trial
would have been different); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (premising
ineffective assistance of counsel on whether the defense attorney's performance was
unreasonable and, if so, whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient
performance, the outcome of trial would have been different).
298. The "well-specified" qualifier is meant to encourage the federal court inquiry to
focus on questions about procedures as to which a simple "yes" or "no" answer will usually
be possible, e.g., videotaping of confessions, notice of aggravating circumstances,
appointment of lawyers off of a specified list and compensation of them at a specified rate,
disclosure of the prosecutor's file, confinement of death qualification voir dire to the
sentencing phase, and use of specified instructions. The qualifier accordingly calls upon
the drafters of relevant legislation to make requirements as straightforward as possible.
The fact that requirements are straightforward will not assure that they will be seen as
more than "merely technical"; indeed, it may have the opposite effect. The question
remains, therefore, whether the contemplated system will be capable of bearing the strain
of controversial reversals that occur because the state violated a "technical" rule, for
example, by failing to give the required notice to a victim consulted at the charging stage.
That strain is limited in three ways. First, the state's "declaration" at the time of opting-in,
see supra note 267 and accompanying text, will have made clear that the state selfconsciously undertook to perform the relevant formalities for sound reasons of public
policy. The declaration thus will provide some of the explanation for the reversal and
enable the reversing court more effectively to share the onus of the reversal with the state.
Second, because the requirements are straightforward, violations should be relatively rare,
and blame will be easy to assign. Third, the cost of a violation will be limited in ways
described in the text following this footnote. All of this, of course, is simply to emphasize
the contractual nature of the states' decision to "opt-in." States can, of course, decline to
opt in and either be satisfied with the pre-existing system of weak trials but strong review
mechanisms-or, more likely-undertake their own reforms that avoid the "technical"
costs of the proposed system and achieve some or all of that system's benefits (and perhaps
others) while still providing enough due process to satisfy ongoing federal habeas corpus
scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. One such reform might be to: (1) abandon state post-
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ment-e.g., the sufficiency of a state's alternatives-to-death instruction
and its comparative proportionality review-that judgment could often
be made once for all cases in each state, in a single, lead decision. Thereafter, questions would arise only upon a state's substantial change in its
routine procedure or substantial deviation from the procedure in a particular case. In most cases, the relevant record would consist of a docket
sheet, a series of appended reports and requisitions, a procedural checklist, and a direct appeal decision. Most importantly, perhaps, the result of
finding a violation would not be a second trial and a second multi-court,
multi-year review process but, instead, automatic imposition of a life sentence and of litigation and adjudication costs on the wrongdoing
agency-in addition to the various "naming and shaming" and related
reporting remedies.
The proposed regime is one to which states would have the choice to
opt into-or not. Although partly designed to forestall Tenth Amendment objections, 299 this attribute serves a fourth and final function. It
would poignantly raise a question that each state would be impelled to
address systematically at all levels, local and statewide, and in a variety of
public forums up to and including the state's legislature and supreme
court: What kind of capital punishment system-if any-does the state
need and want, given the costs? Asking this question does not require the
states to give a particular answer. Some states might conclude that they
need a system of capital punishment as part of their criminal justice arsenal, but that they can improve the existing system by either opting into
the proposed reform or designing their own. 3 00 Other states might decide to maintain the existing system, in which case those states could
stand pat with the system described in Part II above, and stop complaining. Still other states might find that, when push comes to shove,
they do not rationally require a capital sentencing regime, given how expensive it is and how few cases it affects; they could suspend or abolish
the punishment.
CONCLUSION

Procedure affects substance, in capital punishment as elsewhere.
But the relationship is complex. Although there is considerable support
for the long-assumed trade-off of enhanced capital procedures against reduced executions, and vice versa, the hollowing out of capital procedures
at the trial level does not very effectively serve the state's substantive goal
conviction review altogether, (2) shift the saved resources to improved capital trials, and
(3) leave the kinds of claims typically resolved in state post-conviction proceedings (mainly,
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial suppression of evidence) to federal
habeas corpus proceedings in which the "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement is
waived.
299. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-20 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56, 187-88 (1992).
300. See supra note 298.
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of subjecting the deserving, and only the deserving, to the death penalty.
Conversely, the bloated capital procedures that currently characterize the
post-trial level have become crucial to the achievement of the state's substantive capital punishment goal of deciding who, justifiably, should live
and who should die. That our existing capital system hollows-out trial
level procedures, with adverse substantive consequences, then bloats posttrial procedures, with favorable substantive effects, does not, however,
mean that the system successfully accommodates procedure and substance, or even that it operates with a scintilla of rationality. Quite the
contrary. In operating in this fashion, the system gives trial-level officials
a political-capital machine that is as inexhaustible and costless for themand as conducive to the kinds and quantities of serious error on which
their anti-death-penalty opponents thrive at the post-trial level-as it is
irrational and expensive for everyone else, including taxpayers, victims,
appellate courts, state-level officials, and the incessant trickle of wrongly
condemned men and women.
More particularly, by parceling out substantial political and other rewards to trial-level officials on a strictly per-death-sentence basis, while
enabling them to displace the costs of faulty death sentences onto others,
the current death penalty system encourages those officials to generate as
many death verdicts as they can, even in marginal or inappropriate cases,
often through corner-cutting and manipulation. This, in turn, increases
the likelihood of faulty verdicts whose costs others-wrongly condemned
defendants, frustrated victims of crime, appellate courts, and taxpayers
throughout the state-must bear. At the same time, by inflating the number of capital cases at the trial level, while requiring an elaborate appeals
process to catch the flaws that infect many capital verdicts, the system
encourages anti-death penalty lawyers to neglect trials and concentrate
on post-trial representation that benefits them and their clients (and also,
ironically, their pro-death penalty antagonists 30 1) but imposes huge costs
on the public. Diverting defense resources from trial, in turn, facilitates
official corner-cutting and manipulation, inducing more faulty death
sentences, further drawing anti-death penalty lawyers to the easy pickings
at the post-trial stage, and imposing higher public costs. Finally, by simultaneously benefiting trial-focused pro-death penalty officials and appellate-focused anti-death penalty lawyers, the system assures that its trustees
and watchdogs are opposed to serious change.
301. Death penalty supporters often point to high reversal rates as proof that the
review system "works" to catch error. See, e.g., Frank Davies, Two-Thirds of Death
Sentences Derailed, Study Finds Court System Nationwide Saddled with Weight of its Own
Mistakes, The Record (Northern New Jersey), June 12, 2000, at 1 (quoting "a spokesman
for Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida, who supports the death penalty, [saying that] high error rates
[in American death verdicts] show that 'an extensive appeals procedure, with adequate
due process, works in reviewing cases'"); supra note 238. The senselessness ofjury-rigging
an error-generating machine at the trial level to an error-detecting machine on appealand the riskiness of using procedurally focused error-detection mechanisms to catch the
substantive mistakes that capital trials often produce-shows the system does not "work. "
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For these reasons, the solution to the current death penalty crisis is
not a commitment to more or fewer procedures, or to different substantive goals. The solution is a comprehensive overhaul of the procedures
we have that realigns the relevant actors' incentives and leads, in a costeffective way, to the achievement of existing substantive goals. Toward
that end, this Article outlines a ten-point plan for (1) narrowing the
range of cases that are charged capitally, (2) carefully testing capital
charges at trial, and (3) narrowing post-trial review of the fewer and more
reliable capital sentences that result.
Imagining a reformed system is easy. Securing its adoption is not.
The reason is suggested by a question at the beginning of this Article:
Who chose this system? The problem is that no one chose it. For years, no
one (or ones) with a capacity to envision and rationally "choose" a system
of imposing and reviewing capital sentences as a whole-irrespective of
the part of the system that is closest to home-has paid attention to the
system we actually have. 30 2 As a result, trial-level officials have been free
to turn their part of the system into a machine for generating political
capital on a per-death-sentence basis, with the inevitable byproduct of
enough error to fuel the anti-death penalty bar's equally potent machine
for generating post-trial capital on a per-reversalbasis. Because those actors are unlikely to move separately or together to shut down mechanisms
that, in tandem, are a perpetual motion machine for benefiting each of
them, the crucial question is whether policymnakers with a broader perspective or the public at large will move to reclaim control and choose a
different system. The traditional collective action story suggests they will
not.30 3 The currently unfolding story of bipartisan discontent with the
existing system suggests they might.30 4 The aim of this Article is to foster
the choice by fomenting the discontent.
302. Several reasons for this inattention come to mind: (1) It does not seem possible
to take on the capital system without taking on the entire criminal justice system-an
unattractive reform target, given its size and centrality-because the significance of
differences between the systems, such as less frequent plea bargaining and more frequent
appeals in capital cases, is easy to miss. (2) The constituencies with a deep interest in the
capital system's overall rationality-criminal defendants and relatives of murder victimslack political power and have to rely on surrogates who benefit from the system's problems.
(3) Other collective action problems enable those same opposed sets of surrogates, each of
which is cohesive and has a strong interest in the current system, to out maneuver the
larger and less cohesive body of citizens who have individually weaker (if collectively more
powerful) interests in the system. (4) The deep-seated and unresolvable moral differences
that underlie the capital punishment debate dispose citizens to trust surrogates who share
their beliefs, irrespective of conflicting interests, and to dismiss those who raise alarms as
motivated by incompatible beliefs, or to despair of reform in the absence of unattainable
moral agreement. (5) The Supreme Court's treatment of the death penalty as an insular
matter of constitutional law has encouraged policymakers to cede the issue to the courts.
303. See supra note 302.
304. See supra notes 248-264 and accompanying text.

